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William Cai

Publications and source records attributed to William Cai.

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A Causal Framework for Observational Studies of Discrimination

In studies of discrimination, researchers often seek to estimate a causal effect of race or gender on outcomes. For example, in the criminal justice context, one might ask whether arrested individuals would have been subsequently charged or convicted had they been a different race. It has long been known that such counterfactual questions face measurement challenges related to omitted-variable bias, and conceptual challenges related to the definition of causal estimands for largely immutable characteristics. Another concern, which has been the subject of recent debates, is post-treatment bias: many studies of discrimination condition on apparently intermediate outcomes, like being arrested, that themselves may be the product of discrimination, potentially corrupting statistical estimates. There is, however, reason to be optimistic. By carefully defining the estimand -- and by considering the precise timing of events -- we show that a primary causal quantity of interest in discrimination studies can be estimated under an ignorability condition that may hold approximately in some observational settings. We illustrate these ideas by analyzing both simulated data and the charging decisions of a prosecutor's office in a large county in the United States.

stat.ME

Adaptive Sampling Strategies to Construct Equitable Training Datasets

In domains ranging from computer vision to natural language processing, machine learning models have been shown to exhibit stark disparities, often performing worse for members of traditionally underserved groups. One factor contributing to these performance gaps is a lack of representation in the data the models are trained on. It is often unclear, however, how to operationalize representativeness in specific applications. Here we formalize the problem of creating equitable training datasets, and propose a statistical framework for addressing this problem. We consider a setting where a model builder must decide how to allocate a fixed data collection budget to gather training data from different subgroups. We then frame dataset creation as a constrained optimization problem, in which one maximizes a function of group-specific performance metrics based on (estimated) group-specific learning rates and costs per sample. This flexible approach incorporates preferences of model-builders and other stakeholders, as well as the statistical properties of the learning task. When data collection decisions are made sequentially, we show that under certain conditions this optimization problem can be efficiently solved even without prior knowledge of the learning rates. To illustrate our approach, we conduct a simulation study of polygenic risk scores on synthetic genomic data -- an application domain that often suffers from non-representative data collection. We find that our adaptive sampling strategy outperforms several common data collection heuristics, including equal and proportional sampling, demonstrating the value of strategic dataset design for building equitable models.

cs.LG

Fair Allocation through Selective Information Acquisition

Public and private institutions must often allocate scare resources under uncertainty. Banks, for example, extend credit to loan applicants based in part on their estimated likelihood of repaying a loan. But when the quality of information differs across candidates (e.g., if some applicants lack traditional credit histories), common lending strategies can lead to disparities across groups. Here we consider a setting in which decision makers -- before allocating resources -- can choose to spend some of their limited budget further screening select individuals. We present a computationally efficient algorithm for deciding whom to screen that maximizes a standard measure of social welfare. Intuitively, decision makers should screen candidates on the margin, for whom the additional information could plausibly alter the allocation. We formalize this idea by showing the problem can be reduced to solving a series of linear programs. Both on synthetic and real-world datasets, this strategy improves utility, illustrating the value of targeted information acquisition in such decisions. Further, when there is social value for distributing resources to groups for whom we have a priori poor information -- like those without credit scores -- our approach can substantially improve the allocation of limited assets.

cs.CY