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Wengang Ma

Publications and source records attributed to Wengang Ma.

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When Emotion Becomes Trigger: Emotion-style dynamic Backdoor Attack Parasitising Large Language Models

Data-poisoning backdoors pose a practical threat to the fine-tuning of large language models (LLMs). Most existing attacks bind an attacker-selected behavior to fixed tokens, phrases, scenarios, or syntactic structures. These discrete triggers provide concrete handles for defenses based on local token anomalies, pattern matching, or trigger recovery. We found that, \emph{under semantics-preserving rewriting, emotionally styled inputs form representation clusters distinct from their neutral counterparts}. Meanwhile, de-emotionalised controls move back towards the neutral distribution. This observation motivates our method \textbf{Paraesthesia}, a dynamic backdoor attack that encodes its triggering condition in an emotional style. Paraesthesia maps target emotions into a valence--arousal space, rewrites a small subset of clean samples, and retains semantically faithful rewrites for fine-tuning. Across instruction-following and classification tasks evaluated on four major LLMs, Paraesthesia achieves an attack success rate(ASR) above 98.25\%, while introducing only negligible degradation to clean utility across the vast majority of model-task setups. Surface feature controls and paired de-emotionalization experiments demonstrate that no examined token-level cue can fully account for the triggered behavior. ASR remains high after word-level filtering, sample clustering, and subsequent clean-update procedures, whereas a white-box decoding defense with access to a task-aligned clean reference provides a distinct mitigation path. These findings identify emotional style as a concrete backdoor trigger surface beyond fixed lexical and syntactic patterns.\par\smallskip \noindent \textcolor{red}{\textbf{WARNING: }\textnormal{This paper contains risk-related textual content.}}

cs.CL

Grimm: A Plug-and-Play Perturbation Rectifier for Graph Neural Networks Defending against Poisoning Attacks

Recent studies have revealed the vulnerability of graph neural networks (GNNs) to adversarial poisoning attacks on node classification tasks. Current defensive methods require substituting the original GNNs with defense models, regardless of the original's type. This approach, while targeting adversarial robustness, compromises the enhancements developed in prior research to boost GNNs' practical performance. Here we introduce Grimm, the first plug-and-play defense model. With just a minimal interface requirement for extracting features from any layer of the protected GNNs, Grimm is thus enabled to seamlessly rectify perturbations. Specifically, we utilize the feature trajectories (FTs) generated by GNNs, as they evolve through epochs, to reflect the training status of the networks. We then theoretically prove that the FTs of victim nodes will inevitably exhibit discriminable anomalies. Consequently, inspired by the natural parallelism between the biological nervous and immune systems, we construct Grimm, a comprehensive artificial immune system for GNNs. Grimm not only detects abnormal FTs and rectifies adversarial edges during training but also operates efficiently in parallel, thereby mirroring the concurrent functionalities of its biological counterparts. We experimentally confirm that Grimm offers four empirically validated advantages: 1) Harmlessness, as it does not actively interfere with GNN training; 2) Parallelism, ensuring monitoring, detection, and rectification functions operate independently of the GNN training process; 3) Generalizability, demonstrating compatibility with mainstream GNNs such as GCN, GAT, and GraphSAGE; and 4) Transferability, as the detectors for abnormal FTs can be efficiently transferred across different systems for one-step rectification.

cs.LG

Graph Agent Network: Empowering Nodes with Inference Capabilities for Adversarial Resilience

End-to-end training with global optimization have popularized graph neural networks (GNNs) for node classification, yet inadvertently introduced vulnerabilities to adversarial edge-perturbing attacks. Adversaries can exploit the inherent opened interfaces of GNNs' input and output, perturbing critical edges and thus manipulating the classification results. Current defenses, due to their persistent utilization of global-optimization-based end-to-end training schemes, inherently encapsulate the vulnerabilities of GNNs. This is specifically evidenced in their inability to defend against targeted secondary attacks. In this paper, we propose the Graph Agent Network (GAgN) to address the aforementioned vulnerabilities of GNNs. GAgN is a graph-structured agent network in which each node is designed as an 1-hop-view agent. Through the decentralized interactions between agents, they can learn to infer global perceptions to perform tasks including inferring embeddings, degrees and neighbor relationships for given nodes. This empowers nodes to filtering adversarial edges while carrying out classification tasks. Furthermore, agents' limited view prevents malicious messages from propagating globally in GAgN, thereby resisting global-optimization-based secondary attacks. We prove that single-hidden-layer multilayer perceptrons (MLPs) are theoretically sufficient to achieve these functionalities. Experimental results show that GAgN effectively implements all its intended capabilities and, compared to state-of-the-art defenses, achieves optimal classification accuracy on the perturbed datasets.

cs.LG