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Willy Susilo

Publications and source records attributed to Willy Susilo.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

One Prompt Is Enough: Watermark Laundering Through Foundation Image Models

Invisible watermarks are typically evaluated against predefined perturbations such as compression, blur, noise, cropping, and denoising. Public foundation image models expose a distinct threat: an attacker can submit a watermarked image with a single reconstruction prompt and obtain a visually faithful output from which the invisible watermark can no longer be decoded reliably. We formalize this failure mode as watermark laundering and evaluate it using a joint payload-fidelity profile that combines bit error rate (BER) with visual and semantic preservation. Across six OpenAI and Google image editing models, three representative watermarking schemes, and 1,800 reconstructed outputs, we identify two complementary laundering regimes: OpenAI models produce the strongest payload disruption across the evaluated schemes, whereas Nano Banana 2 shows that DwtDct remains vulnerable under high-fidelity reconstruction. Prompt ablations show that no single removal-oriented instruction is necessary for payload disruption, indicating that the effect is primarily induced by the reconstruction pathway rather than by explicit attack wording. Comparisons with conventional attacks further show that prompt-conditioned reconstruction constitutes a distinct operational attack interface. These findings motivate foundation-model reconstruction as a missing robustness condition in invisible watermark evaluation.

cs.CV

AI Slop and Hallucinations in Vulnerability Assessment: A Survey on Reasoning Failures and Trustworthy Mitigation

The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into cybersecurity has transformed vulnerability assessment, but it has also produced a trustworthiness crisis driven by the unchecked proliferation of "AI slop." These artifacts, hallucinated vulnerabilities, plausible but incorrect patches, and semantically repackaged bug reports, impose a cognitive burden on human triage pipelines that mirrors a denial-of-service attack. This paper surveys the empirical evidence, identifies a unifying mechanism, and traces a path toward trustworthy triage. We formalize a taxonomy of AI slop grounded in a structured literature review and dissect its root cause: the gap between the causal deductive reasoning of security experts and the autoregressive probabilistic generation of current LLMs. We operationalize this gap through a measurable proxy, the Deductive Coverage Score, and show that chain-of-thought prompting and tool-using agents narrow but do not close it. We review mitigation strategies and argue that passive detection and watermarking target provenance rather than correctness, facing fundamental entropy constraints. We instead advocate for active neuro-symbolic verification, mapping each pipeline component to prior systems with documented limits on security inputs. Finally, we specify two evaluation instruments, CVE-Bench and Slop-Score, including dataset construction, metric formulas, and anti-gaming provisions. By shifting evaluation from linguistic fluency to mathematical verifiability, this survey provides a roadmap for securing emerging AI-driven triage systems.

cs.CR

Structural Leakage in Graph Encryption: Attacks and Defenses

Graph encryption schemes (GES) enable secure outsourcing of graph data while supporting efficient queries. This report provides a comprehensive analysis of structural leakage in GES for single-pair shortest path (SPSP) queries, integrating findings from two recent works. First, we analyze PathGES, a scheme designed to resist query recovery attacks through heavy-light decomposition (HLD) and canonical fragment encoding. Our analysis reveals that PathGES suffers from significant imbalances in HLD decomposition, with over 99% of token-path mappings being one-to-one on real-world datasets, enabling both the Falzon-Paterson attack and side-channel inference of path lengths. Second, we present Fragment Tree attack that exploits these structural weaknesses to recover query contents, achieving up to 10.24% exact recovery on sparse graphs. Third, we introduce BlindGES, an enhanced scheme incorporating a Merge-and-Divide mechanism and two-level multimap index that reduces one-to-one mappings to below 20%, cuts setup time by 50%, reduces storage overhead by 32%, and limits path length leakage to under 1%. This report systematically presents attack methodologies, defense mechanisms, security proofs, and experimental evaluations on seven real-world datasets.

cs.CR

FusionVul: A Multimodal Feature Fusion Framework for Source Code Vulnerability Detection

