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Wentao Fu

Publications and source records attributed to Wentao Fu.

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MemSecBench: Tracking Agent Memory Poisoning from Persistence to Consequence and Repair

Memory systems allow agents to retain and reuse information from past interactions, but they can also let malicious content persist. A malicious instruction crafted by an attacker may be stored in long-term memory, recalled much later, and quietly shape a real action. Recent benchmarks increasingly examine agent memory security, yet few trace the same malicious semantics across persistence, downstream consequences, and selective repair under diverse memory-backend comparisons. To address this gap, we introduce MemSecBench, a task-grounded benchmark for the lifecycle security of agent memory systems. It contains 310 cases drawn from 48 realistic contexts across code and science, daily life, and office work. Each case follows a controlled Write--Execute--Forget protocol in an isolated runtime under an exact agent configuration, defined by an agent harness, a memory backend, and an LLM backend. Evidence-based adjudication combines a deterministic write check, checkpoint-specific judge-model evaluations, and programmatic gates across seven lifecycle checkpoints. The experimental design spans a 24-configuration matrix of two agent harnesses, four memory backends, and three LLM backends. Across all 24 configurations, malicious memory persists in 84.2% of all cases, and the full Write--Execute chain succeeds in 50.3%. Among successfully poisoned cases, 59.6% complete the full Execute chain, while 56.1% achieve selective repair.Compared with matched Native configurations, the largest absolute differences are 16.1 percentage points for end-to-end attack success and 41.3 percentage points for selective repair. These descriptive contrasts indicate that the evaluated memory system stacks differ in lifecycle security, both in the propagation of malicious memory and in selective repair after successful memory poisoning.

cs.CR

Traffic-MoE: A Sparse Foundation Model for Network Traffic Security Analysis

As adversaries increasingly weaponize encryption and protocol obfuscation to evade traffic detection, traditional methods are rendered obsolete, necessitating deep learning to unmask sophisticated threats. However, the prohibitive computational costs of existing large models create a critical defense gap, hindering their deployment in real-time and throughput-sensitive environments. To close this vulnerability, we introduce Traffic-MoE, a sparse foundation model tailored for traffic security analysis. By dynamically routing traffic tokens to a small subset of specialized experts, Traffic-MoE effectively decouples model capacity from computational overhead. Extensive evaluations across four security-oriented tasks demonstrate that Traffic-MoE achieves state-of-the-art or highly competitive performance compared to leading competitors. Crucially, it delivers a 70.42% increase in throughput, reduces inference latency by 41.39% while significantly optimizing GPU memory consumption. Beyond efficiency, Traffic-MoE exhibits superior robustness against adversarial traffic shaping and maintains strong detection capabilities in few-shot scenarios, establishing a scalable and resilient paradigm for modern network traffic security analysis.

cs.CR

Multi-view Correlation-aware Network Traffic Detection on Flow Hypergraph

As the Internet rapidly expands, the increasing complexity and diversity of network activities pose significant challenges to effective network governance and security regulation. Network traffic, which serves as a crucial data carrier of network activities, has become indispensable in this process. Network traffic detection aims to monitor, analyze, and evaluate the data flows transmitted across the network to ensure network security and optimize performance. However, existing network traffic detection methods generally suffer from several limitations: 1) a narrow focus on characterizing traffic features from a single perspective; 2) insufficient exploration of discriminative features for different traffic; 3) poor generalization to different traffic scenarios. To address these issues, we propose a multi-view correlation-aware framework named FlowID for network traffic detection. FlowID captures multi-view traffic features via temporal and interaction awareness, while a hypergraph encoder further explores higher-order relationships between flows. To overcome the challenges of data imbalance and label scarcity, we design a dual-contrastive proxy task, enhancing the framework's ability to differentiate between various traffic flows through flow-to-flow and group-to-group contrast. Extensive experiments on five real-world datasets demonstrate that FlowID significantly outperforms existing methods in accuracy, robustness, and generalization across diverse network scenarios, particularly in detecting malicious traffic.

cs.CR

Network Anomaly Traffic Detection via Multi-view Feature Fusion

Traditional anomalous traffic detection methods are based on single-view analysis, which has obvious limitations in dealing with complex attacks and encrypted communications. In this regard, we propose a Multi-view Feature Fusion (MuFF) method for network anomaly traffic detection. MuFF models the temporal and interactive relationships of packets in network traffic based on the temporal and interactive viewpoints respectively. It learns temporal and interactive features. These features are then fused from different perspectives for anomaly traffic detection. Extensive experiments on six real traffic datasets show that MuFF has excellent performance in network anomalous traffic detection, which makes up for the shortcomings of detection under a single perspective.

cs.LG

EG-ConMix: An Intrusion Detection Method based on Graph Contrastive Learning

As the number of IoT devices increases, security concerns become more prominent. The impact of threats can be minimized by deploying Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) by monitoring network traffic, detecting and discovering intrusions, and issuing security alerts promptly. Most intrusion detection research in recent years has been directed towards the pair of traffic itself without considering the interrelationships among them, thus limiting the monitoring of complex IoT network attack events. Besides, anomalous traffic in real networks accounts for only a small fraction, which leads to a severe imbalance problem in the dataset that makes algorithmic learning and prediction extremely difficult. In this paper, we propose an EG-ConMix method based on E-GraphSAGE, incorporating a data augmentation module to fix the problem of data imbalance. In addition, we incorporate contrastive learning to discern the difference between normal and malicious traffic samples, facilitating the extraction of key features. Extensive experiments on two publicly available datasets demonstrate the superior intrusion detection performance of EG-ConMix compared to state-of-the-art methods. Remarkably, it exhibits significant advantages in terms of training speed and accuracy for large-scale graphs.

cs.CR