arXiv subjects

Vladimir Gurvich

Publications and source records attributed to Vladimir Gurvich.

At least 55 records · Page 3Linked to original sources

arXiv2019

On the Sprague-Grundy function of compound games

The classical game of {\sc Nim} can be naturally extended and played on an arbitrary hypergraph $\cH \subseteq 2^V \setminus \{\emptyset\}$ whose vertices $V = \{1, \ldots, n\}$ correspond to piles of stones. By one move a player chooses an edge $H$ of $\cH$ and reduces arbitrarily all piles $i \in H$. In 1901 Bouton solved the classical {\sc Nim} for which $\cH = \{\{1\}, \ldots, \{n\}\}$. In 1910 Moore introduced and solved a more general game $k$-{\sc Nim}, for which $\cH = \{H \subseteq V \mid |H| \leq k\}$, where $1 \leq k < n$. In 1980 Jenkyns and Mayberry obtained an explicit formula for the Sprague-Grundy function of Moore's {\sc Nim} for the case $k+1 = n$. Recently it was shown that the same formula works for a large class of hypergraphs. In this paper we study combinatorial properties of these hypergraphs and obtain explicit formulas for the Sprague-Grundy functions of the conjunctive and selective compounds of the corresponding hypergraph {\sc Nim} games.

math.CO↗

arXiv2018

Characterizing and decomposing classes of threshold, split, and bipartite graphs via 1-Sperner hypergraphs

A hypergraph is said to be $1$-Sperner if for every two hyperedges the smallest of their two set differences is of size one. We present several applications of $1$-Sperner hypergraphs and their structure to graphs. In particular, we consider the classical characterizations of threshold and domishold graphs and use them to obtain further characterizations of these classes in terms of $1$-Spernerness, thresholdness, and $2$-asummability of their vertex cover, clique, dominating set, and closed neighborhood hypergraphs. Furthermore, we apply a decomposition property of $1$-Sperner hypergraphs to derive decomposition theorems for two classes of split graphs, a class of bipartite graphs, and a class of cobipartite graphs. These decomposition theorems are based on certain matrix partitions of the corresponding graphs, giving rise to new classes of graphs of bounded clique-width and new polynomially solvable cases of several domination problems.

math.CO↗

arXiv2018

Decomposing 1-Sperner hypergraphs

A hypergraph is Sperner if no hyperedge contains another one. A Sperner hypergraph is equilizable (resp., threshold) if the characteristic vectors of its hyperedges are the (minimal) binary solutions to a linear equation (resp., inequality) with positive coefficients. These combinatorial notions have many applications and are motivated by the theory of Boolean functions and integer programming. We introduce in this paper the class of $1$-Sperner hypergraphs, defined by the property that for every two hyperedges the smallest of their two set differences is of size one. We characterize this class of Sperner hypergraphs by a decomposition theorem and derive several consequences from it. In particular, we obtain bounds on the size of $1$-Sperner hypergraphs and their transversal hypergraphs, show that the characteristic vectors of the hyperedges are linearly independent over the reals, and prove that $1$-Sperner hypergraphs are both threshold and equilizable. The study of $1$-Sperner hypergraphs is motivated also by their applications in graph theory, which we present in a companion paper.

math.CO↗

arXiv2018

Sprague-Grundy Function of Symmetric Hypergraphs

We consider a generalization of the classical game of $NIM$ called hypergraph $NIM$. Given a hypergraph $\cH$ on the ground set $V = \{1, \ldots, n\}$ of $n$ piles of stones, two players alternate in choosing a hyperedge $H \in \cH$ and strictly decreasing all piles $i\in H$. The player who makes the last move is the winner. Recently it was shown that for many classes of hypergraphs the Sprague-Grundy function of the corresponding game is given by the formula introduced originally by Jenkyns and Mayberry (1980). In this paper we characterize symmetric hypergraphs for which the Sprague-Grundy function is described by the same formula.

math.CO↗

arXiv2018

On the Sprague-Grundy Function of Tetris Extensions of Proper {\sc Nim}

Given a hypergraph $\cH \subseteq 2^I \setminus \{\emptyset\}$ on the ground set $I = \{1, \ldots, n\}$, we assign to each $i \in I$ a nonnegative integer $x_i$, that is a pile of $x_i$ tokens, and consider the following generalization of the classical game of {\sc Nim}: Two players alternate turns. In a move a player chooses an arbitrary edge $H \in \cH$ and reduces all piles $i \in H$. The player who is out of moves loses. We call the obtained game hypergraph {\sc Nim}. Such a game is called proper {\sc Nim}, when $\cH=2^I \setminus\{I,\emptyset\}$ is the family of all proper subsets of $I$. Jenkyns and Mayberry \cite{JM80} described the Sprague-Grundy (or SG in short) function of these games. In this paper we introduce Tetris extensions of hypergraph {\sc Nim}, and obtain a closed formula for the SG functions of the extensions of proper {\sc Nim}, when $n\geq 3$. Surprisingly, the case of $n=2$ is much more complicated. For this case we only suggest several partial results and conjectures.

