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Walid S. Saba

Publications and source records attributed to Walid S. Saba.

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LLMs' Understanding of Natural Language Revealed

Large language models (LLMs) are the result of a massive experiment in bottom-up, data-driven reverse engineering of language at scale. Despite their utility in a number of downstream NLP tasks, ample research has shown that LLMs are incapable of performing reasoning in tasks that require quantification over and the manipulation of symbolic variables (e.g., planning and problem solving); see for example [25][26]. In this document, however, we will focus on testing LLMs for their language understanding capabilities, their supposed forte. As we will show here, the language understanding capabilities of LLMs have been widely exaggerated. While LLMs have proven to generate human-like coherent language (since that's how they were designed), their language understanding capabilities have not been properly tested. In particular, we believe that the language understanding capabilities of LLMs should be tested by performing an operation that is the opposite of 'text generation' and specifically by giving the LLM snippets of text as input and then querying what the LLM "understood". As we show here, when doing so it will become apparent that LLMs do not truly understand language, beyond very superficial inferences that are essentially the byproduct of the memorization of massive amounts of ingested text.

cs.AI

Reinterpreting 'the Company a Word Keeps': Towards Explainable and Ontologically Grounded Language Models

We argue that the relative success of large language models (LLMs) is not a reflection on the symbolic vs. subsymbolic debate but a reflection on employing a successful bottom-up strategy of a reverse engineering of language at scale. However, and due to their subsymbolic nature whatever knowledge these systems acquire about language will always be buried in millions of weights none of which is meaningful on its own, rendering such systems utterly unexplainable. Furthermore, and due to their stochastic nature, LLMs will often fail in making the correct inferences in various linguistic contexts that require reasoning in intensional, temporal, or modal contexts. To remedy these shortcomings we suggest employing the same successful bottom-up strategy employed in LLMs but in a symbolic setting, resulting in explainable, language-agnostic, and ontologically grounded language models.

cs.CL

Stochastic LLMs do not Understand Language: Towards Symbolic, Explainable and Ontologically Based LLMs

In our opinion the exuberance surrounding the relative success of data-driven large language models (LLMs) is slightly misguided and for several reasons (i) LLMs cannot be relied upon for factual information since for LLMs all ingested text (factual or non-factual) was created equal; (ii) due to their subsymbolic na-ture, whatever 'knowledge' these models acquire about language will always be buried in billions of microfeatures (weights), none of which is meaningful on its own; and (iii) LLMs will often fail to make the correct inferences in several linguistic contexts (e.g., nominal compounds, copredication, quantifier scope ambi-guities, intensional contexts. Since we believe the relative success of data-driven large language models (LLMs) is not a reflection on the symbolic vs. subsymbol-ic debate but a reflection on applying the successful strategy of a bottom-up reverse engineering of language at scale, we suggest in this paper applying the effective bottom-up strategy in a symbolic setting resulting in symbolic, explainable, and ontologically grounded language models.

cs.CL

Symbolic and Language Agnostic Large Language Models

We argue that the relative success of large language models (LLMs) is not a reflection on the symbolic vs. subsymbolic debate but a reflection on employing an appropriate strategy of bottom-up reverse engineering of language at scale. However, due to the subsymbolic nature of these models whatever knowledge these systems acquire about language will always be buried in millions of microfeatures (weights) none of which is meaningful on its own. Moreover, and due to their stochastic nature, these models will often fail in capturing various inferential aspects that are prevalent in natural language. What we suggest here is employing the successful bottom-up strategy in a symbolic setting, producing symbolic, language agnostic and ontologically grounded large language models.

cs.AI

Towards Explainable and Language-Agnostic LLMs: Symbolic Reverse Engineering of Language at Scale

