arXiv subjects

Wolfgang Kuhle

Publications and source records attributed to Wolfgang Kuhle.

13 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Equilibrium Selection in Coordination Games with Planned Actions and Scouting

We study coordination games in which every action requires planning and preparation. Before players act, they can revise their plans based on partially revealing information about their adversary's preparations. Precise information enables agents to screen for cooperation, selecting the payoff-dominant equilibrium either via small exogenous trembles or via payoff uncertainty. Across scenarios, we emphasize that decomposing an action into (i) preparation and (ii) execution allows us to analyze simultaneous-move games where players partially observe each other's contemporaneous actions.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

Endogenous Fertility Waves and the Dynamics of Utility in an Overlapping Generations Model

This paper investigates the conditions under which the Easterlin hypothesis holds within a neoclassical overlapping generations model with endogenous capital accumulation, wages, interest rates, and fertility. We develop a tractable analytical framework that maps economic transitions into utility space via a continuously differentiable first-order difference equation for cohort lifetime utilities. This reformulation allows for a transparent normative evaluation of non-steady-state paths without requiring explicit solutions to the underlying nonlinear system. Within this framework, we show that when fertility cycles emerge and children are normal goods, the utility of small cohorts strictly exceeds that of large cohorts. Crucially, this cohort-welfare asymmetry is driven by fertility preferences and is independent of the economy's position relative to the golden rule.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2026

Janus-Faced Technological Progress and the Arms Race in the Education of Humans and Chatbots

We study the conditions under which technological advances, in combination with a lognormal wage distribution, incentivize agents into an inefficient educational arms race. Our model emphasizes that lognormal wage distributions imply that agents' wages increase exponentially in the level of their skill as well as in the level of technology. In turn, this exponential relation between skills, technology, and wages pressures agents into an exhausting race for the tails of the economy's skill distribution. Moreover, technological advances and overinvestment in education increase GDP and inequality, while welfare may decline. In an alternative interpretation, our model studies firms that invest in artificial intelligence of their chatbots and AI agents. For a wide range of specifications, firms, just like humans, have an incentive to choose corner solutions where investment is limited only by borrowing constraints.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2024

Information Aggregation in Markets with Analysts, Experts, and Chatbots

The present paper shows that it can be advantageous for traders to publish their information on the true value of an asset even if they (i) cannot build a position in the asset prior to the publication of their information and (ii) cannot charge for the provision of information. The model also shows that the informational content of prices is U-shaped in the number of traders who publish their information. Put differently, information aggregation works best if either no trader, or if every trader publishes his information. Small groups of distinguished experts are, on the contrary, an obstacle to information aggregation. The model's key assumption is that the perception/interpretation of a given piece of published information differs slightly across traders.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2024

Games with Planned Actions and Scouting

We study games in which every action requires planning and preparation. Moreover, before players act, they can revise their plans based on partially revealing information that they receive on their adversary's preparations. In turn, we examine how players' information over each others' planned actions influences winning odds in matching pennies games, and how it incentivises the use of decoys, deception, and camouflage. Across scenarios, we emphasize that the decomposition of an action into (i) a preparation to act and (ii) the execution of the action, allows to analyze one-shot simultaneous-move games, where players partially observe each others' contemporaneous actions.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2021

The Inflation Game

We study a game where households convert paper assets, such as money, into consumption goods, to preempt inflation. The game features a unique equilibrium with high (low) inflation, if money supply is high (low). For intermediate levels of money supply, there exist multiple equilibria with either high or low inflation. Equilibria with moderate inflation, however, do not exist, and can thus not be targeted by a central bank. That is, depending on agents' equilibrium play, money supply is always either too high or too low for moderate inflation. We also show that inflation rates of long-lived goods, such as houses, cars, expensive watches, furniture, or paintings, are a leading indicator for broader, economy wide, inflation.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2021