Source code vulnerability detection remains a long-standing challenge due to the increasing scale, structural complexity, and semantic diversity of modern codebases. Conventional static-analysis or rule-based approaches often fail to capture subtle execution dependencies, while single-modality learning models tend to overlook critical structural information embedded beyond the lexical surface of source code. To improve robustness across heterogeneous code patterns, we propose FusionVul, a joint representation learning framework that integrates sequential syntactic representations extracted by a pretrained Transformer encoder with structural semantics propagated through a graph neural network. The framework further incorporates a cross-attention-based feature fusion network to enable fine-grained cross-modal interaction and employs a sample-aware weighting mechanism to integrate multiple predictive branches. Experimental results on four datasets demonstrate that FusionVul achieves superior F1 scores on datasets with highly dispersed function size distributions and broader vulnerability-type coverage, such as SVulD and DiverseVul, reflecting its capability to capture complex and diverse vulnerability patterns.

cs.SE

A Cross-graph Tuning-free GNN Prompting Framework

GNN prompting aims to adapt models across tasks and graphs without requiring extensive retraining. However, most existing graph prompt methods still require task-specific parameter updates and face the issue of generalizing across graphs, limiting their performance and undermining the core promise of prompting. In this work, we introduce a Cross-graph Tuning-free Prompting Framework (CTP), which supports both homogeneous and heterogeneous graphs, can be directly deployed to unseen graphs without further parameter tuning, and thus enables a plug-and-play GNN inference engine. Extensive experiments on few-shot prediction tasks show that, compared to SOTAs, CTP achieves an average accuracy gain of 30.8% and a maximum gain of 54%, confirming its effectiveness and offering a new perspective on graph prompt learning.

cs.LG

Privacy-Enhancing Encryption in Data Sharing: A Survey on Security, Performance and Functionality

The vigorous development of the Internet has spurred exponential data growth, yet data is predominantly stored in isolated user entities, hampering its full value realization. In large-scale deployment of ``AI+industries'' such as smart medical care, intelligent transportation and smart homes, the gap between data supply and demand continues to widen, and establishing an effective data sharing mechanism is the core of promoting high-quality industrial development. However, data sharing faces significant challenges in security, performance, and functional adaptability. Privacy-enhancing encryption technologies, including Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE), Proxy Re-encryption (PRE), and Searchable Encryption (SE), offer promising solutions with distinct advantages in enhancing security, improving flexibility, and enabling efficient sharing. Statistical analysis of relevant literature from 2020 to 2025 reveals a rising research trend in ABE, PRE and SE, focusing on their data sharing applications. Firstly, this work proposes a data sharing process framework and identifies 20 potential attacks across its stages. Secondly, this work integrates ABE, SE, PRE with 12 enhancement technologies and examines their multi-dimensional impacts on the security, performance, and functional adaptability of data sharing schemes. Lastly, this work outlines key application scenarios, challenges, and future research directions, providing valuable insights for advancing data sharing mechanisms based on privacy-enhancing encryption technologies.

cs.CR

Traceable Signatures from Lattices

Traceable signatures (Kiayas et al., EUROCRYPT 2004) is an anonymous digital signature system that extends the tracing power of the opening authority in group signatures. There are many known constructions of traceable signatures, but all are based on number-theoretic/pairing assumptions. For such reason, they may not be secure in the presence of quantum computers. This work revisits the notion of traceable signatures and presents a lattice-based construction provably secure in the quantum random oracle model (QROM).

cs.CR

RAID: Refusal-Aware and Integrated Decoding for Jailbreaking LLMs

Large language models (LLMs) achieve impressive performance across diverse tasks yet remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that bypass safety mechanisms. We present RAID (Refusal-Aware and Integrated Decoding), a framework that systematically probes these weaknesses by crafting adversarial suffixes that induce restricted content while preserving fluency. RAID relaxes discrete tokens into continuous embeddings and optimizes them with a joint objective that (i) encourages restricted responses, (ii) incorporates a refusal-aware regularizer to steer activations away from refusal directions in embedding space, and (iii) applies a coherence term to maintain semantic plausibility and non-redundancy. After optimization, a critic-guided decoding procedure maps embeddings back to tokens by balancing embedding affinity with language-model likelihood. This integration yields suffixes that are both effective in bypassing defenses and natural in form. Experiments on multiple open-source LLMs show that RAID achieves higher attack success rates with fewer queries and lower computational cost than recent white-box and black-box baselines. These findings highlight the importance of embedding-space regularization for understanding and mitigating LLM jailbreak vulnerabilities.

