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Weihang Cao

Publications and source records attributed to Weihang Cao.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

SEDULity: A Proof-of-Learning Framework for Distributed and Secure Blockchains with Efficient Useful Work

The security and decentralization of Proof-of-Work (PoW) have been well-tested in existing blockchain systems. However, its tremendous energy waste has raised concerns about sustainability. Proof-of-Useful-Work (PoUW) aims to redirect the meaningless computation to meaningful tasks such as solving machine learning (ML) problems, giving rise to the branch of Proof-of-Learning (PoL). While previous studies have proposed various PoLs, they all, to some degree, suffer from security, decentralization, or efficiency issues. In this paper, we propose a PoL framework that trains ML models efficiently while maintaining blockchain security in a fully distributed manner. We name the framework SEDULity, which stands for a Secure, Efficient, Distributed, and Useful Learning-based blockchain system. Specifically, we encode the template block into the training process and design a useful function that is difficult to solve but relatively easy to verify, as a substitute for the PoW puzzle. We show that our framework is distributed, secure, and efficiently trains ML models. We further demonstrate that the proposed PoL framework can be extended to other types of useful work and design an incentive mechanism to incentivize task verification. We show theoretically that a rational miner is incentivized to train fully honestly with well-designed system parameters. Finally, we present simulation results to demonstrate the performance of our framework and validate our analysis.

cs.CR

Analysis of Channel Uncertainty in Trusted Wireless Services via Repeated Interactions

The coexistence of heterogeneous sub-networks in 6G poses new security and trust concerns and thus calls for a perimeterless-security model. Blockchain radio access network (B-RAN) provides a trust-building approach via repeated interactions rather than relying on pre-established trust or central authentication. Such a trust-building process naturally supports dynamic trusted services across various service providers (SP) without the need for perimeter-based authentications; however, it remains vulnerable to environmental and system unreliability such as wireless channel uncertainty. In this study, we investigate channel unreliability in the trust-building framework based on repeated interactions for secure wireless services. We derive specific requirements for achieving cooperation between SPs and clients via a repeated game model and illustrate the implications of channel unreliability on sustaining trusted wireless services. We consider the framework design and optimization to guarantee SP-client cooperation, given the worst channel condition and/or the least cooperation willingness. Furthermore, we explore the maximum cooperation area to enhance service resilience and reveal the trade-off relationship between transmission efficiency, security integrity, and cooperative margin. Finally, we present simulations to demonstrate the system performance over fading channels and verify our results.

cs.NI

Optimization-based Proof of Useful Work: Framework, Modeling, and Security Analysis

Proof of Work (PoW) has extensively served as the foundation of blockchain's security, consistency, and tamper-resistance, but long has it been criticized for its tremendous and inefficient utilization of computational power and energy. Proof of useful work (PoUW) can effectively address the blockchain's sustainability issue by redirecting the computing power towards useful tasks instead of meaningless hash puzzles. Optimization problems, whose solutions are often hard to find but easy to verify, present a viable class of useful work for PoUW. However, most existing studies rely on either specific problems or particular algorithms, and there lacks comprehensive security analysis for optimization-based PoUW. Therefore, in this work, we build a generic PoUW framework that solves useful optimization problems for blockchain consensus. Through modeling and analysis, we identify the security conditions against both selfishness and maliciousness. Based on these conditions, we establish a lower bound for the security overhead and uncover the trade-off between useful work efficiency and PoW safeguard. We further offer the reward function design guidelines to guarantee miners' integrity. We also show that the optimization-based PoUW is secure in the presence of malicious miners and derive a necessary condition against long-range attacks. Finally, simulation results are presented to validate our analytical results.

cs.DC