math.CO↗

arXiv2017

Monotone bargaining is Nash-solvable

Given two finite ordered sets $A = \{a_1, \ldots, a_m\}$ and $B = \{b_1, \ldots, b_n\}$, introduce the set of $m n$ outcomes of the game $O = \{(a, b) \mid a \in A, b \in B\} = \{(a_i, b_j) \mid i \in I = \{1, \ldots, m\}, j \in J = \{1, \ldots, n\}$. Two players, Alice and Bob, have the sets of strategies $X$ and $Y$ that consist of all monotone non-decreasing mappings $x: A \rightarrow B$ and $y: B \rightarrow A$, respectively. It is easily seen that each pair $(x,y) \in X \times Y$ produces at least one {\em deal}, that is, an outcome $(a,b) \in O$ such that $x(a) = b$ and $y(b) = a$. Denote by $G(x,y) \subseteq O$ the set of all such deals related to $(x,y)$. The obtained mapping $G = G_{m,n}: X \times Y \rightarrow 2^O$ is a game correspondence. Choose an arbitrary deal $g(x,y) \in G(x,y)$ to obtained a mapping $g : X \times Y \rightarrow O$, which is a game form. We will show that each such game form is tight and, hence, Nash-solvable, that is, for any pair $u = (u_A, u_B)$ of utility functions $u_A : O \rightarrow \mathbb R$ of Alice and $u_B: O \rightarrow \mathbb R$ of Bob, the obtained monotone bargaining game $(g, u)$ has at least one Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Moreover, the same equilibrium can be chosen for all selections $g(x,y) \in G(x,y)$. We also obtain an efficient algorithm that determines such an equilibrium in time linear in $m n$, although the numbers of strategies $|X| = \binom{m+n-1}{m}$ and $|Y| = \binom{m+n-1}{n}$ are exponential in $m n$. Our results show that, somewhat surprising, the players have no need to hide or randomize their bargaining strategies, even in the zero-sum case.

math.CO↗

arXiv2017

Generalizing Gale's theorem on backward induction and domination of strategies

In 1953 Gale noticed that for every n-person game in extensive form with perfect information modeled by a rooted treesome special Nash equilibrium in pure strategies can be found by an algorithm of successive elimination of leaves, which is now called backward induction. He also noticed the same procedure, performed for the normal form of this game, turns into successive elimination of dominated strategies of the players that results in a single strategy profile (x_1,..., x_n), which is called a domination equilibrium (DE) and appears to be a Nash-equilibrium (NE) too. In other words, the game in normal form obtained from a positional game with perfect information is dominance-solvable (DS) and also Nash-solvable (NS). Yet, an arbitrary game in normal form may be not DS. We strengthen Gale's results as follows. Consider several successive eliminations of dominated strategies that begins with X = X_1 x ... x X_n and ends in X' = X'_1 x ... x X'_n. We will call X' a D-box of X. Our main (but obvious) lemma claims that for any i =1,..., n} and for any strategy x_i in X_i its projection to a D-box X' is dominated by a strategy x'_i in X'_i. It follows that any DE is an NE and, hence, DS implies NS. It is enough to apply the lemma in case when X' consists of a single strategy profile. The same lemma implies that the domination procedure is well-defined. A D-box X' is called terminal if it is domination-free, that is, it contains no pair of strategies such that one of them is dominated by the other. Any two terminal D-boxes X' and X" of X are equal. More precisely, there exist $n$ permutations π= (π_1, ..., π_n)$, with π_i : X_i to X_i for i in I, that transform X' into X", that is, π(X') = X" and the payoffs are respected. We also recall some published results on dominance-solvable game forms.

math.CO↗

arXiv2017

Backward induction in presence of cycles

For the classical backward induction algorithm, the input is an arbitrary $n$-person positional game with perfect information modeled by a finite acyclic directed graph (digraph) and the output is a profile $(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ of pure positional strategies that form some special subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. We extend this algorithm to work with digraphs that may have directed cycles. Each digraph admits a unique partition into strongly connected components, which will be treated as the outcomes of the game. Such a game will be called a {\em deterministic graphical multistage}(DGMS) game. If we identify the outcomes corresponding to all strongly connected components, except terminal positions, we obtain the so-called {\em deterministic graphical}(DG) games, which are frequent in the literature. The outcomes of a DG game are all terminal positions and one special outcome $c$ that is assigned to all infinite plays. We modify the backward induction procedure to adapt it for the DGMS games. However, by doing so, we lose two important properties: the modified algorithm always outputs a {\em Nash equilibrium} (NE) only when $n = 2$ and, even in this case, this NE may be not {\em subgame perfect}. (Yet, in the zero-sum case it is.) The lack of these two properties is not a fault of the algorithm, just (subgame perfect) Nash equilibria in pure positional strategies may fail to exist in the considered game. {\bf Keywords:} deterministic graphical (multistage) game, game in normal and in positional form, saddle point, Nash equilibrium, Nash-solvability, game form, positional structure, directed graph, digraph, directed cycle, acyclic digraph.