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved a milestone that undenia-bly changed many held beliefs in artificial intelligence (AI). However, there remains many limitations of these LLMs when it comes to true language understanding, limitations that are a byproduct of the under-lying architecture of deep neural networks. Moreover, and due to their subsymbolic nature, whatever knowledge these models acquire about how language works will always be buried in billions of microfeatures (weights), none of which is meaningful on its own, making such models hopelessly unexplainable. To address these limitations, we suggest com-bining the strength of symbolic representations with what we believe to be the key to the success of LLMs, namely a successful bottom-up re-verse engineering of language at scale. As such we argue for a bottom-up reverse engineering of language in a symbolic setting. Hints on what this project amounts to have been suggested by several authors, and we discuss in some detail here how this project could be accomplished.

cs.CL

Towards Ontologically Grounded and Language-Agnostic Knowledge Graphs

Knowledge graphs (KGs) have become the standard technology for the representation of factual information in applications such as recommendation engines, search, and question-answering systems. However, the continual updating of KGs, as well as the integration of KGs from different domains and KGs in different languages, remains to be a major challenge. What we suggest here is that by a reification of abstract objects and by acknowledging the ontological distinction between concepts and types, we arrive at an ontologically grounded and language-agnostic representation that can alleviate the difficulties in KG integration.

cs.AI

No Adjective Ordering Mystery, and No Raven Paradox, Just an Ontological Mishap

In the concluding remarks of Ontological Promiscuity Hobbs (1985) made what we believe to be a very insightful observation: given that semantics is an attempt at specifying the relation between language and the world, if "one can assume a theory of the world that is isomorphic to the way we talk about it ... then semantics becomes nearly trivial". But how exactly can we rectify our logical formalisms so that semantics, an endeavor that has occupied the most penetrating minds for over two centuries, can become (nearly) trivial, and what exactly does it mean to assume a theory of the world in our semantics? In this paper we hope to provide answers for both questions. First, we believe that a commonsense theory of the world can (and should) be embedded in our semantic formalisms resulting in a logical semantics grounded in commonsense metaphysics. Moreover, we believe the first step to accomplishing this vision is rectifying what we think was a crucial oversight in logical semantics, namely the failure to distinguish between two fundamentally different types of concepts: (i) ontological concepts, that correspond to what Cocchiarella (2001) calls first-intension concepts and are types in a strongly-typed ontology; and (ii) logical concepts (or second intension concepts), that are predicates corresponding to properties of (and relations between) objects of various ontological types1. In such a framework, which we will refer to henceforth by ontologik, it will be shown how type unification and other type operations can be used to account for the `missing text phenomenon' (MTP) (see Saba, 2019a) that is at the heart of most challenges in the semantics of natural language, by uncovering the significant amount of missing text that is never explicitly stated in everyday discourse, but is often implicitly assumed as shared background knowledge.

cs.CL

On the Winograd Schema: Situating Language Understanding in the Data-Information-Knowledge Continuum

The Winograd Schema (WS) challenge, proposed as an al-ternative to the Turing Test, has become the new standard for evaluating progress in natural language understanding (NLU). In this paper we will not however be concerned with how this challenge might be addressed. Instead, our aim here is threefold: (i) we will first formally 'situate' the WS challenge in the data-information-knowledge continuum, suggesting where in that continuum a good WS resides; (ii) we will show that a WS is just special case of a more general phenomenon in language understanding, namely the missing text phenomenon (henceforth, MTP) - in particular, we will argue that what we usually call thinking in the process of language understanding involves discovering a significant amount of 'missing text' - text that is not explicitly stated, but is often implicitly assumed as shared background knowledge; and (iii) we conclude by a brief discussion on why MTP is inconsistent with the data-driven and machine learning approach to language understanding.

cs.AI

Logical Semantics and Commonsense Knowledge: Where Did we Go Wrong, and How to Go Forward, Again

