arXiv subjects
Publications and source records attributed to Wang Yijia.
The collapse process is a constitutive sub-process in the full finding Nash equilibrium process. We conducted laboratory game experiments with human subjects to study this process. We observed significant pulse signals in the collapse process. The observations from the data support the completeness and consistency of the game dynamics paradigm.
In evolutionary game dynamics, there exists a hypothesis, which states that, the dynamic structure of the game's steady -- state system is characterized by the linear superposition of eigenmanifolds, which depends specifically on the eigenvector structure at the Nash equilibrium and is ultimately governed by the game dynamics equations. This hypotheses has been supported widely in discrete strategy game. In continuous -- strategy game, using experimental data from human -- subject games, this paper finds that the hypothesis is supported in significant, too.
We conducted a laboratory experiment involving human subjects to test the theoretical hypothesis that equilibrium selection can be impacted by manipulating the games dynamics process, by using modern control theory. Our findings indicate that human behavior consists with the predictions derived from evolutionary game theory paradigm. The consistency is supported by three key observations: (1) the long-term distribution of strategies in the strategy space, (2) the cyclic patterns observed within this space, and (3) the speed of convergence to the selected equilibrium. These findings suggest that the design of controllers aimed at equilibrium selection can indeed achieve their theoretical intended purpose. The location of this study in the knowledge tree of evolutionary game science is presented.