arXiv subjects

Vineeth Satheeskumar Varma

Publications and source records attributed to Vineeth Satheeskumar Varma.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Social learning community detection with nonlinear interaction

Conventional community detection requires centralized network data, making it unsuitable for distributed or privacy-preserving systems. In this paper, we demonstrate that macroscopic graph partitioning can emerge purely from strictly local, privacy preserving interactions driven by social learning. By reframing clustering as a symmetry-breaking process within nonlinear opinion dynamics, we show that exchanging saturated state dependent signal (like public actions) forces a network to naturally fracture along its sparsest cuts. We mathematically establish the spectral conditions under which dense core communities lock into stable, polarized states, robustly resisting external influence. To apply this mechanism, we propose three decentralized algorithms, leading up to the Score-based Edge Reliability (SER) framework. By evaluating network ties across multiple independent discussion topics, SER statistically bypasses the errors of traditional greedy bisections and naturally isolates structurally ambiguous frontier nodes. Validations on the ABCD benchmark and the real-world Ngogo chimpanzee network confirm that our fully decentralized approach matches the accuracy of globally optimized heuristics (e.g., Louvain, Leiden) up to a theoretical limit of detectable graphs.

cs.SI↗

arXiv2026

Strategic Gaussian Signaling under Linear Sensitivity Mismatch

We analyze Stackelberg Gaussian signaling games where the encoder and decoder have a linear sensitivity mismatch. Unlike the standard additive-bias model, a sensitivity mismatch means the encoder prefers the decoder to track a linear transformation of the state rather than a shifted one. We derive the equilibrium structure for both noiseless (cheap-talk) and noisy signaling channels. In the noiseless case, the equilibrium admits a spectral characterization: the encoder transmits information only along eigenspaces associated with the negative eigenvalues of a mismatch matrix. In the noisy regime, we derive analytical thresholds for informative signaling, showing that communication collapses if the sensitivity mismatch or transmission cost exceeds a channel-dependent threshold.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Pricing for Information Revelation in Demand Response: A Strategic Communication Approach

Many smart grid frameworks, such as demand response programs, require accurate information about consumers' parameters (e.g., flexibility) at the aggregator side to optimize grid operations. Existing works typically rely on perfect information assumptions or complex incentive-compatible mechanisms; however, in voluntary settings, and in the presence of strategic consumers, possibly implemented by automated intelligent agents, private parameters may be misreported due to strategic incentives. We analyze this communication setting using cheap-talk game theory, delivering four key insights. First, the nontrivial scenario of multiple strategic transmitters (consumers) turns out to be tractable for the case study of interest: we prove that complex strategic interactions among multiple consumers decouple into independent subgames. Second, we demonstrate that a pre-announced retail price can be exploited as a design lever to control the information revealed by the consumers and therefore the overall system efficiency. Third, we derive a closed-form expression for the optimal uniform price that maximizes information revelation. Finally, we characterize the equilibrium structure to identify when communication is informative. Simulations show that a properly designed price for the communication scheme can recover up to 95% of the ideal system utility (i.e., under perfect information reporting), whereas a price-unaware choice leads to significant losses in social welfare.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

From Consensus to Robust Clustering: Multi-Agent Systems with Nonlinear Interactions

This paper establishes a theoretical framework to describe the transition from consensus to stable clustering in multi-agent systems with nonlinear, cooperative interactions. We first establish a sharp threshold for consensus. For a broad class of non-decreasing, Lipschitz-continuous interactions, an explicit inequality linking the interaction's Lipschitz constant to the second-largest eigenvalue of the normalized adjacency matrix of the interaction graph confines all system equilibria to the synchronization manifold. This condition is shown to be a sharp threshold, as its violation permits the emergence of non-synchronized equilibria. We also demonstrate that such clustered states can only arise if the interaction law itself possesses specific structural properties, such as unstable fixed points. For the clustered states that emerge, we introduce a formal framework using Input-to-State Stability (ISS) theory to quantify their robustness. This approach allows us to prove that the internal cohesion of a cluster is robust to perturbations from the rest of the network. The analysis reveals a fundamental principle: cluster coherence is limited not by the magnitude of external influence, but by its heterogeneity across internal nodes. This unified framework, explaining both the sharp breakdown of consensus and the quantifiable robustness of the resulting modular structures, is validated on Zachary's Karate Club network, used as a classic benchmark for community structure.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2023

A Stackelberg viral marketing design for two competing players

A Stackelberg duopoly model in which two firms compete to maximize their market share is considered. The firms offer a service/product to customers that are spread over several geographical regions (e.g., countries, provinces, or states). Each region has its own characteristics (spreading and recovery rates) of each service propagation. We consider that the spreading rate can be controlled by each firm and is subject to some investment that the firm does in each region. One of the main objectives of this work is to characterize the advertising budget allocation strategy for each firm across regions to maximize its market share when competing. To achieve this goal we propose a Stackelberg game model that is relatively simple while capturing the main effects of the competition for market share. {By characterizing the strong/weak Stackelberg equilibria of the game, we provide the associated budget allocation strategy.} In this setting, it is established under which conditions the solution of the game is the so-called ``winner takes all". Numerical results expand upon our theoretical findings and we provide the equilibrium characterization for an example.

cs.GT↗