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Vishisht Srihari Rao

Publications and source records attributed to Vishisht Srihari Rao.

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Deep Learning Meets Mechanism Design: Key Results and Some Novel Applications

Mechanism design is essentially reverse engineering of games and involves inducing a game among strategic agents in a way that the induced game satisfies a set of desired properties in an equilibrium of the game. Desirable properties for a mechanism include incentive compatibility, individual rationality, welfare maximisation, revenue maximisation (or cost minimisation), fairness of allocation, etc. It is known from mechanism design theory that only certain strict subsets of these properties can be simultaneously satisfied exactly by any given mechanism. Often, the mechanisms required by real-world applications may need a subset of these properties that are theoretically impossible to be simultaneously satisfied. In such cases, a prominent recent approach is to use a deep learning based approach to learn a mechanism that approximately satisfies the required properties by minimizing a suitably defined loss function. In this paper, we present, from relevant literature, technical details of using a deep learning approach for mechanism design and provide an overview of key results in this topic. We demonstrate the power of this approach for three illustrative case studies: (a) efficient energy management in a vehicular network (b) resource allocation in a mobile network (c) designing a volume discount procurement auction for agricultural inputs. Section 6 concludes the paper.

cs.GT↗

Deep Learning Based Auction Design for Selling Agricultural Produce through Farmer Collectives to Maximize Nash Social Welfare

This paper is motivated by the need to design a robust market mechanism to benefit farmers (producers of agricultural produce) as well as buyers of agricultural produce (consumers). Our proposal is a volume discount auction with a Farmer Collective (FC) as the selling agent and high volume or retail consumers as buying agents. An FC is a cooperative of farmers coming together to harness the power of aggregation and economies of scale. Our auction mechanism seeks to satisfy fundamental properties such as incentive compatibility and individual rationality, and an extremely relevant property for the agriculture setting, namely, Nash social welfare maximization. Besides satisfying these properties, our proposed auction mechanism also ensures that certain practical business constraints are met. Since an auction satisfying all of these properties exactly is a theoretical impossibility, we invoke the idea of designing deep learning networks that learn such an auction with minimal violation of the desired properties. The proposed auction, which we call VDA-SAP (Volume Discount Auction for Selling Agricultural Produce), is superior in many ways to the classical VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism in terms of richness of properties satisfied and further outperforms other baseline auctions as well. We demonstrate our results for a realistic setting of an FC selling perishable vegetables to potential buyers.

cs.GT↗