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Wang Zhijian

Publications and source records attributed to Wang Zhijian.

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Eigenmanifold in Game: Evidence from human continuous strategy game experiments

In evolutionary game dynamics, there exists a hypothesis, which states that, the dynamic structure of the game's steady-state system is characterized by the linear superposition of eigenmanifolds, which depends specifically on the complex eigenvector structure at the Nash equilibrium and is ultimately governed by the game dynamics equations. This hypothesis has been supported widely in discrete strategy games. In continuous-strategy game, using experimental data from human-subject games, this paper finds that the hypothesis is also significantly supported. A simplified model is provided to capture the observed wave mechanics of the dominant eigenmanifold, which is the algebraic representation of the complex eigenvector, generated by the utility-driven evolutionary game dynamics.

cs.GT

Pulse in collapse: a game dynamics experiment

The collapse process is a constitutive sub-process in the full finding Nash equilibrium process. We conducted laboratory game experiments with human subjects to study this process. We observed significant pulse signals in the collapse process. The observations from the data support the completeness and consistency of the game dynamics paradigm.

econ.TH

Human game experiment to verify the equilibrium selection controlled by design

We conducted a laboratory experiment involving human subjects to test the theoretical hypothesis that equilibrium selection can be impacted by manipulating the games dynamics process, by using modern control theory. Our findings indicate that human behavior consists with the predictions derived from evolutionary game theory paradigm. The consistency is supported by three key observations: (1) the long-term distribution of strategies in the strategy space, (2) the cyclic patterns observed within this space, and (3) the speed of convergence to the selected equilibrium. These findings suggest that the design of controllers aimed at equilibrium selection can indeed achieve their theoretical intended purpose. The location of this study in the knowledge tree of evolutionary game science is presented.

econ.GN

Nash equilibrium selection by eigenvalue control

People choose their strategies through a trial-and-error learning process in which they gradually discover that some strategies work better than others. The process can be modelled as an evolutionary game dynamics system, which may be controllable. In modern control theory, eigenvalue (pole) assignment is a basic approach to designing a full-state feedback controller, which can influence the outcome of a game. This study shows that, in a game with two Nash equilibria, the long-running strategy distribution can be controlled by pole assignment. We illustrate a theoretical workflow to design and evaluate the controller. To our knowledge, this is the first realisation of the control of equilibrium selection by design in the game dynamics theory paradigm. We hope the controller can be verified in a laboratory human subject game experiment.

econ.TH

Game Dynamics Structure Control by Design: an Example from Experimental Economics

Game dynamics structure (e.g., endogenous cycle motion) in human subjects game experiments can be predicted by game dynamics theory. However, whether the structure can be controlled by mechanism design to a desired goal is not known. Here, using the pole assignment approach in modern control theory, we demonstrate how to control the structure in two steps: (1) Illustrate an theoretical workflow on how to design a state-depended feedback controller for desired structure; (2) Evaluate the controller by laboratory human subject game experiments and by agent-based evolutionary dynamics simulation. To our knowledge, this is the first realisation of the control of the human social game dynamics structure in theory and experiment.

econ.TH

Human Social Cycling Spectrum

This paper investigates the reality and accuracy of evolutionary game dynamics theory in human game behavior experiments. In classical game theory, the central concept is Nash equilibrium, which reality and accuracy has been well known since the firstly illustration by the O'Neill game experiment in 1987. In game dynamics theory, the central approach is dynamics equations, however, its reality and accuracy is rare known, especially in high dimensional games. By develop a new approach, namely the eigencycle approach, with the eigenvectors from the game dynamics equations, we discover the fine structure of the cycles in the same experiments. We show that, the eigencycle approach can increase the accuracy by an order of magnitude in the human dynamic hehavior data. As the eigenvector is fundamental in dynamical systems theory which has applications in natural, social, and virtual worlds, the power of the eigencycles is expectedly. Inspired by the high dimensional eigencycles, we suggest that, the mathematical concept, namely 'invariant manifolds', could be a candidate as the central concept for the game dynamics theory, like the fixed point concept for classical game theory.

econ.TH

Consequence of doping in spatiotemporal rock-paper-scissors games

What determines species diversity is dramatic concern in science. Here we report the effect of doping on diversity in spatiotemporal rock-paper-scissors (RPS) games, which can be observed directly in ecological, biological and social systems in nature. Doping means that there exists some buffer patches which do not involve the main procession of the conflicts but occupied the game space. Quantitative lattices simulation finds that (1) decrease of extinction possibility is exponential dependent on the increase of doping rate, (2) the possibility of the conflict is independent of doping rate at well mix evolution beginning, and is buffered by doping in long time coexistence procession. Practical meaning of doping are discussed. To demonstrate the importance of doping, we present one practical example for microbial laboratory efficient operation and one theoretical example for human-environment co-existence system better understanding. It suggests that, for diversity, doping can not be neglected.

nlin.AO