arXiv subjects

Walid Krichene

Publications and source records attributed to Walid Krichene.

26 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2018

Efficient Training on Very Large Corpora via Gramian Estimation

We study the problem of learning similarity functions over very large corpora using neural network embedding models. These models are typically trained using SGD with sampling of random observed and unobserved pairs, with a number of samples that grows quadratically with the corpus size, making it expensive to scale to very large corpora. We propose new efficient methods to train these models without having to sample unobserved pairs. Inspired by matrix factorization, our approach relies on adding a global quadratic penalty to all pairs of examples and expressing this term as the matrix-inner-product of two generalized Gramians. We show that the gradient of this term can be efficiently computed by maintaining estimates of the Gramians, and develop variance reduction schemes to improve the quality of the estimates. We conduct large-scale experiments that show a significant improvement in training time and generalization quality compared to traditional sampling methods.

stat.ML↗

arXiv2017

Acceleration and Averaging in Stochastic Mirror Descent Dynamics

We formulate and study a general family of (continuous-time) stochastic dynamics for accelerated first-order minimization of smooth convex functions. Building on an averaging formulation of accelerated mirror descent, we propose a stochastic variant in which the gradient is contaminated by noise, and study the resulting stochastic differential equation. We prove a bound on the rate of change of an energy function associated with the problem, then use it to derive estimates of convergence rates of the function values, (a.s. and in expectation) both for persistent and asymptotically vanishing noise. We discuss the interaction between the parameters of the dynamics (learning rate and averaging weights) and the covariation of the noise process, and show, in particular, how the asymptotic rate of covariation affects the choice of parameters and, ultimately, the convergence rate.

math.OC↗

arXiv2016

Minimizing Regret on Reflexive Banach Spaces and Learning Nash Equilibria in Continuous Zero-Sum Games

We study a general version of the adversarial online learning problem. We are given a decision set $\mathcal{X}$ in a reflexive Banach space $X$ and a sequence of reward vectors in the dual space of $X$. At each iteration, we choose an action from $\mathcal{X}$, based on the observed sequence of previous rewards. Our goal is to minimize regret, defined as the gap between the realized reward and the reward of the best fixed action in hindsight. Using results from infinite dimensional convex analysis, we generalize the method of Dual Averaging (or Follow the Regularized Leader) to our setting and obtain general upper bounds on the worst-case regret that subsume a wide range of results from the literature. Under the assumption of uniformly continuous rewards, we obtain explicit anytime regret bounds in a setting where the decision set is the set of probability distributions on a compact metric space $S$ whose Radon-Nikodym derivatives are elements of $L^p(S)$ for some $p > 1$. Importantly, we make no convexity assumptions on either the set $S$ or the reward functions. We also prove a general lower bound on the worst-case regret for any online algorithm. We then apply these results to the problem of learning in repeated continuous two-player zero-sum games, in which players' strategy sets are compact metric spaces. In doing so, we first prove that if both players play a Hannan-consistent strategy, then with probability 1 the empirical distributions of play weakly converge to the set of Nash equilibria of the game. We then show that, under mild assumptions, Dual Averaging on the (infinite-dimensional) space of probability distributions indeed achieves Hannan-consistency. Finally, we illustrate our results through numerical examples.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2016

Differential Privacy of Populations in Routing Games

As our ground transportation infrastructure modernizes, the large amount of data being measured, transmitted, and stored motivates an analysis of the privacy aspect of these emerging cyber-physical technologies. In this paper, we consider privacy in the routing game, where the origins and destinations of drivers are considered private. This is motivated by the fact that this spatiotemporal information can easily be used as the basis for inferences for a person's activities. More specifically, we consider the differential privacy of the mapping from the amount of flow for each origin-destination pair to the traffic flow measurements on each link of a traffic network. We use a stochastic online learning framework for the population dynamics, which is known to converge to the Nash equilibrium of the routing game. We analyze the sensitivity of this process and provide theoretical guarantees on the convergence rates as well as differential privacy values for these models. We confirm these with simulations on a small example.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2015

