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William Kennedy

Publications and source records attributed to William Kennedy.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Detecting and Explaining Unlawful Insider Trading: A Shapley Value and Causal Forest Approach to Identifying Key Drivers and Causal Relationships

Corporate insiders trade for diverse reasons, often possessing Material Non-Public Information (MNPI). Determining whether specific trades leverage MNPI is a significant challenge due to inherent complexity. This study focuses on two critical objectives: accurately detecting Unlawful Insider Trading (UIT) and identifying key features explaining classification. The analysis demonstrates how combining Shapley Values (SHAP) and Causal Forest (CF) reveals these explanatory drivers. The findings underscore the necessity of causality in identifying and interpreting UIT, requiring the consideration of alternative scenarios and potential outcomes. Within a high-dimensional feature space, the proposed architecture integrates state-of-the-art techniques to achieve high classification accuracy. The framework provides robust feature rankings via SHAP and causal significance assessments through CF, facilitating the discovery of unique causal relationships. Statistically significant relationships are documented between the outcome and several key features, including director status, price-to-book ratio, return, and market beta. These features significantly influence the likelihood of UIT, suggesting potential links between insider behavior and factors such as information asymmetry, valuation risk, market volatility, and stock performance. The analysis draws attention to the complexities of financial causality, noting that while initial descriptors offer intuitive insights, deeper examination is required to understand nuanced impacts. These findings reaffirm the architectural flexibility of decision tree models. By incorporating heterogeneity during tree construction, these models effectively uncover latent structures within trade, finance, and governance data, characterizing fraudulent behavior while maintaining reliable results.

q-fin.ST

Navigating Quantum Missteps in Agent-Based Modeling: A Schelling Model Case Study

Quantum computing promises transformative advances, but remains constrained by recurring misconceptions and methodological pitfalls. This paper demonstrates a fundamental incompatibility between traditional agent-based modeling (ABM) implementations and quantum optimization frameworks like Quadratic Unconstrained Binary Optimization (QUBO). Using Schelling's segregation model as a case study, we show that the standard practice of directly translating ABM state observations into QUBO formulations not only fails to deliver quantum advantage, but actively undermines computational efficiency. The fundamental issue is architectural. Traditional ABM implementations entail observing the state of the system at each iteration, systematically destroying the quantum superposition required for computational advantage. Through analysis of Schelling's segregation dynamics on lollipop networks, we demonstrate how abandoning the QUBO reduction paradigm and instead reconceptualizing the research question, from "simulate agent dynamics iteratively until convergence" to "compute minimum of agent moves required for global satisfaction", enables a faster classical solution. This structural reconceptualization yields an algorithm that exploits network symmetries obscured in traditional ABM simulations and QUBO formulations. It establishes a new lower bound which quantum approaches must outperform to achieve advantage. Our work emphasizes that progress in quantum agent-based modeling does not require forcing classical ABM implementations into quantum frameworks. Instead, it should focus on clarifying when quantum advantage is structurally possible, developing best-in-class classical baselines through problem analysis, and fundamentally reformulating research questions rather than preserving classical iterative state change observation paradigms.

quant-ph

Fair Allocation in Crowd-Sourced Systems

In this paper, we address the problem of fair sharing of the total value of a crowd-sourced network system between major participants (founders) and minor participants (crowd) using cooperative game theory. Shapley allocation is regarded as a fair way for computing the shares of all participants in a cooperative game when the values of all possible coalitions could be quantified. We define a class of value functions for crowd-sourced systems which capture the contributions of the founders and the crowd plausibly and derive closed-form expressions for Shapley allocations to both. These value functions are defined for different scenarios, such as presence of oligopolies or geographic spread of the crowd, taking network effects, including Metcalfe's law, into account. A key result we obtain is that under quite general conditions, the crowd participants are collectively owed a share between $\frac{1}{2}$ to $\frac{2}{3}$ of the total value of the crowd-sourced system. We close with an empirical analysis demonstrating consistency of our results with the compensation offered to the crowd participants in some public internet content sharing companies.

cs.GT