We argue that logical semantics might have faltered due to its failure in distinguishing between two fundamentally very different types of concepts: ontological concepts, that should be types in a strongly-typed ontology, and logical concepts, that are predicates corresponding to properties of and relations between objects of various ontological types. We will then show that accounting for these differences amounts to the integration of lexical and compositional semantics in one coherent framework, and to an embedding in our logical semantics of a strongly-typed ontology that reflects our commonsense view of the world and the way we talk about it in ordinary language. We will show that in such a framework a number of challenges in natural language semantics can be adequately and systematically treated.

cs.AI

Commonsense Knowledge, Ontology and Ordinary Language

Over two decades ago a "quite revolution" overwhelmingly replaced knowledgebased approaches in natural language processing (NLP) by quantitative (e.g., statistical, corpus-based, machine learning) methods. Although it is our firm belief that purely quantitative approaches cannot be the only paradigm for NLP, dissatisfaction with purely engineering approaches to the construction of large knowledge bases for NLP are somewhat justified. In this paper we hope to demonstrate that both trends are partly misguided and that the time has come to enrich logical semantics with an ontological structure that reflects our commonsense view of the world and the way we talk about in ordinary language. In this paper it will be demonstrated that assuming such an ontological structure a number of challenges in the semantics of natural language (e.g., metonymy, intensionality, copredication, nominal compounds, etc.) can be properly and uniformly addressed.

cs.AI

Concerning Olga, the Beautiful Little Street Dancer (Adjectives as Higher-Order Polymorphic Functions)

In this paper we suggest a typed compositional seman-tics for nominal compounds of the form [Adj Noun] that models adjectives as higher-order polymorphic functions, and where types are assumed to represent concepts in an ontology that reflects our commonsense view of the world and the way we talk about it in or-dinary language. In addition to [Adj Noun] compounds our proposal seems also to suggest a plausible explana-tion for well known adjective ordering restrictions.

cs.CL

Ontology and Formal Semantics - Integration Overdue

In this note we suggest that difficulties encountered in natural language semantics are, for the most part, due to the use of mere symbol manipulation systems that are devoid of any content. In such systems, where there is hardly any link with our common-sense view of the world, and it is quite difficult to envision how one can formally account for the considerable amount of content that is often implicit, but almost never explicitly stated in our everyday discourse. The solution, in our opinion, is a compositional semantics grounded in an ontology that reflects our commonsense view of the world and the way we talk about it in ordinary language. In the compositional logic we envision there are ontological (or first-intension) concepts, and logical (or second-intension) concepts, and where the ontological concepts include not only Davidsonian events, but other abstract objects as well (e.g., states, processes, properties, activities, attributes, etc.) It will be demonstrated here that in such a framework, a number of challenges in the semantics of natural language (e.g., metonymy, intensionality, metaphor, etc.) can be properly and uniformly addressed.

cs.AI

Compositional Semantics Grounded in Commonsense Metaphysics

We argue for a compositional semantics grounded in a strongly typed ontology that reflects our commonsense view of the world and the way we talk about it in ordinary language. Assuming the existence of such a structure, we show that the semantics of various natural language phenomena may become nearly trivial.

cs.AI

A Note on Ontology and Ordinary Language

We argue for a compositional semantics grounded in a strongly typed ontology that reflects our commonsense view of the world and the way we talk about it. Assuming such a structure we show that the semantics of various natural language phenomena may become nearly trivial.

cs.AI

Language, logic and ontology: uncovering the structure of commonsense knowledge

The purpose of this paper is twofold: (i) we argue that the structure of commonsense knowledge must be discovered, rather than invented; and (ii) we argue that natural language, which is the best known theory of our (shared) commonsense knowledge, should itself be used as a guide to discovering the structure of commonsense knowledge. In addition to suggesting a systematic method to the discovery of the structure of commonsense knowledge, the method we propose seems to also provide an explanation for a number of phenomena in natural language, such as metaphor, intensionality, and the semantics of nominal compounds. Admittedly, our ultimate goal is quite ambitious, and it is no less than the systematic 'discovery' of a well-typed ontology of commonsense knowledge, and the subsequent formulation of the long-awaited goal of a meaning algebra.

cs.AI