arXiv subjects

Wing Suen

Publications and source records attributed to Wing Suen.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Multi-Sender Disclosure with Costs

We study voluntary disclosure with multiple biased senders who may bear costs for disclosing or concealing their private information. Under relevant assumptions, disclosures are strategic substitutes under a disclosure cost but complements under a concealment cost. Additional senders thus impede any sender's disclosure under a disclosure cost but promote it under a concealment cost. In the former case, a decision maker can be harmed by additional senders, even when senders have opposing interests. The effects under both kinds of message costs turn on how a sender, when concealing his information, expects others' messages to systematically sway the decision maker's belief.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2023

Coarse Information Design

We study an information design problem with continuous state and discrete signal space. Under convex and S-shaped value functions, the optimal information structure is interval-partitional and exhibits a dual expectations property: each induced signal is the conditional mean (taken under the prior density) of each interval; and each interval cutoff is the barycenter (taken under the value function curvature) of the interval formed by neighboring signals. This property enables an examination into which part of the state space is more finely partitioned. The analysis can be extended to general value functions and adapted to study coarse mechanism design.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2022

Information Design in Cheap Talk

An uninformed sender publicly commits to an informative experiment about an uncertain state, privately observes its outcome, and sends a cheap-talk message to a receiver. We provide an algorithm valid for arbitrary state-dependent preferences that will determine the sender's optimal experiment and his equilibrium payoff under binary state space. We give sufficient conditions for informative information transmission. These conditions depend more on marginal incentives -- how payoffs vary with the state -- than on the alignment of sender's and receiver's rankings over actions within a state. The algorithm can be easily modified to study the canonical cheap talk game with a perfectly informed sender.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2020

Information Validates the Prior: A Theorem on Bayesian Updating and Applications

We develop a result on expected posteriors for Bayesians with heterogenous priors, dubbed information validates the prior (IVP). Under familiar ordering requirements, Anne expects a (Blackwell) more informative experiment to bring Bob's posterior mean closer to Anne's prior mean. We apply the result in two contexts of games of asymmetric information: voluntary testing or certification, and costly signaling or falsification. IVP can be used to determine how an agent's behavior responds to additional exogenous or endogenous information. We discuss economic implications.

econ.TH↗