cs.CL

FedGuard: A Diverse-Byzantine-Robust Mechanism for Federated Learning with Major Malicious Clients

Federated learning is a distributed training framework vulnerable to Byzantine attacks, particularly when over 50% of clients are malicious or when datasets are highly non-independent and identically distributed (non-IID). Additionally, most existing defense mechanisms are designed for specific attack types (e.g., gradient similarity-based schemes can only defend against outlier model poisoning), limiting their effectiveness. In response, we propose FedGuard, a novel federated learning mechanism. FedGuard cleverly addresses the aforementioned issues by leveraging the high sensitivity of membership inference to model bias. By requiring clients to include an additional mini-batch of server-specified data in their training, FedGuard can identify and exclude poisoned models, as their confidence in the mini-batch will drop significantly. Our comprehensive evaluation unequivocally shows that, under three highly non-IID datasets, with 90% of clients being Byzantine and seven different types of Byzantine attacks occurring in each round, FedGuard significantly outperforms existing robust federated learning schemes in mitigating various types of Byzantine attacks.

cs.CR

Kill Two Birds with One Stone! Trajectory enabled Unified Online Detection of Adversarial Examples and Backdoor Attacks

The proposed UniGuard is the first unified online detection framework capable of simultaneously addressing adversarial examples and backdoor attacks. UniGuard builds upon two key insights: first, both AE and backdoor attacks have to compromise the inference phase, making it possible to tackle them simultaneously during run-time via online detection. Second, an adversarial input, whether a perturbed sample in AE attacks or a trigger-carrying sample in backdoor attacks, exhibits distinctive trajectory signatures from a benign sample as it propagates through the layers of a DL model in forward inference. The propagation trajectory of the adversarial sample must deviate from that of its benign counterpart; otherwise, the adversarial objective cannot be fulfilled. Detecting these trajectory signatures is inherently challenging due to their subtlety; UniGuard overcomes this by treating the propagation trajectory as a time-series signal, leveraging LSTM and spectrum transformation to amplify differences between adversarial and benign trajectories that are subtle in the time domain. UniGuard exceptional efficiency and effectiveness have been extensively validated across various modalities (image, text, and audio) and tasks (classification and regression), ranging from diverse model architectures against a wide range of AE attacks and backdoor attacks, including challenging partial backdoors and dynamic triggers. When compared to SOTA methods, including ContraNet (NDSS 22) specific for AE detection and TED (IEEE SP 24) specific for backdoor detection, UniGuard consistently demonstrates superior performance, even when matched against each method's strengths in addressing their respective threats-each SOTA fails to parts of attack strategies while UniGuard succeeds for all.

cs.CR

Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing: Generic Constructions and Lattice-Based Instantiations in the Standard Model

Publicly verifiable secret sharing (PVSS) allows a dealer to share a secret among a set of shareholders so that the secret can be reconstructed later from any set of qualified participants. In addition, any public verifier should be able to check the correctness of the sharing and reconstruction process. PVSS has been demonstrated to yield various applications, such as e-voting, distributed key generation, decentralized random number generation protocols, and multi-party computation. Although many concrete PVSS protocols have been proposed, their security is either proven in the random oracle model or relies on quantum-vulnerable assumptions such as factoring or discrete logarithm. In this work, we put forward a generic construction for PVSS that can be instantiated in the standard model under the Learning With Errors (LWE) assumption. Our instantiation provides the first post-quantum PVSS in the standard model, with a reasonable level of asymptotic efficiency.

cs.CR

Intellectual Property Protection for Deep Learning Model and Dataset Intelligence

With the growing applications of Deep Learning (DL), especially recent spectacular achievements of Large Language Models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT and LLaMA, the commercial significance of these remarkable models has soared. However, acquiring well-trained models is costly and resource-intensive. It requires a considerable high-quality dataset, substantial investment in dedicated architecture design, expensive computational resources, and efforts to develop technical expertise. Consequently, safeguarding the Intellectual Property (IP) of well-trained models is attracting increasing attention. In contrast to existing surveys overwhelmingly focusing on model IPP mainly, this survey not only encompasses the protection on model level intelligence but also valuable dataset intelligence. Firstly, according to the requirements for effective IPP design, this work systematically summarizes the general and scheme-specific performance evaluation metrics. Secondly, from proactive IP infringement prevention and reactive IP ownership verification perspectives, it comprehensively investigates and analyzes the existing IPP methods for both dataset and model intelligence. Additionally, from the standpoint of training settings, it delves into the unique challenges that distributed settings pose to IPP compared to centralized settings. Furthermore, this work examines various attacks faced by deep IPP techniques. Finally, we outline prospects for promising future directions that may act as a guide for innovative research.

