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Wenlu Xu

Publications and source records attributed to Wenlu Xu.

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Learn then Decide: A Learning Approach for Designing Data Marketplaces

As data marketplaces become increasingly central to the digital economy, it is crucial to design efficient pricing mechanisms that optimize revenue while ensuring fair and adaptive pricing. We introduce the Maximum Auction-to-Posted Price (MAPP) mechanism, a novel two-stage approach that first estimates the bidders' value distribution through auctions and then determines the optimal posted price based on the learned distribution. We establish that MAPP is individually rational and incentive-compatible, ensuring truthful bidding while balancing revenue maximization with minimal price discrimination. On the theoretical side, we establish a statistical viewpoint that recasts revenue optimization as a valuation density estimation problem: we show that revenue regret can be controlled by uniform error in estimating the valuation density. MAPP achieves a regret of $O_p(n^{-1}(\log n)^2)$ when incorporating historical bid data, where $n$ is the number of bids in the current round. For sequential dataset sales over $T$ rounds, we propose an online MAPP mechanism that dynamically adjusts pricing across datasets with varying value distributions. Our approach achieves no-regret learning, with the average cumulative regret converging at a rate of $O_p(T^{-1/2}(\log T)^2)$. We validate the effectiveness of MAPP through simulations and real-world data from the FCC AWS-3 spectrum auction.

stat.ML

Byzantine-Resilient Federated Learning at Edge

Both Byzantine resilience and communication efficiency have attracted tremendous attention recently for their significance in edge federated learning. However, most existing algorithms may fail when dealing with real-world irregular data that behaves in a heavy-tailed manner. To address this issue, we study the stochastic convex and non-convex optimization problem for federated learning at edge and show how to handle heavy-tailed data while retaining the Byzantine resilience, communication efficiency and the optimal statistical error rates simultaneously. Specifically, we first present a Byzantine-resilient distributed gradient descent algorithm that can handle the heavy-tailed data and meanwhile converge under the standard assumptions. To reduce the communication overhead, we further propose another algorithm that incorporates gradient compression techniques to save communication costs during the learning process. Theoretical analysis shows that our algorithms achieve order-optimal statistical error rate in presence of Byzantine devices. Finally, we conduct extensive experiments on both synthetic and real-world datasets to verify the efficacy of our algorithms.

cs.DC

Incentive-Aware Recommender Systems in Two-Sided Markets

Online platforms in the Internet Economy commonly incorporate recommender systems that recommend products (or "arms") to users (or "agents"). A key challenge in this domain arises from myopic agents who are naturally incentivized to exploit by choosing the optimal arm based on current information, rather than exploring various alternatives to gather information that benefits the collective. We propose a novel recommender system that aligns with agents' incentives while achieving asymptotically optimal performance, as measured by regret in repeated interactions. Our framework models this incentive-aware system as a multi-agent bandit problem in two-sided markets, where the interactions of agents and arms are facilitated by recommender systems on online platforms. This model incorporates incentive constraints induced by agents' opportunity costs. In scenarios where opportunity costs are known to the platform, we show the existence of an incentive-compatible recommendation algorithm. This algorithm pools recommendations between a genuinely good arm and an unknown arm using a randomized and adaptive strategy. Moreover, when these opportunity costs are unknown, we introduce an algorithm that randomly pools recommendations across all arms, utilizing the cumulative loss from each arm as feedback for strategic exploration. We demonstrate that both algorithms satisfy an ex-post fairness criterion, which protects agents from over-exploitation. All code for using the proposed algorithms and reproducing results is made available on GitHub.

cs.IR