On Market Design and Latency Arbitrage

We argue that contemporary stock market designs are, due to traders' inability to fully express their preferences over the execution times of their orders, prone to latency arbitrage. In turn, we propose a new order type which allows traders to specify the time at which their orders are executed after reaching the exchange. Using this order type, traders can synchronize order executions across different exchanges, such that high-frequency traders, even if they operate at the speed of light, can no-longer engage in latency arbitrage.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2021

Observing Actions in Global Games

We study Bayesian coordination games where agents receive noisy private information over the game's payoffs, and over each others' actions. If private information over actions is of low quality, equilibrium uniqueness obtains in a manner similar to a global games setting. On the contrary, if private information over actions (and thus over the game's payoff coefficient) is precise, agents can coordinate on multiple equilibria. We argue that our results apply to phenomena such as bank-runs, currency crises, recessions, or riots and revolutions, where agents monitor each other closely.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2019

Observing Actions in Bayesian Games

We study Bayesian coordination games where agents receive noisy private information over the game's payoff structure, and over each others' actions. If private information over actions is precise, we find that agents can coordinate on multiple equilibria. If private information over actions is of low quality, equilibrium uniqueness obtains like in a standard global games setting. The current model, with its flexible information structure, can thus be used to study phenomena such as bank-runs, currency crises, recessions, riots, and revolutions, where agents rely on information over each others' actions.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2018

Thought Viruses and Asset Prices

We use insights from epidemiology, namely the SIR model, to study how agents infect each other with "investment ideas." Once an investment idea "goes viral," equilibrium prices exhibit the typical "fever peak," which is characteristic for speculative excesses. Using our model, we identify a time line of symptoms that indicate whether a boom is in its early or later stages. Regarding the market's top, we find that prices start to decline while the number of infected agents, who buy the asset, is still rising. Moreover, the presence of fully rational agents (i) accelerates booms (ii) lowers peak prices and (iii) produces broad, drawn-out, market tops.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2016

An Equilibrium Model with Computationally Constrained Agents

We study a large economy in which firms cannot compute exact solutions to the non-linear equations that characterize the equilibrium price at which they can sell future output. Instead, firms use polynomial expansions to approximate prices. The precision with which they can compute prices is endogenous and depends on the overall level of supply. At the same time, firms' individual supplies, and thus aggregate supply, depend on the precision with which they approximate prices. This interrelation between supply and price forecast induces multiple equilibria, with inefficiently low output, in economies that otherwise have a unique, efficient equilibrium. Moreover, exogenous parameter changes, which would increase output were there no computational frictions, can diminish agents' ability to approximate future prices, and reduce output. Our model therefore accommodates the intuition that interventions, such as unprecedented quantitative easing, can put agents into "uncharted territory".

econ.GN↗

arXiv2015

Darwinian Adverse Selection

We develop a model to study the role of rationality in economics and biology. The model's agents differ continuously in their ability to make rational choices. The agents' objective is to ensure their individual survival over time or, equivalently, to maximize profits. In equilibrium, however, rational agents who maximize their objective survival probability are, individually and collectively, eliminated by the forces of competition. Instead of rationality, there emerges a unique distribution of irrational players who are individually not fit for the struggle of survival. The selection of irrational players over rational ones relies on the fact that all rational players coordinate on the same optimal action, which leaves them collectively undiversified and thus vulnerable to aggregate risks.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2013

A Global Game with Heterogenous Priors

This paper relaxes the common prior assumption in the public and private information game of Morris and Shin (2000, 2004). For the generalized game, where the agent's prior expectations are heterogenous, it derives a sharp condition for the emergence of unique/multiple equilibria. This condition indicates that unique equilibria are played if player's public disagreement is substantial. If disagreement is small, equilibrium multiplicity depends on the relative precisions of private signals and subjective priors. Extensions to environments with public signals of exogenous and endogenous quality show that prior heterogeneity, unlike heterogeneity in private information, provides a robust anchor for unique equilibria. Finally, irrespective of whether priors are common or not, we show that public signals can ensure equilibrium uniqueness, rather than multiplicity, if they are sufficiently precise.

q-fin.TR↗