cs.CR

New Permutation Decomposition Techniques for Efficient Homomorphic Permutation

Homomorphic permutation is fundamental to privacy-preserving computations based on batch-encoding homomorphic encryption. It underpins nearly all homomorphic matrix operations and predominantly influences their complexity. Permutation decomposition as a potential approach to optimize this critical component remains underexplored. In this paper, we propose novel decomposition techniques to optimize homomorphic permutations, advancing homomorphic encryption-based privacy-preserving computations. We start by defining an ideal decomposition form for permutations and propose an algorithm searching for depth-1 ideal decompositions. Based on this, we prove the full-depth ideal decomposability of permutations used in specific homomorphic matrix transposition (HMT) and multiplication (HMM) algorithms, allowing them to achieve asymptotic improvement in speed and rotation key reduction. As a demonstration of applicability, substituting the HMM components in the best-known inference framework of encrypted neural networks with our enhanced version shows up to $3.9\times$ reduction in latency. We further devise a new method for computing arbitrary homomorphic permutations, specifically those with weak structures that cannot be ideally decomposed. We design a network structure that deviates from the conventional scope of decomposition and outperforms the state-of-the-art technique with a speed-up of up to $1.69\times$ under a minimal rotation key requirement.

cs.CR

The Power of Bamboo: On the Post-Compromise Security for Searchable Symmetric Encryption

Dynamic searchable symmetric encryption (DSSE) enables users to delegate the keyword search over dynamically updated encrypted databases to an honest-but-curious server without losing keyword privacy. This paper studies a new and practical security risk to DSSE, namely, secret key compromise (e.g., a user's secret key is leaked or stolen), which threatens all the security guarantees offered by existing DSSE schemes. To address this open problem, we introduce the notion of searchable encryption with key-update (SEKU) that provides users with the option of non-interactive key updates. We further define the notion of post-compromise secure with respect to leakage functions to study whether DSSE schemes can still provide data security after the client's secret key is compromised. We demonstrate that post-compromise security is achievable with a proposed protocol called ``Bamboo". Interestingly, the leakage functions of Bamboo satisfy the requirements for both forward and backward security. We conduct a performance evaluation of Bamboo using a real-world dataset and compare its runtime efficiency with the existing forward-and-backward secure DSSE schemes. The result shows that Bamboo provides strong security with better or comparable performance.

cs.CR

Defense Against Multi-target Trojan Attacks

Adversarial attacks on deep learning-based models pose a significant threat to the current AI infrastructure. Among them, Trojan attacks are the hardest to defend against. In this paper, we first introduce a variation of the Badnet kind of attacks that introduces Trojan backdoors to multiple target classes and allows triggers to be placed anywhere in the image. The former makes it more potent and the latter makes it extremely easy to carry out the attack in the physical space. The state-of-the-art Trojan detection methods fail with this threat model. To defend against this attack, we first introduce a trigger reverse-engineering mechanism that uses multiple images to recover a variety of potential triggers. We then propose a detection mechanism by measuring the transferability of such recovered triggers. A Trojan trigger will have very high transferability i.e. they make other images also go to the same class. We study many practical advantages of our attack method and then demonstrate the detection performance using a variety of image datasets. The experimental results show the superior detection performance of our method over the state-of-the-arts.

cs.CV

CASSOCK: Viable Backdoor Attacks against DNN in The Wall of Source-Specific Backdoor Defences

