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Vineeth Satheeskumar Varma

Publications and source records attributed to Vineeth Satheeskumar Varma.

7 recordsLinked to original sources

Robust Action Clusters and Cascades in Opinion Dynamics with Heterogeneous Action Thresholds

We study the preservation and propagation of public actions in networks whose agents hold continuous private opinions. Agents update their opinions from their neighbors' observed actions and express them through action rules whose thresholds differ across agents. We characterize groups of agents that preserve a given common action regardless of the outsiders' actions. We call such a group, paired with that action, a robust action cluster. We show that a group is a robust action cluster for that action if and only if each member places enough of its influence weight on the group, where the required influence depends on the member's own action rule. We further give a sufficient condition under which an agent outside the cluster permanently adopts the cluster's action, and we iterate it to obtain a cascade of agents that are guaranteed to adopt that action. Finally, numerical examples show that replacing heterogeneous thresholds by their mean can change both the propagation of an action and the presence of robust action clusters.

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Pricing for Information Revelation in Demand Response: A Strategic Communication Approach

Demand response aggregators require consumers' private flexibility information to dispatch loads efficiently. Yet self-interested consumers have incentives to misreport it. This paper investigates how much information heterogeneous consumers can credibly convey through nonbinding, unverifiable reports, and how a pre-announced retail tariff can improve this revelation. We model this interaction as a multi-sender strategic communication game with state-dependent bias, using the cheap-talk framework. The aggregator maximizes social welfare, and consumers have private valuations and quadratic payoffs. Closed-form conditions identify when the set of dispatched consumers is invariant to the reports. Under these conditions, reporting incentives decouple into independent single-sender subgames. We derive a closed-form uniform tariff that simultaneously minimizes the mean-squared strategic bias of all dispatched consumers. In this regime, the welfare loss relative to full communication is expressed as a weighted sum of residual posterior variances, showing that every equilibrium weakly improves expected social welfare over no communication. Numerical studies support the theoretical results and show that, when consumers coordinate on informative equilibria, strategic communication with the proposed bias-minimizing tariff recovers most of the full-communication welfare gain over no communication.

cs.GT↗

Recursive Neighbor Pruning: Decentralized Community Detection with Certified Behavior from Saturated Opinion Dynamics

Detecting communities, i.e., groups of densely connected nodes, usually requires a central entity that knows the whole network. We study Recursive Neighbor Pruning (RNP), a fully decentralized alternative inspired by social learning. Each agent holds a private opinion but only shows its neighbors a coarse public action, namely its opinion amplified and clipped to a fixed range. Agents repeatedly move their opinion toward the actions of their neighbors and, once opinions settle, drop the links with neighbors whose action has the opposite sign. Repeating this procedure on the remaining network splits it into communities, without any agent knowing the network or the number of communities. We use tools from nonlinear control to characterize this behavior. We show that splitting requires the amplification to exceed a threshold set by how strongly the network is bottlenecked. We also show that a group in which every member has enough of its links inside the group can no longer be split once its members agree, and that a single run separates such groups exactly when started from suitable opinions. Finally, we bound the number of runs and messages. On two standard families of synthetic networks, RNP is as accurate as the best centralized method as long as each node has fewer than about forty percent of its links outside its community, and it fails close to the value predicted by our analysis. It is more accurate than two decentralized competitors below this level, but exchanges many more messages.

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Social learning community detection with nonlinear interaction

Conventional community detection requires centralized network data, making it unsuitable for distributed or privacy-preserving systems. In this paper, we demonstrate that macroscopic graph partitioning can emerge purely from strictly local, privacy preserving interactions driven by social learning. By reframing clustering as a symmetry-breaking process within nonlinear opinion dynamics, we show that exchanging saturated state dependent signal (like public actions) forces a network to naturally fracture along its sparsest cuts. We mathematically establish the spectral conditions under which dense core communities lock into stable, polarized states, robustly resisting external influence. To apply this mechanism, we propose three decentralized algorithms, leading up to the Score-based Edge Reliability (SER) framework. By evaluating network ties across multiple independent discussion topics, SER statistically bypasses the errors of traditional greedy bisections and naturally isolates structurally ambiguous frontier nodes. Validations on the ABCD benchmark and the real-world Ngogo chimpanzee network confirm that our fully decentralized approach matches the accuracy of globally optimized heuristics (e.g., Louvain, Leiden) up to a theoretical limit of detectable graphs.

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Strategic Gaussian Signaling under Linear Sensitivity Mismatch

We analyze Stackelberg Gaussian signaling games where the encoder and decoder have a linear sensitivity mismatch. Unlike the standard additive-bias model, a sensitivity mismatch means the encoder prefers the decoder to track a linear transformation of the state rather than a shifted one. We derive the equilibrium structure for both noiseless (cheap-talk) and noisy signaling channels. In the noiseless case, the equilibrium admits a spectral characterization: the encoder transmits information only along eigenspaces associated with the negative eigenvalues of a mismatch matrix. In the noisy regime, we derive analytical thresholds for informative signaling, showing that communication collapses if the sensitivity mismatch or transmission cost exceeds a channel-dependent threshold.

cs.GT↗

From Consensus to Robust Clustering: Multi-Agent Systems with Nonlinear Interactions

This paper establishes a theoretical framework to describe the transition from consensus to stable clustering in multi-agent systems with nonlinear, cooperative interactions. We first establish a sharp threshold for consensus. For a broad class of non-decreasing, Lipschitz-continuous interactions, an explicit inequality linking the interaction's Lipschitz constant to the second-largest eigenvalue of the normalized adjacency matrix of the interaction graph confines all system equilibria to the synchronization manifold. This condition is shown to be a sharp threshold, as its violation permits the emergence of non-synchronized equilibria. We also demonstrate that such clustered states can only arise if the interaction law itself possesses specific structural properties, such as unstable fixed points. For the clustered states that emerge, we introduce a formal framework using Input-to-State Stability (ISS) theory to quantify their robustness. This approach allows us to prove that the internal cohesion of a cluster is robust to perturbations from the rest of the network. The analysis reveals a fundamental principle: cluster coherence is limited not by the magnitude of external influence, but by its heterogeneity across internal nodes. This unified framework, explaining both the sharp breakdown of consensus and the quantifiable robustness of the resulting modular structures, is validated on Zachary's Karate Club network, used as a classic benchmark for community structure.

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A Stackelberg viral marketing design for two competing players

A Stackelberg duopoly model in which two firms compete to maximize their market share is considered. The firms offer a service/product to customers that are spread over several geographical regions (e.g., countries, provinces, or states). Each region has its own characteristics (spreading and recovery rates) of each service propagation. We consider that the spreading rate can be controlled by each firm and is subject to some investment that the firm does in each region. One of the main objectives of this work is to characterize the advertising budget allocation strategy for each firm across regions to maximize its market share when competing. To achieve this goal we propose a Stackelberg game model that is relatively simple while capturing the main effects of the competition for market share. {By characterizing the strong/weak Stackelberg equilibria of the game, we provide the associated budget allocation strategy.} In this setting, it is established under which conditions the solution of the game is the so-called ``winner takes all". Numerical results expand upon our theoretical findings and we provide the equilibrium characterization for an example.

cs.GT↗