arXiv subjects

Weibing Wang

Publications and source records attributed to Weibing Wang.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Popular Knowledge Propagates More Errors in LLM Knowledge Updating

Updating a language model's knowledge through fine-tuning is essential for keeping its outputs current, yet can also induce factual forgetting and new hallucinations. Prior work shows that long-tail knowledge is harder to acquire and newly memorized long-tail facts are difficult to retain during later fine-tuning. We study a complementary question: among facts that a model has encoded correctly, which are most vulnerable to collateral corruption during other updates? To investigate this question under a realistic factual distribution, we construct a large-scale graph FACTPROP of verified Wikipedia facts by linking triples that share head or tail entities, thereby preserving connections among factual knowledge. We fine-tune models on factual statements and measure correct-to-incorrect facts after each update. Our results reveal a pattern distinct from prior findings on long-tail vulnerability during acquisition and retention: among facts that models already answer correctly, those associated with highly connected entities are more likely to be corrupted by neighboring updates, and updates to such facts propagate errors more broadly. Structural popularity therefore predicts both vulnerability and downstream damage. Inspired by this finding, we propose Popularity-based Anchoring (PopAnchor), a lightweight rehearsal strategy that preserves a small set of popular facts and reduces forgetting.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2026

What to Distinguish and How? Opportunities and Challenges of Augmenting Multiple, Cluttered Objects in Complex Scenes for People with Low Vision

People with low vision (PLV) struggle to perceive complex scenes like busy kitchens and crowded streets, which contain many objects, visual clutter, and dynamic elements. Prior AR systems for low vision either enhance low-level visual features or augment task-relevant objects for single tasks in simple settings, leaving multi-object augmentation in complex scenes underexplored. Informed by a formative study characterizing important objects and their perceived importance for PLV, we built SceneGlance, a wearable AR system that recognizes important objects and visually distinguishes them by importance level. Through a controlled lab study with 12 PLV in a mock-up kitchen scene and a free-form think-aloud study with 13 PLV navigating an outdoor route, we found that AR distinction on object importance shifted PLV's attention toward objects of higher importance, and supported perception strategies such as building mental snapshots from the augmentation distribution and hierarchical scanning by importance. However, this attention shift came with a tradeoff of reduced overall scene recall. The studies also surfaced challenges posed by AR augmentations in complex scenes, such as adjacent augmentations blending or interfering with each other, yielding design implications for more practical AR vision enhancement systems in the complex real world.

cs.HC↗

arXiv2026

The Emergence of Autonomous Penetration Capabilities in Large Language Model-Powered AI Systems

Nowadays, the autonomous execution of cyberattacks capable of causing substantial real-world harm is widely regarded as one of the critical red lines that frontier AI systems must not cross. Within this broader red-line scenario, autonomous penetration represents a core enabling capability and subtask: the ability of LLM-powered AI systems to independently conduct adversarial operations against a target server without human intervention, identify and exploit vulnerabilities, and obtain unauthorized access or control. A growing body of work has sought to assess the autonomous penetration capabilities of AI systems. However, existing evaluations often employ opaque methodologies, rely on unrealistic or overly simplified penetration-testing scenarios, or provide LLMs with excessive prior knowledge and task-specific guidance, and cannot accurately capture the extent to which modern AI systems can autonomously perform this core capability within broader high-impact cyberattack scenarios. To address these limitations, we construct a new autonomous penetration evaluation framework consisting of two components: target servers and agent scaffolding. Specifically, on the target-server side, we design two levels of target environments based on the number of secure services without known vulnerabilities deployed alongside a vulnerable service: Tier~1 (one secure service) and Tier~2 (three secure services), resulting in a total of 300 target servers. Meanwhile, the agent scaffolding adopts a general-purpose agent architecture equipped with a set of general-purpose cybersecurity tools, without any target-specific prior knowledge. We evaluate 19 open-weight and proprietary LLMs, and find that current models achieve penetration success rates ranging from 10.7% to 69.3%. Moreover, we observe that autonomous penetration capability continues to improve alongside advances in overall model capability.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Frontier AI Risk Management Framework in Practice: A Risk Analysis Technical Report

To understand and identify the unprecedented risks posed by rapidly advancing artificial intelligence (AI) models, this report presents a comprehensive assessment of their frontier risks. Drawing on the E-T-C analysis (deployment environment, threat source, enabling capability) from the Frontier AI Risk Management Framework (v1.0) (SafeWork-F1-Framework), we identify critical risks in seven areas: cyber offense, biological and chemical risks, persuasion and manipulation, uncontrolled autonomous AI R\&D, strategic deception and scheming, self-replication, and collusion. Guided by the "AI-$45^\circ$ Law," we evaluate these risks using "red lines" (intolerable thresholds) and "yellow lines" (early warning indicators) to define risk zones: green (manageable risk for routine deployment and continuous monitoring), yellow (requiring strengthened mitigations and controlled deployment), and red (necessitating suspension of development and/or deployment). Experimental results show that all recent frontier AI models reside in green and yellow zones, without crossing red lines. Specifically, no evaluated models cross the yellow line for cyber offense or uncontrolled AI R\&D risks. For self-replication, and strategic deception and scheming, most models remain in the green zone, except for certain reasoning models in the yellow zone. In persuasion and manipulation, most models are in the yellow zone due to their effective influence on humans. For biological and chemical risks, we are unable to rule out the possibility of most models residing in the yellow zone, although detailed threat modeling and in-depth assessment are required to make further claims. This work reflects our current understanding of AI frontier risks and urges collective action to mitigate these challenges.

cs.AI↗