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Wanning He

Publications and source records attributed to Wanning He.

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Beyond MoCap: Scaling Motion Tokenizers with Synthetic Human Motion for Generative Modeling

Human motion generation models are fundamentally constrained by the limited diversity of motion capture datasets, which predominantly contain common, repetitive actions and fail to cover the long tail of complex human movements, resulting in a restricted motion vocabulary in learned latent representations and poor generalization to rare, compositional, and highly dynamic motions. In this work, we propose a framework for expanding the motion representation space by leveraging large-scale synthetic human motion, introducing a data generation pipeline that produces diverse, physically plausible motion sequences beyond the distribution of existing datasets and integrating it with a redesigned VQ-VAE tokenizer that adapts to this expanded motion space. Unlike conventional tokenizers trained on narrow data distributions, our approach jointly scales both the training distribution and the discrete codebook, enabling the model to capture a significantly richer set of motion primitives. We demonstrate that training with synthetic motion substantially improves the coverage and compositionality of the learned motion vocabulary, leading to consistent gains across motion generation tasks such as text-to-motion and motion continuation, while remaining fully compatible with existing frameworks including MotionGPT. Our results suggest that the primary bottleneck lies in the limited support of the learned motion representation, rather than model architecture alone. Scaling synthetic motion in tandem with representation learning offers a principled path toward more expressive, controllable, and generalizable human motion synthesis.

cs.CV

MOAT: Towards Safe BPF Kernel Extension

The Linux kernel extensively uses the Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF) to allow user-written BPF applications to execute in the kernel space. The BPF employs a verifier to check the security of user-supplied BPF code statically. Recent attacks show that BPF programs can evade security checks and gain unauthorized access to kernel memory, indicating that the verification process is not flawless. In this paper, we present MOAT, a system that isolates potentially malicious BPF programs using Intel Memory Protection Keys (MPK). Enforcing BPF program isolation with MPK is not straightforward; MOAT is designed to alleviate technical obstacles, such as limited hardware keys and the need to protect a wide variety of BPF helper functions. We implement MOAT on Linux (ver. 6.1.38), and our evaluation shows that MOAT delivers low-cost isolation of BPF programs under mainstream use cases, such as isolating a BPF packet filter with only 3% throughput loss.

cs.CR