arXiv subjects

Weixuan Lin

Publications and source records attributed to Weixuan Lin.

6 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2020

Design of Robust Decentralized Controllers via Assume-Guarantee Contracts

We consider the decentralized control of a discrete-time time-varying linear system subject to additive disturbances and polyhedral constraints on the state and input trajectories. The underlying system is composed of a finite collection of dynamically coupled subsystems, where each subsystem is assumed to have a dedicated local controller. The decentralization of information is expressed according to sparsity constraints on the state measurements that each local controller has access to. We investigate the design of decentralized controllers that are affinely parameterized in their measurement history. For problems with partially nested information structures, the optimization over such restricted policy spaces is known to be convex. Convexity is not, however, guaranteed under more general (nonclassical) information structures, where the information available to one local controller can be affected by control actions that it cannot reconstruct. To address the nonconvexity that arises in such problems, we propose an approach to decentralized control design where such information-coupling states are effectively treated as disturbances whose trajectories are constrained to take values in ellipsoidal "contract" sets whose location, scale, and orientation are jointly optimized with the underlying affine decentralized control policy. We establish a structural condition on the space of allowable contracts that facilitates the joint optimization over the control policy and the contract set via semidefinite programming.

math.OC↗

arXiv2020

Decentralized Control of Constrained Linear Systems via Assume-Guarantee Contracts

We consider the decentralized control of a discrete-time, linear system subject to exogenous disturbances and polyhedral constraints on the state and input trajectories. The underlying system is composed of a finite collection of dynamically coupled subsystems, where each subsystem is assumed to have a dedicated local controller. The decentralization of information is expressed according to sparsity constraints on the state measurements that each local controller has access to. In this context, we investigate the design of decentralized controllers that are affinely parameterized in their measurement history. For problems with partially nested information structures, the optimization over such policy spaces is known to be convex. Convexity is not, however, guaranteed under more general (nonclassical) information structures in which the information available to one local controller can be affected by control actions that it cannot access or reconstruct. With the aim of alleviating the nonconvexity that arises in such problems, we propose an approach to decentralized control design where the information-coupling states are effectively treated as disturbances whose trajectories are constrained to take values in ellipsoidal contract sets whose location, scale, and orientation are jointly optimized with the underlying affine decentralized control policy. We establish a natural structural condition on the space of allowable contracts that facilitates the joint optimization over the control policy and the contract set via semidefinite programming.

math.OC↗

arXiv2019

Transparency and Control in Platforms for Networked Markets

In this paper, we analyze the worst case efficiency loss of online platform designs under a networked Cournot competition model. Inspired by some of the largest platforms in operation today, the platform designs that we consider examine the trade-off between transparency and control. Our results show that open access designs incentivize increased production towards perfectly competitive levels and limit efficiency loss, while controlled allocation designs lead to producer-platform incentive misalignment, resulting in low participation and unbounded efficiency loss. We also show that discriminatory access designs balance transparency and control, achieving the best of both worlds by maintaining high participation rates while limiting efficiency loss.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2017

A Structural Characterization of Market Power in Electric Power Networks

We consider a market in which capacity-constrained generators compete in scalar-parameterized supply functions to serve an inelastic demand spread throughout a transmission constrained power network. The market clears according to a locational marginal pricing mechanism, in which the independent system operator (ISO) determines the generators' production quantities to minimize the revealed cost of meeting demand, while ensuring that network transmission and generator capacity constraints are met. Under the stylizing assumption that both the ISO and generators choose their strategies simultaneously, we establish the existence of Nash equilibria for the underlying market, and derive an upper bound on the allocative efficiency loss at Nash equilibrium relative to the socially optimal level. We also characterize an upper bound on the markup of locational marginal prices at Nash equilibrium above their perfectly competitive levels. Of particular relevance to ex ante market power monitoring, these bounds reveal the role of certain market structures---specifically, the \emph{market share} and \emph{residual supply index} of a producer---in predicting the degree to which that producer is able to exercise market power to influence the market outcome to its advantage. Finally, restricting our attention to the simpler setting of a two-node power network, we provide a characterization of market structures under which a Braess-like paradox occurs due to the exercise of market power---that is to say, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition on market structure under which the strengthening of the network's transmission line capacity results in the (counterintuitive) increase in the total cost of generation at Nash equilibrium.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2017

A Convex Information Relaxation for Constrained Decentralized Control Design Problems

We describe a convex programming approach to the calculation of lower bounds on the minimum cost of constrained decentralized control problems with nonclassical information structures. The class of problems we consider entail the decentralized output feedback control of a linear time-varying system over a finite horizon, subject to polyhedral constraints on the state and input trajectories, and sparsity constraints on the controller's information structure. As the determination of optimal control policies for such systems is known to be computationally intractable in general, considerable effort has been made in the literature to identify efficiently computable, albeit suboptimal, feasible control policies. The construction of computationally tractable bounds on their suboptimality is the primary motivation for the techniques developed in this note. Specifically, given a decentralized control problem with nonclassical information, we characterize an expansion of the given information structure, which ensures its partial nestedness, while maximizing the optimal value of the resulting decentralized control problem under the expanded information structure. The resulting decentralized control problem is cast as an infinite-dimensional convex program, which is further relaxed via a partial dualization and restriction to affine dual control policies. The resulting problem is a finite-dimensional conic program whose optimal value is a provable lower bound on the minimum cost of the original constrained decentralized control problem.

math.OC↗

arXiv2016

Decentralized Stochastic Control of Distributed Energy Resources

We consider the decentralized control of radial distribution systems with controllable photovoltaic inverters and energy storage resources. For such systems, we investigate the problem of designing fully decentralized controllers that minimize the expected cost of balancing demand, while guaranteeing the satisfaction of individual resource and distribution system voltage constraints. Employing a linear approximation of the branch flow model, we formulate this problem as the design of a decentralized disturbance-feedback controller that minimizes the expected value of a convex quadratic cost function, subject to robust convex quadratic constraints on the system state and input. As such problems are, in general, computationally intractable, we derive a tractable inner approximation to this decentralized control problem, which enables the efficient computation of an affine control policy via the solution of a finite-dimensional conic program. As affine policies are, in general, suboptimal for the family of systems considered, we provide an efficient method to bound their suboptimality via the optimal solution of another finite-dimensional conic program. A case study of a 12 kV radial distribution system demonstrates that decentralized affine controllers can perform close to optimal.

math.OC↗