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Warodom Werapun

Publications and source records attributed to Warodom Werapun.

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FDM: A Framework for Decision-making to build ML-based Malware detection systems

Selecting appropriate machine learning (ML) configurations for malware detection is a complex, multi-criteria problem. Model choice, feature engineering, and update mechanisms must jointly satisfy operational constraints that vary across deployment contexts. This paper proposes the Framework for Decision-making (FDM) to build ML-based malware detection systems. The FDM formalises this selection process using the Weighted Configuration Compatibility Score (WCCS), a multi-criteria scoring function mapping five operational parameters (platform constraint, resource budget, response latency, update frequency, and detection sensitivity) to ranked recommendations across nine configuration dimensions. To validate the framework, four experiments were conducted on three datasets (a private Windows API dataset, the public Malimg image benchmark, and an Android static API dataset). Key results include: (i) XGBoost achieved the best accuracy-to-resource ratio in binary classification (97.46 % test accuracy, <70 MB RAM), outperforming LSTM/BiLSTM which consumed up to 2.8 GB; (ii) in multi-class classification, classical models (XGBoost 79.03 %) outperformed recurrent deep models (BiLSTM 72.27 %), reversing the binary ranking; (iii) class-incremental learning with EfficientNetB0 maintained 99.13 % accuracy with only 0.65 pp degradation across 11 incremental steps; (iv) transfer learning reduced training time by 2.14 times on average for image-based malware data without significant accuracy cost; and (v) autoencoder pre-processing yielded a 14 times training speedup at a cost of only 0.86 pp accuracy. These findings confirm that the optimal ML configuration is context-dependent, validating the FDM's core premise and demonstrating its practical utility for cybersecurity practitioners.

cs.CR

A Toolchain for Assisting Migration of Software Executables Towards Post-Quantum Cryptography

Quantum computing poses a significant global threat to today's security mechanisms. As a result, security experts and public sectors have issued guidelines to help organizations migrate their software to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). Despite these efforts, there is a lack of (semi-)automatic tools to support this transition especially when software is used and deployed as binary executables. To address this gap, in this work, we first propose a set of requirements necessary for a tool to detect quantum-vulnerable software executables. Following these requirements, we introduce QED: a toolchain for Quantum-vulnerable Executable Detection. QED uses a three-phase approach to identify quantum-vulnerable dependencies in a given set of executables, from file-level to API-level, and finally, precise identification of a static trace that triggers a quantum-vulnerable API. We evaluate QED on both a synthetic dataset with four cryptography libraries and a real-world dataset with over 200 software executables. The results demonstrate that: (1) QED discerns quantum-vulnerable from quantum-safe executables with 100% accuracy in the synthetic dataset; (2) QED is practical and scalable, completing analyses on average in less than 4 seconds per real-world executable; and (3) QED reduces the manual workload required by analysts to identify quantum-vulnerable executables in the real-world dataset by more than 90%. We hope that QED can become a crucial tool to facilitate the transition to PQC, particularly for small and medium-sized businesses with limited resources.

cs.CR