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Weiyi He

Publications and source records attributed to Weiyi He.

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Efficient LLM Adversarial Training via Low-Rank Defense and Circuit-Guided Surrogates

Adversarial training is one of the most effective defenses against adversarial attacks, yet the computational cost remains prohibitive at modern scales, especially for large language models (LLMs). While existing mitigation strategies, e.g., latent adversarial training (LAT), have been developed, they still incur a high computational cost. In this work, we comprehensively investigate computation-efficient strategies to speed up LAT from two complementary perspectives: (1) Defense-side optimization: We explore the representation fine-tuning (ReFT) within LAT, and reveal a potential issue if there is a mismatch on which tokens to apply ReFT and the attack. (2) Attack-side optimization: When computing adversarial attacks in each LAT iteration, we extract only the relevant circuits from the LLM to construct a lightweight surrogate model, avoiding the computation in the forward-backward passes through the full model during the attack generation. For both perspectives, we provide theoretical justifications and numerical evidence to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed strategies. Ultimately, compared to standard LAT with full fine-tuning, our method on average reduces per-step adversarial-training FLOPs by 48.1% while requiring only 0.0118% trainable parameters.

cs.LG

AURA: Adaptive Uncertainty-aware Refinement for LLM-as-a-Judge Auditing

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as judges for open-ended generation, as large-scale human evaluation is often expensive and difficult to scale, yet their preferences remain imperfect proxies for human judgment. Existing auditing pipelines often assume that a reliable subset of examples or clean supervision signals are available beforehand, for example from human annotation, heuristic filtering, or the outputs of strong judges. In LLM evaluation, this assumption is fragile: the initial split may inherit judge bias, while human verification is typically too scarce to define stable groups at scale. We propose AURA, an adaptive uncertainty--aware refinement framework for auditing pairwise LLM--as--a--judge decisions under selected human verification. AURA iteratively learns a human-consistency signal, propagates reliable evidence, and prioritizes uncertain comparisons for human review. The key idea is to treat trust in a judge as a latent quantity that is progressively refined as evidence accumulates. We provide a compact formulation, a stable refinement procedure, and a comprehensive evaluation on both synthetic and real pairwise LLM-answer data.

stat.ML

Impact of Positional Encoding: Clean and Adversarial Rademacher Complexity for Transformers under In-Context Regression

Positional encoding (PE) is a core architectural component of Transformers, yet its impact on the Transformer's generalization and robustness remains unclear. In this work, we provide the first generalization analysis for a single-layer Transformer under in-context regression that explicitly accounts for a completely trainable PE module. Our result shows that PE systematically enlarges the generalization gap. Extending to the adversarial setting, we derive the adversarial Rademacher generalization bound. We find that the gap between models with and without PE is magnified under attack, demonstrating that PE amplifies the vulnerability of models. Our bounds are empirically validated by a simulation study. Together, this work establishes a new framework for understanding the clean and adversarial generalization in ICL with PE.

stat.ML

Unveiling Privacy Risks in LLM Agent Memory

Large Language Model (LLM) agents have become increasingly prevalent across various real-world applications. They enhance decision-making by storing private user-agent interactions in the memory module for demonstrations, introducing new privacy risks for LLM agents. In this work, we systematically investigate the vulnerability of LLM agents to our proposed Memory EXTRaction Attack (MEXTRA) under a black-box setting. To extract private information from memory, we propose an effective attacking prompt design and an automated prompt generation method based on different levels of knowledge about the LLM agent. Experiments on two representative agents demonstrate the effectiveness of MEXTRA. Moreover, we explore key factors influencing memory leakage from both the agent designer's and the attacker's perspectives. Our findings highlight the urgent need for effective memory safeguards in LLM agent design and deployment.

cs.CR