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Xiangzhe Xu

Publications and source records attributed to Xiangzhe Xu.

23 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

LOTUS: Evasive and Resilient Backdoor Attacks through Sub-Partitioning

Backdoor attack poses a significant security threat to Deep Learning applications. Existing attacks are often not evasive to established backdoor detection techniques. This susceptibility primarily stems from the fact that these attacks typically leverage a universal trigger pattern or transformation function, such that the trigger can cause misclassification for any input. In response to this, recent papers have introduced attacks using sample-specific invisible triggers crafted through special transformation functions. While these approaches manage to evade detection to some extent, they reveal vulnerability to existing backdoor mitigation techniques. To address and enhance both evasiveness and resilience, we introduce a novel backdoor attack LOTUS. Specifically, it leverages a secret function to separate samples in the victim class into a set of partitions and applies unique triggers to different partitions. Furthermore, LOTUS incorporates an effective trigger focusing mechanism, ensuring only the trigger corresponding to the partition can induce the backdoor behavior. Extensive experimental results show that LOTUS can achieve high attack success rate across 4 datasets and 7 model structures, and effectively evading 13 backdoor detection and mitigation techniques. The code is available at https://github.com/Megum1/LOTUS.

cs.CV↗

CodeArt: Better Code Models by Attention Regularization When Symbols Are Lacking

Transformer based code models have impressive performance in many software engineering tasks. However, their effectiveness degrades when symbols are missing or not informative. The reason is that the model may not learn to pay attention to the right correlations/contexts without the help of symbols. We propose a new method to pre-train general code models when symbols are lacking. We observe that in such cases, programs degenerate to something written in a very primitive language. We hence propose to use program analysis to extract contexts a priori (instead of relying on symbols and masked language modeling as in vanilla models). We then leverage a novel attention masking method to only allow the model attending to these contexts, e.g., bi-directional program dependence transitive closures and token co-occurrences. In the meantime, the inherent self-attention mechanism is utilized to learn which of the allowed attentions are more important compared to others. To realize the idea, we enhance the vanilla tokenization and model architecture of a BERT model, construct and utilize attention masks, and introduce a new pre-training algorithm. We pre-train this BERT-like model from scratch, using a dataset of 26 million stripped binary functions with explicit program dependence information extracted by our tool. We apply the model in three downstream tasks: binary similarity, type inference, and malware family classification. Our pre-trained model can improve the SOTAs in these tasks from 53% to 64%, 49% to 60%, and 74% to 94%, respectively. It also substantially outperforms other general pre-training techniques of code understanding models.

cs.SE↗

PEM: Representing Binary Program Semantics for Similarity Analysis via a Probabilistic Execution Model

Binary similarity analysis determines if two binary executables are from the same source program. Existing techniques leverage static and dynamic program features and may utilize advanced Deep Learning techniques. Although they have demonstrated great potential, the community believes that a more effective representation of program semantics can further improve similarity analysis. In this paper, we propose a new method to represent binary program semantics. It is based on a novel probabilistic execution engine that can effectively sample the input space and the program path space of subject binaries. More importantly, it ensures that the collected samples are comparable across binaries, addressing the substantial variations of input specifications. Our evaluation on 9 real-world projects with 35k functions, and comparison with 6 state-of-the-art techniques show that PEM can achieve a precision of 96% with common settings, outperforming the baselines by 10-20%.

cs.SE↗

Detecting Backdoors in Pre-trained Encoders

Self-supervised learning in computer vision trains on unlabeled data, such as images or (image, text) pairs, to obtain an image encoder that learns high-quality embeddings for input data. Emerging backdoor attacks towards encoders expose crucial vulnerabilities of self-supervised learning, since downstream classifiers (even further trained on clean data) may inherit backdoor behaviors from encoders. Existing backdoor detection methods mainly focus on supervised learning settings and cannot handle pre-trained encoders especially when input labels are not available. In this paper, we propose DECREE, the first backdoor detection approach for pre-trained encoders, requiring neither classifier headers nor input labels. We evaluate DECREE on over 400 encoders trojaned under 3 paradigms. We show the effectiveness of our method on image encoders pre-trained on ImageNet and OpenAI's CLIP 400 million image-text pairs. Our method consistently has a high detection accuracy even if we have only limited or no access to the pre-training dataset.

cs.CV↗

BEAGLE: Forensics of Deep Learning Backdoor Attack for Better Defense

Deep Learning backdoor attacks have a threat model similar to traditional cyber attacks. Attack forensics, a critical counter-measure for traditional cyber attacks, is hence of importance for defending model backdoor attacks. In this paper, we propose a novel model backdoor forensics technique. Given a few attack samples such as inputs with backdoor triggers, which may represent different types of backdoors, our technique automatically decomposes them to clean inputs and the corresponding triggers. It then clusters the triggers based on their properties to allow automatic attack categorization and summarization. Backdoor scanners can then be automatically synthesized to find other instances of the same type of backdoor in other models. Our evaluation on 2,532 pre-trained models, 10 popular attacks, and comparison with 9 baselines show that our technique is highly effective. The decomposed clean inputs and triggers closely resemble the ground truth. The synthesized scanners substantially outperform the vanilla versions of existing scanners that can hardly generalize to different kinds of attacks.

cs.CR↗