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Warren Armstrong

Publications and source records attributed to Warren Armstrong.

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Double-Signed Fragmented DNSSEC for Countering Quantum Threat

DNSSEC, a DNS security extension, is essential to accurately translating domain names to IP addresses. Digital signatures provide the foundation for this reliable translation; however, the evolution of 'Quantum Computers' has made traditional digital signatures vulnerable. In light of this, NIST has recently selected potential post-quantum digital signatures that can operate on conventional computers and resist attacks made with Quantum Computers. Since these post-quantum digital signatures are still in their early stages of development, replacing pre-quantum digital signature schemes in DNSSEC with post-quantum candidates is risky until the post-quantum candidates have undergone a thorough security analysis. Given this, herein, we investigate the viability of employing 'Double-Signatures' in DNSSEC, combining a post-quantum digital signature and a classic one. The rationale is that double-signatures will offer protection against quantum threats on conventional signature schemes as well as unknown non-quantum attacks on post-quantum signature schemes, hence even if one fails, the other provides security guarantees. However, the inclusion of two signatures in the DNSSEC response message doesn't bode well with the maximum allowed size of DNSSEC responses (i.e., 1232B, a limitation enforced by the MTU of physical links). To counter this issue, we leverage a way to do application-layer fragmentation of DNSSEC responses with two signatures. We implement our solution on top of OQS-BIND and, through experiments, show that the addition of two signatures in DNSSEC and application-layer fragmentation of all relevant resource records and their reassembly does not have a substantial impact on the efficiency of the resolution process and thus is suitable for the interim period at least until the quantum computers are fully realized.

cs.CR

A Framework for Migrating to Post-Quantum Cryptography: Security Dependency Analysis and Case Studies

Quantum computing is emerging as a significant threat to information protected by widely used cryptographic systems. Cryptographic methods, once deemed secure for decades, are now at risk of being compromised, posing a massive threat to the security of sensitive data and communications across enterprises worldwide. As a result, there is an urgent need to migrate to quantum-resistant cryptographic systems. This is no simple task. Migrating to a quantum-safe state is a complex process, and many organisations lack the in-house expertise to navigate this transition without guidance. In this paper, we present a comprehensive framework designed to assist enterprises with this migration. Our framework outlines essential steps involved in the cryptographic migration process, and leverages existing organisational inventories. The framework facilitates the efficient identification of cryptographic assets and can be integrated with other enterprise frameworks smoothly. To underscore its practicality and effectiveness, we have incorporated case studies that utilise graph-theoretic techniques to pinpoint and assess cryptographic dependencies. This is useful in prioritising crypto-systems for replacement.

cs.CR

How Do Organizations Seek Cyber Assurance? Investigations on the Adoption of the Common Criteria and Beyond

Cyber assurance, which is the ability to operate under the onslaught of cyber attacks and other unexpected events, is essential for organizations facing inundating security threats on a daily basis. Organizations usually employ multiple strategies to conduct risk management to achieve cyber assurance. Utilizing cybersecurity standards and certifications can provide guidance for vendors to design and manufacture secure Information and Communication Technology (ICT) products as well as provide a level of assurance of the security functionality of the products for consumers. Hence, employing security standards and certifications is an effective strategy for risk management and cyber assurance. In this work, we begin with investigating the adoption of cybersecurity standards and certifications by surveying 258 participants from organizations across various countries and sectors. Specifically, we identify adoption barriers of the Common Criteria through the designed questionnaire. Taking into account the seven identified adoption barriers, we show the recommendations for promoting cybersecurity standards and certifications. Moreover, beyond cybersecurity standards and certifications, we shed light on other risk management strategies devised by our participants, which provides directions on cybersecurity approaches for enhancing cyber assurance in organizations.

cs.CR

Defining Security Requirements with the Common Criteria: Applications, Adoptions, and Challenges

Advances of emerging Information and Communications Technology (ICT) technologies push the boundaries of what is possible and open up new markets for innovative ICT products and services. The adoption of ICT products and systems with security properties depends on consumers' confidence and markets' trust in the security functionalities and whether the assurance measures applied to these products meet the inherent security requirements. Such confidence and trust are primarily gained through the rigorous development of security requirements, validation criteria, evaluation, and certification. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (often referred to as Common Criteria or CC) is an international standard (ISO/IEC 15408) for cyber security certification. In this paper, we conduct a systematic review of the CC standards and its adoptions. Adoption barriers of the CC are also investigated based on the analysis of current trends in security evaluation. Specifically, we share the experiences and lessons gained through the recent Development of Australian Cyber Criteria Assessment (DACCA) project that promotes the CC among stakeholders in ICT security products related to specification, development, evaluation, certification and approval, procurement, and deployment. Best practices on developing Protection Profiles, recommendations, and future directions for trusted cybersecurity advancement are presented.

cs.CR