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Wen-Jing Li

Publications and source records attributed to Wen-Jing Li.

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GARCH-FIS: A Hybrid Forecasting Model with Dynamic Volatility-Driven Parameter Adaptation

This paper proposes a novel hybrid model, termed GARCH-FIS, for recursive rolling multi-step forecasting of financial time series. It integrates a Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) with a Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model to jointly address nonlinear dynamics and time-varying volatility. The core innovation is a dynamic parameter adaptation mechanism for the FIS, specifically activated within the multi-step forecasting cycle. In this process, the conditional volatility estimated by a rolling window GARCH model is continuously translated into a price volatility measure. At each forecasting step, this measure, alongside the updated mean of the sliding window data -- which now incorporates the most recent predicted price -- jointly determines the parameters of the FIS membership functions for the next prediction. Consequently, the granularity of the fuzzy inference adapts as the forecast horizon extends: membership functions are automatically widened during high-volatility market regimes to bolster robustness and narrowed during stable periods to enhance precision. This constitutes a fundamental advancement over a static one-step-ahead prediction setup. Furthermore, the model's fuzzy rule base is automatically constructed from data using the Wang-Mendel method, promoting interpretability and adaptability. Empirical evaluation, focused exclusively on multi-step forecasting performance across ten diverse financial assets, demonstrates that the proposed GARCH-FIS model significantly outperforms benchmark models -- including Support Vector Regression(SVR), Long Short-Term Memory networks(LSTM), and an ARIMA-GARCH econometric model -- in terms of predictive accuracy and stability, while effectively mitigating error accumulation in extended recursive forecasts.

cs.LG

Combined effect of incentives and coupling in multigames in two-layer networks

The lack of cooperation can easily result in inequality among members of a society, which provides an increasing gap between individual incomes. To tackle this issue, we introduce an incentive mechanism based on individual strategies and incomes, wherein a portion of the income from defectors is allocated to reward low-income cooperators, aiming to enhance cooperation by improving the equitable distribution of wealth across the entire population. Moreover, previous research has typically employed network structures or game mechanisms characterized by homogeneity. In this study, we present a network framework that more accurately reflects real-world conditions, where agents are engaged in multiple games, including prisoner's dilemma games in the top-layer and public good games in the down-layer networks. Within this framework, we introduce the concept of ``external coupling'' which connects agents across different networks as acquaintances, thereby facilitating access to shared datasets. Our results indicate that the combined positive effects of external coupling and incentive mechanism lead to optimal cooperation rates and lower Gini coefficients, demonstrating a negative correlation between cooperation and inequality. From a micro-level perspective, this phenomenon primarily arises from the regular network, whereas suboptimal outcomes are observed within the scale-free network. These observations help to give a deeper insight into the interplay between cooperation and wealth disparity in evolutionary games in large populations.

physics.soc-ph