arXiv subjects

Xiangchen Guan

Publications and source records attributed to Xiangchen Guan.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Trust Is Not Enough: Influence Calibration for On-Policy Self-Distillation in Agentic RL

On-policy self-distillation (OPSD) gives language agents dense token-level supervision from a privileged self-teacher on the policy's own trajectories. Existing methods allocate this supervision mainly by teacher trust, but trust does not reveal whether emphasizing a token supports the current policy objective. We call this the trust-utility mismatch and introduce Influence Calibration for Self-Distillation (ICSD). For each supervised token, ICSD measures the first-order response of its importance-weighted RL surrogate contribution to a teacher-directed output perturbation. Batch-adaptive calibration converts this non-stationary signal into a bounded allocation weight while preserving the original auxiliary-loss mass within each action turn. These detached weights affect only the distillation loss and require no additional model pass. Across ALFWorld, WebShop, and Search-QA, ICSD improves all matched aggregate metrics over trust-only allocation under Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) and Group-in-Group Policy Optimization (GiGPO), across two model families spanning 1.5B to 7B. At 7B, it reaches 96.1% ALFWorld success and a WebShop score of 93.1. Frozen-batch analyses show that ICSD reduces teacher-supported mass assigned to objective-opposed tokens from 60.1% to 37.8% and raises cosine compatibility with the RL gradient by 0.192. A companion repository is avail- able at https://github.com/lanqz7766/Influence-Calibration-for-On-Policy-Self-Distillation-in-Agentic-RL.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

MemPrism: Task-Conditioned Relational Memory Views for Long-Horizon Agents

Long-horizon agents rely on memory to reuse experiences, yet existing memory systems often assume that evidence can be directly consumed through a fixed representation. This leads to representation mismatch, where relevant information is available but not organized for the current decision. To this end, we propose MemPrism, a task-conditioned relational memory framework that separates persistent experience storage from decision-time working memory. MemPrism records interactions as the event stream and dynamically constructs relational views according to the current task context. A lightweight view policy selects the relation structure, evidence range, outcome condition, and granularity, while a deterministic composer and render transform historical facts into a temporary optical working-memory view for a frozen task policy. Experiments on long-horizon embodied and web-agent benchmarks show that MemPrism consistently improves the task performance, especially as trajectories become longer, while reducing memory token consumption. Furthermore, the learned view policy transfers across different VLMs without additional adaptation, demonstrating the effectiveness of task-conditioned relational views as a general memory interface for agents.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Decoy Images Amplify Caption-Mediated Defenses Against Encoded Jailbreaks

We report a counter-intuitive interaction between image inputs and existing black-box defenses on Vision--Language Models (VLMs): pairing an encoded jailbreak prompt with an unrelated decoy image can sharply lower attack success rate (ASR). The operative change is in the defense pipeline, not in the image. Across five frontier VLMs, two encoded-attack families, and three black-box defenses, a caption-mediated defense (ECSO) that leaves ASR essentially unchanged on text-only encoded input drops it by up to $73$pp once a content-free decoy is attached; every non-saturated contrast is significant under exact McNemar tests. We advance two hypotheses for this pattern, supported by indirect evidence rather than pipeline introspection, since a black-box threat model precludes inspecting vendor internals: caption-mediated defenses branch on image presence, and intrinsic image-side safety engages on image-resident content. Three controls constrain the explanation. Blank-canvas and natural-photograph decoys reproduce the effect on every model, implicating image presence rather than content; the effect replicates on three open-weight VLMs served with no moderation layer, so it is not a vendor-filtering artifact; and a non-symbolic, meaning-based encoder reproduces it, so it is not specific to symbolic obfuscation. Attaching a decoy unconditionally is not deployable --- it raises benign refusal to $20$--$79\%$, an inflation of $+10$ to $+67$pp --- but gating attachment on a lightweight encoded-input detector returns benign refusal to the text baseline while preserving the safety gain wherever the detector fires, making detector recall the binding constraint. Under adaptive attacks that target the caption-mediated re-check, the effect degrades but holds. We frame this as an observation about pipeline interaction, not as a robust defense.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

Attack Ensembles Expose a Safety-Utility Trade-off in Black-Box Guard Defenses Against Encoded VLM Jailbreaks

Safety classifiers ("guards") are the dominant black-box defense for vision-language models, yet a guard judges an input's surface form, not its meaning: a harmful request re-encoded as set theory, formal logic, a classical language, code, or text rendered inside an image slips past a guard that would block it in plain language - the decode gap. The standard fix is a preprocessor that recovers image content and decodes the encoding before the guard. We build one and evaluate it against an ensemble of eleven published encoding attacks, counting a behavior as broken if any attack succeeds. That metric separates two mechanisms such defenses conflate. Restoring a view the guard never had improves it on both axes at once: it blocks far more attacks, and, measured on a category-balanced benign set, it blocks fewer benign requests, because restating a request normalizes the borderline phrasing a classifier over-flags. It still does not make the system safer: against an attacker free to choose among eleven encodings, closing one channel relocates the success rather than removing it, and no ensemble contrast survives multiple-comparison correction. What does lower ensemble attack success is re-screening the recovered pre-decode surface, and that step is where the entire benign cost falls. The safety-utility trade-off is therefore not a property of recovery; it is localized to one step. Across the full guard x target x condition factorial, no configuration reaches an ensemble attack-success rate at or below 40% while holding benign over-refusal under 70%. The per-attack averages usually reported understate the attacker roughly fourfold, which is why this frontier is easy to miss. Composing across defense families is the one lever that moved the safety axis, beating every configuration we measured, and still landing far outside any deployable refusal budget.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

Borrowed Strength: Best-of-N Search over a Code EncodingBreaks Self-Check Jailbreak Defenses

A self-check defense asks the target model to assess a request before answering it; SAGE, the strongest published instance, reports an average 99% defense success rate. We show it can be breached by composing two attacks that are individually harmless against it: an established code-completion encoding and an established best-of-N search, neither of which exceeds 4.7% of behaviors alone. Composed, with the search budget spent on the encoding, they reach 67/22/15% across three open targets, and the effect persists on a 70B target. We then explain the composition rather than only reporting it. First, a self-check defense borrows its strength from the target: SAGE does not detect the attack, it asks the model to, and the four targets convert that request into an explicit refusal between 32% and 97% of the time, which orders the spread in defended coverage even though undefended reach is near-identical. Second, which attack survives is decided by the type of defense, and it inverts: against transform defenses the code encoding retains far more of its undefended reach than the character search, while against gate defenses the ordering flips. We account for this with the number of independent probes an attack delivers to a defense's decision boundary. Finally, we report a validity defect we found and repaired in our own pipeline, a deterministic attack under greedy decoding has no best-of-N variation channel at all, and give the one-line diagnostic that detects it. All claims rest on 310,000 generations scored by a human-validated judge.

cs.CR↗