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Wayne C. Myrvold

Publications and source records attributed to Wayne C. Myrvold.

11 recordsLinked to original sources

Relativistic Constraints on Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics

This chapter, from the Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Physics (Eleanor Knox and Alastair Wilson, eds., 2021), is an overview of the constraints that relativity places on interpretations of quantum theory. It focuses on four main avenues of approach: (i) additional beables theories, which include "hidden-variables" theories and modal interpretations, (ii) dynamical collapse theories, (iii) Everettian, or "many-worlds" interpretations, and (iv) non-realist interpretations, which deny that quantum states represent anything in physical reality independent of considerations of agents and their beliefs.

quant-ph

Shakin' All Over: Proving Landauer's Principle without neglect of fluctuations

Landauer's principle is, roughly, the principle that there is an entropic cost associated with implementation of logically irreversible operations. Though widely accepted in the literature on the thermodynamics of computation, it has been the subject of considerable dispute in the philosophical literature. Both the cogency of proofs of the principle and its relevance, should it be true, have been questioned. In particular, it has been argued that microscale fluctuations entail dissipation that always greatly exceeds the Landauer bound. In this article Landauer's principle is treated within statistical mechanics, and a proof is given that neither relies on neglect of fluctuations nor assumes the availability of thermodynamically reversible processes. In addition, it is argued that microscale fluctuations are no obstacle to approximating thermodynamic reversibility as closely as one would like

physics.hist-ph

The Science of $ΘΔ^{cs}$

There is a long tradition of thinking of thermodynamics, not as a theory of fundamental physics (or even a candidate theory of fundamental physics), but as a theory of how manipulations of a physical system may be used to obtain desired effects, such as mechanical work. On this view, the basic concepts of thermodynamics, heat and work, and with them, the concept of entropy, are relative to a class of envisaged manipulations. This view has been dismissed by many philosophers of physics, in my opinion too hastily. This paper is a sketch and defense of a science of manipulations and their effects on physical systems. This is, I claim, the best way to make sense of thermodynamics as it is found in textbooks and as it is practiced. I call this science thermo-dynamics (with hyphen), or $ΘΔ^{cs}$, for short, to highlight that it may be different from the science of thermodynamics, as the reader conceives it. Even if one is not convinced that it is the best way to make sense of thermodynamics as it is practiced, it should be non-controversial that $ΘΔ^{cs}$ is a legitimate science. An upshot of the discussion is a clarification of the roles of the Gibbs and von Neumann entropies. Given the definition of statistical thermo-dynamic entropy, it can be proven that, under the assumption of availability of thermodynamically reversible processes, these functions are the unique (up to an additive constant) functions that represent thermo-dynamic entropy. Light is also shed on the use of coarse-grained entropies.}

physics.hist-ph

On the Status of Quantum State Realism

I argue that we have good reason for being realist about quantum states. Though a research programme of attempting to construct a plausible theory that accounts for quantum phenomena without ontic quantum states is well-motivated, that research programme is confronted by considerable obstacles. Two theorems are considered that place restrictions on a theory of that sort: a theorem due to Barrett, Cavalcanti, Lal, and Maroney, and an extension, by the author, of the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph theorem, that employs an assumption weaker than their Cartesian Product Assumption. These theorems have assumptions, of course. If there were powerful evidence against the conclusion that quantum states correspond to something in physical reality, it might be reasonable to reject these assumptions. But the situation we find ourselves in is the opposite: there is no evidence at all supporting irrealism about quantum states.

quant-ph

Subjectivists about Quantum Probabilities Should be Realists about Quantum States

There is a significant body of literature, which includes Itamar Pitowksy's "Betting on Outcomes of Measurements," that sheds light on the structure of quantum mechanics, and the ways in which it differs from classical mechanics, by casting the theory in terms of agents' bets on the outcomes of experiments. Though this approach, by itself, is neutral as to the ontological status of quantum observables and quantum states, some, notably those who adopt the label "QBism" for their views, take this approach as providing incentive to conclude that quantum states represent nothing in physical reality, but, rather, merely encode an agent's beliefs. In this chapter, I will argue that the arguments for realism about quantum states go through when the probabilities involved are taken to be subjective, if the conclusion is about the agent's beliefs: an agent whose credences conform to quantum probabilities should believe that preparation procedures with which she associates distinct pure quantum states produce distinct states of reality. The conclusion can be avoided only by stipulation of limitations on the agent's theorizing about the world, limitations that are not warranted by the empirical success of quantum mechanics or any other empirical considerations. Subjectivists about quantum probabilities should be realists about quantum states.

quant-ph

A $ψ$-Ontology Result without the Cartesian Product Assumption

We introduce a weakening of the Preparation Independence Postulate of Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph that does not presuppose that the space of ontic states resulting from a product state preparation can be represented by the Cartesian product of subsystem state spaces. On the basis of this weakened assumption, it is shown that, in any model that reproduces the quantum probabilities, any pair of pure quantum states $\ketψ$, $\ketϕ$ with $\bktϕψ \leq 1/\sqrt{2}$ must be ontologically distinct.

quant-ph

Relativistically Invariant Markovian Dynamical Collapse Theories Must Employ Nonstandard Degrees of Freedom

The impossibility of an indeterministic evolution for standard relativistic quantum field theories, that is, theories in which all fields satisfy the condition that the generators of spacetime translation have spectrum in the forward light-cone, is demonstrated. The demonstration proceeds by arguing that a relativistically invariant theory must have a stable vacuum, and then showing that stability of the vacuum, together with the requirements imposed by relativistic causality, entails deterministic evolution, if all degrees of freedom are standard degrees of freedom.

quant-ph

On the Debate Concerning the Proper Characterisation of Quantum Dynamical Evolution

There has been a long-standing and sometimes passionate debate between physicists over whether a dynamical framework for quantum systems should incorporate not completely positive (NCP) maps in addition to completely positive (CP) maps. Despite the reasonableness of the arguments for complete positivity, we argue that NCP maps should be allowed, with a qualification: these should be understood, not as reflecting 'not completely positive' evolution, but as linear extensions, to a system's entire state space, of CP maps that are only partially defined. Beyond the domain of definition of a partial-CP map, we argue, much may be permitted.

quant-ph

Modal Interpretations and Relativity

A proof is given, at a greater level of generality than previous 'no-go' theorems, of the impossibility of formulating a modal interpretation that exhibits 'serious' Lorentz invariance at the fundamental level. Particular attention is given to modal interpretations of the type proposed by Bub.

quant-ph

A Loophole in Bell's Theorem? Parameter Dependence in the Hess-Philipp Model

The hidden-variables model constructed by Karl Hess and Walter Philipp is claimed by its authors to exploit a "loophole" in Bell's theorem; the claim is made by Hess and Philipp that the parameters employed in their model extend beyond those considered by Bell. Furthermore, they claim that their model satisfies Einstein locality and is free of any "suspicion of spooky action at a distance." Both of these claims are false; the Hess-Philipp model achieves agreement with the quantum-mechanical predictions, not by circumventing Bell's theorem, but via Parameter Dependence.

quant-ph