math.CO↗

arXiv2017

Separable discrete functions: recognition and sufficient conditions

A discrete function of $n$ variables is a mapping $g : X_1 \times \ldots \times X_n \rightarrow A$, where $X_1, \ldots, X_n$, and $A$ are arbitrary finite sets. Function $g$ is called {\em separable} if there exist $n$ functions $g_i : X_i \rightarrow A$ for $i = 1, \ldots, n$, such that for every input $x_1, \ldots ,x_n$ the function $g(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ takes one of the values $g_1(x_1), \ldots ,g_n(x_n)$. Given a discrete function $g$, it is an interesting problem to ask whether $g$ is separable or not. Although this seems to be a very basic problem concerning discrete functions, the complexity of recognition of separable discrete functions of $n$ variables is known only for $n=2$. In this paper we will show that a slightly more general recognition problem, when $g$ is not fully but only partially defined, is NP-complete for $n \geq 3$. We will then use this result to show that the recognition of fully defined separable discrete functions is NP-complete for $n \geq 4$. The case $n = 2$ is well-studied in the context of game theory, where (separable) discrete functions of $n$ variables are referred to as (assignable) $n$-person game forms. There is a known sufficient condition for assignability (separability) of two-person game forms (discrete functions of two variables) called (weak) total tightness of a game form. This property can be tested in polynomial time, and can be easily generalized both to higher dimension and to partially defined functions. We will prove in this paper that weak total tightness implies separability for (partially defined) discrete functions of $n$ variables for any $n$, thus generalizing the above result known for $n=2$. Keywords: separable discrete functions, totally tight and assignable game forms

math.CO↗

arXiv2017

A three-person deterministic graphical game without Nash equilibria

We give an example of a three-person deterministic graphical game that has no Nash equilibrium in pure stationary strategies. The game has seven positions, four outcomes (a unique cycle and three terminal positions), and its normal form is of size 2 x 2 x 4 only. Thus, our example strengthens significantly the one obtained in 2014 by Gurvich and Oudalov; the latter has four players, five terminals, and a 2 x 4 x 6 x 8 normal form. Furthermore, our example is minimal with respect to the number of players. Both examples are tight but not Nash-solvable. Such examples were known since 1975, but they were not related to deterministic graphical games. Moreover, due to the small size of our example, we can strengthen it further by showing that it has no Nash equilibrium not only in pure but also in independently mixed strategies, for both Markovian and a priori evaluations.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2017

On tame, pet, domestic, and miserable impartial games

Playing impartial games under the normal and misere conventions may differ a lot. However, there are also many "exceptions" for which the normal and misere plays are very similar. As early as in 1901 Bouton noticed that this is the case with the game of Nim. In 1976 Conway introduced a large class of such games that he called tame games. Here we introduce a proper subclass, pet games, and a proper superclass, domestic games. For each of these three classes we provide an efficiently verifiable characterization based on the following property. These games are closely related to another important subclass of the tame games introduced in 2007 by the first author and called miserable games. We show that tame, pet, and domestic games turn into miserable games by "slight modifications" of their definitions. We also show that the sum of miserable games is miserable and find several other classes that respect summation. The developed techniques allow us to prove that very many well-known impartial games fall into classes mentioned above. Such examples include all subtraction games, which are pet; game Euclid, which is miserable (and, hence, tame), as well as many versions of the Wythoff game and Nim, which may be miserable, pet, or domestic.

math.CO↗

arXiv2017

A Pseudo-Polynomial Algorithm for Mean Payoff Stochastic Games with Perfect Information and Few Random Positions

We consider two-person zero-sum stochastic mean payoff games with perfect information, or BWR-games, given by a digraph $G = (V, E)$, with local rewards $r: E \to \ZZ$, and three types of positions: black $V_B$, white $V_W$, and random $V_R$ forming a partition of $V$. It is a long-standing open question whether a polynomial time algorithm for BWR-games exists, or not, even when $|V_R|=0$. In fact, a pseudo-polynomial algorithm for BWR-games would already imply their polynomial solvability. In this paper, we show that BWR-games with a constant number of random positions can be solved in pseudo-polynomial time. More precisely, in any BWR-game with $|V_R|=O(1)$, a saddle point in uniformly optimal pure stationary strategies can be found in time polynomial in $|V_W|+|V_B|$, the maximum absolute local reward, and the common denominator of the transition probabilities.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2017