As a critical threat to deep neural networks (DNNs), backdoor attacks can be categorized into two types, i.e., source-agnostic backdoor attacks (SABAs) and source-specific backdoor attacks (SSBAs). Compared to traditional SABAs, SSBAs are more advanced in that they have superior stealthier in bypassing mainstream countermeasures that are effective against SABAs. Nonetheless, existing SSBAs suffer from two major limitations. First, they can hardly achieve a good trade-off between ASR (attack success rate) and FPR (false positive rate). Besides, they can be effectively detected by the state-of-the-art (SOTA) countermeasures (e.g., SCAn). To address the limitations above, we propose a new class of viable source-specific backdoor attacks, coined as CASSOCK. Our key insight is that trigger designs when creating poisoned data and cover data in SSBAs play a crucial role in demonstrating a viable source-specific attack, which has not been considered by existing SSBAs. With this insight, we focus on trigger transparency and content when crafting triggers for poisoned dataset where a sample has an attacker-targeted label and cover dataset where a sample has a ground-truth label. Specifically, we implement $CASSOCK_{Trans}$ and $CASSOCK_{Cont}$. While both they are orthogonal, they are complementary to each other, generating a more powerful attack, called $CASSOCK_{Comp}$, with further improved attack performance and stealthiness. We perform a comprehensive evaluation of the three $CASSOCK$-based attacks on four popular datasets and three SOTA defenses. Compared with a representative SSBA as a baseline ($SSBA_{Base}$), $CASSOCK$-based attacks have significantly advanced the attack performance, i.e., higher ASR and lower FPR with comparable CDA (clean data accuracy). Besides, $CASSOCK$-based attacks have effectively bypassed the SOTA defenses, and $SSBA_{Base}$ cannot.

cs.CR

Towards Effective and Robust Neural Trojan Defenses via Input Filtering

Trojan attacks on deep neural networks are both dangerous and surreptitious. Over the past few years, Trojan attacks have advanced from using only a single input-agnostic trigger and targeting only one class to using multiple, input-specific triggers and targeting multiple classes. However, Trojan defenses have not caught up with this development. Most defense methods still make inadequate assumptions about Trojan triggers and target classes, thus, can be easily circumvented by modern Trojan attacks. To deal with this problem, we propose two novel "filtering" defenses called Variational Input Filtering (VIF) and Adversarial Input Filtering (AIF) which leverage lossy data compression and adversarial learning respectively to effectively purify potential Trojan triggers in the input at run time without making assumptions about the number of triggers/target classes or the input dependence property of triggers. In addition, we introduce a new defense mechanism called "Filtering-then-Contrasting" (FtC) which helps avoid the drop in classification accuracy on clean data caused by "filtering", and combine it with VIF/AIF to derive new defenses of this kind. Extensive experimental results and ablation studies show that our proposed defenses significantly outperform well-known baseline defenses in mitigating five advanced Trojan attacks including two recent state-of-the-art while being quite robust to small amounts of training data and large-norm triggers.

cs.CR

ABG: A Multi-Party Mixed Protocol Framework for Privacy-Preserving Cooperative Learning

Cooperative learning, that enables two or more data owners to jointly train a model, has been widely adopted to solve the problem of insufficient training data in machine learning. Nowadays, there is an urgent need for institutions and organizations to train a model cooperatively while keeping each other's data privately. To address the issue of privacy-preserving in collaborative learning, secure outsourced computation and federated learning are two typical methods. Nevertheless, there are many drawbacks for these two methods when they are leveraged in cooperative learning. For secure outsourced computation, semi-honest servers need to be introduced. Once the outsourced servers collude or perform other active attacks, the privacy of data will be disclosed. For federated learning, it is difficult to apply to the scenarios where vertically partitioned data are distributed over multiple parties. In this work, we propose a multi-party mixed protocol framework, ABG$^n$, which effectively implements arbitrary conversion between Arithmetic sharing (A), Boolean sharing (B) and Garbled-Circuits sharing (G) for $n$-party scenarios. Based on ABG$^n$, we design a privacy-preserving multi-party cooperative learning system, which allows different data owners to cooperate in machine learning in terms of data security and privacy-preserving. Additionally, we design specific privacy-preserving computation protocols for some typical machine learning methods such as logistic regression and neural networks. Compared with previous work, the proposed method has a wider scope of application and does not need to rely on additional servers. Finally, we evaluate the performance of ABG$^n$ on the local setting and on the public cloud setting. The experiments indicate that ABG$^n$ has excellent performance, especially in the network environment with low latency.

cs.CR