Dual Averaging on Compactly-Supported Distributions And Application to No-Regret Learning on a Continuum

We consider an online learning problem on a continuum. A decision maker is given a compact feasible set $S$, and is faced with the following sequential problem: at iteration~$t$, the decision maker chooses a distribution $x^{(t)} \in Δ(S)$, then a loss function $\ell^{(t)} : S \to \mathbb{R}_+$ is revealed, and the decision maker incurs expected loss $\langle \ell^{(t)}, x^{(t)} \rangle = \mathbb{E}_{s \sim x^{(t)}} \ell^{(t)}(s)$. We view the problem as an online convex optimization problem on the space $Δ(S)$ of Lebesgue-continnuous distributions on $S$. We prove a general regret bound for the Dual Averaging method on $L^2(S)$, then prove that dual averaging with $ω$-potentials (a class of strongly convex regularizers) achieves sublinear regret when $S$ is uniformly fat (a condition weaker than convexity).

cs.LG↗

arXiv2014

Learning Nash Equilibria in Congestion Games

We study the repeated congestion game, in which multiple populations of players share resources, and make, at each iteration, a decentralized decision on which resources to utilize. We investigate the following question: given a model of how individual players update their strategies, does the resulting dynamics of strategy profiles converge to the set of Nash equilibria of the one-shot game? We consider in particular a model in which players update their strategies using algorithms with sublinear discounted regret. We show that the resulting sequence of strategy profiles converges to the set of Nash equilibria in the sense of Cesàro means. However, strong convergence is not guaranteed in general. We show that strong convergence can be guaranteed for a class of algorithms with a vanishing upper bound on discounted regret, and which satisfy an additional condition. We call such algorithms AREP algorithms, for Approximate REPlicator, as they can be interpreted as a discrete-time approximation of the replicator equation, which models the continuous-time evolution of population strategies, and which is known to converge for the class of congestion games. In particular, we show that the discounted Hedge algorithm belongs to the AREP class, which guarantees its strong convergence.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2014

A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for the Existence of Potential Functions for Heterogeneous Routing Games

We study a heterogeneous routing game in which vehicles might belong to more than one type. The type determines the cost of traveling along an edge as a function of the flow of various types of vehicles over that edge. We relax the assumptions needed for the existence of a Nash equilibrium in this heterogeneous routing game. We extend the available results to present necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a potential function. We characterize a set of tolls that guarantee the existence of a potential function when only two types of users are participating in the game. We present an upper bound for the price of anarchy (i.e., the worst-case ratio of the social cost calculated for a Nash equilibrium over the social cost for a socially optimal flow) for the case in which only two types of players are participating in a game with affine edge cost functions. A heterogeneous routing game with vehicle platooning incentives is used as an example throughout the article to clarify the concepts and to validate the results.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2013

Arriving on time: estimating travel time distributions on large-scale road networks

Most optimal routing problems focus on minimizing travel time or distance traveled. Oftentimes, a more useful objective is to maximize the probability of on-time arrival, which requires statistical distributions of travel times, rather than just mean values. We propose a method to estimate travel time distributions on large-scale road networks, using probe vehicle data collected from GPS. We present a framework that works with large input of data, and scales linearly with the size of the network. Leveraging the planar topology of the graph, the method computes efficiently the time correlations between neighboring streets. First, raw probe vehicle traces are compressed into pairs of travel times and number of stops for each traversed road segment using a `stop-and-go' algorithm developed for this work. The compressed data is then used as input for training a path travel time model, which couples a Markov model along with a Gaussian Markov random field. Finally, scalable inference algorithms are developed for obtaining path travel time distributions from the composite MM-GMRF model. We illustrate the accuracy and scalability of our model on a 505,000 road link network spanning the San Francisco Bay Area.

cs.LG↗