On the Sprague-Grundy function of Exact $k$-Nim

Moore's generalization of the game of {\sc Nim} is played as follows. Let $n$ and $k$ be two integers such that $1 \leq k \leq n$. Given $n$ piles of tokens, two players move alternately, removing tokens from at least one and at most $k$ of the piles. The player who makes the last move wins. The game was solved by Moore in 1910 and an explicit formula for its Sprague-Grundy function was given by Jenkyns and Mayberry in 1980, for the case $n = k+1$ only. We introduce another generalization of {\sc Nim}, called {\sc Exact $k$-Nim}, in which each move reduces exactly $k$ piles. We give an explicit formula for the Sprague-Grundy function of {\sc Exact $k$-Nim} in case $2k \geq n$. In case $n=2k$ our formula is surprisingly similar to Jenkyns and Mayberry's one.

math.CO↗

arXiv2017

Tetris Hypergraphs and Combinations of Impartial Games

The Sprague-Grundy (SG) theory reduces the sum of impartial games to the classical game of $NIM$. We generalize the concept of sum and introduce $\cH$-combinations of impartial games for any hypergraph $\cH$. In particular, we introduce the game $NIM_\cH$ which is the $\cH$-combination of single pile $NIM$ games. An impartial game is called SG decreasing if its SG value is decreased by every move. Extending the SG theory, we reduce the $\cH$-combination of SG decreasing games to $NIM_\cH$. We call $\cH$ a Tetris hypergraph if $NIM_\cH$ is SG decreasing. We provide some necessary and some sufficient conditions for a hypergraph to be Tetris.

math.CO↗

arXiv2016

A Convex Programming-based Algorithm for Mean Payoff Stochastic Games with Perfect Information

We consider two-person zero-sum stochastic mean payoff games with perfect information, or BWR-games, given by a digraph $G = (V, E)$, with local rewards $r: E \to \ZZ$, and three types of positions: black $V_B$, white $V_W$, and random $V_R$ forming a partition of $V$. It is a long-standing open question whether a polynomial time algorithm for BWR-games exists, even when $|V_R|=0$. In fact, a pseudo-polynomial algorithm for BWR-games would already imply their polynomial solvability. In this short note, we show that BWR-games can be solved via convex programming in pseudo-polynomial time if the number of random positions is a constant.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2015

Slow $k$-Nim

Given $n$ piles of tokens and a positive integer $k \leq n$, we study the following two impartial combinatorial games Nim$^1_{n, \leq k}$ and Nim$^1_{n, =k}$. In the first (resp. second) game, a player, by one move, chooses at least $1$ and at most (resp. exactly) $k$ non-empty piles and removes one token from each of these piles. For the normal and misère version of each game we compute the Sprague-Grundy function for the cases $n = k = 2$ and $n = k+1 = 3$. For game Nim$^1_{n, \leq k}$ we also characterize its P-positions for the cases $n \leq k+2$ and $n = k+3 \leq 6$.

math.CO↗

arXiv2015

A Nested Family of $k$-total Effective Rewards for Positional Games

We consider Gillette's two-person zero-sum stochastic games with perfect information. For each $k \in \ZZ_+$ we introduce an effective reward function, called $k$-total. For $k = 0$ and $1$ this function is known as {\it mean payoff} and {\it total reward}, respectively. We restrict our attention to the deterministic case. For all $k$, we prove the existence of a saddle point which can be realized by uniformly optimal pure stationary strategies. We also demonstrate that $k$-total reward games can be embedded into $(k+1)$-total reward games.

cs.DM↗

arXiv2015

A Potential Reduction Algorithm for Two-person Zero-sum Mean Payoff Stochastic Games

We suggest a new algorithm for two-person zero-sum undiscounted stochastic games focusing on stationary strategies. Given a positive real $ε$, let us call a stochastic game $ε$-ergodic, if its values from any two initial positions differ by at most $ε$. The proposed new algorithm outputs for every $ε>0$ in finite time either a pair of stationary strategies for the two players guaranteeing that the values from any initial positions are within an $ε$-range, or identifies two initial positions $u$ and $v$ and corresponding stationary strategies for the players proving that the game values starting from $u$ and $v$ are at least $ε/24$ apart. In particular, the above result shows that if a stochastic game is $ε$-ergodic, then there are stationary strategies for the players proving $24ε$-ergodicity. This result strengthens and provides a constructive version of an existential result by Vrieze (1980) claiming that if a stochastic game is $0$-ergodic, then there are $ε$-optimal stationary strategies for every $ε> 0$. The suggested algorithm is based on a potential transformation technique that changes the range of local values at all positions without changing the normal form of the game.

cs.GT↗