arXiv subjects

Xiaohui Bei

Publications and source records attributed to Xiaohui Bei.

36 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2021

Least Square Calibration for Peer Review

Peer review systems such as conference paper review often suffer from the issue of miscalibration. Previous works on peer review calibration usually only use the ordinal information or assume simplistic reviewer scoring functions such as linear functions. In practice, applications like academic conferences often rely on manual methods, such as open discussions, to mitigate miscalibration. It remains an important question to develop algorithms that can handle different types of miscalibrations based on available prior knowledge. In this paper, we propose a flexible framework, namely least square calibration (LSC), for selecting top candidates from peer ratings. Our framework provably performs perfect calibration from noiseless linear scoring functions under mild assumptions, yet also provides competitive calibration results when the scoring function is from broader classes beyond linear functions and with arbitrary noise. On our synthetic dataset, we empirically demonstrate that our algorithm consistently outperforms the baseline which select top papers based on the highest average ratings.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2021

Maximin Fairness with Mixed Divisible and Indivisible Goods

We study fair resource allocation when the resources contain a mixture of divisible and indivisible goods, focusing on the well-studied fairness notion of maximin share fairness (MMS). With only indivisible goods, a full MMS allocation may not exist, but a constant multiplicative approximate allocation always does. We analyze how the MMS approximation guarantee would be affected when the resources to be allocated also contain divisible goods. In particular, we show that the worst-case MMS approximation guarantee with mixed goods is no worse than that with only indivisible goods. However, there exist problem instances to which adding some divisible resources would strictly decrease the MMS approximation ratio of the instance. On the algorithmic front, we propose a constructive algorithm that will always produce an $α$-MMS allocation for any number of agents, where $α$ takes values between $1/2$ and $1$ and is a monotone increasing function determined by how agents value the divisible goods relative to their MMS values.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2021

The Price of Fairness for Indivisible Goods

We investigate the efficiency of fair allocations of indivisible goods using the well-studied price of fairness concept. Previous work has focused on classical fairness notions such as envy-freeness, proportionality, and equitability. However, these notions cannot always be satisfied for indivisible goods, leading to certain instances being ignored in the analysis. In this paper, we focus instead on notions with guaranteed existence, including envy-freeness up to one good (EF1), balancedness, maximum Nash welfare (MNW), and leximin. We also introduce the concept of strong price of fairness, which captures the efficiency loss in the worst fair allocation as opposed to that in the best fair allocation as in the price of fairness. We mostly provide tight or asymptotically tight bounds on the worst-case efficiency loss for allocations satisfying these notions, for both the price of fairness and the strong price of fairness.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2021

Fair Division of Mixed Divisible and Indivisible Goods

We study the problem of fair division when the resources contain both divisible and indivisible goods. Classic fairness notions such as envy-freeness (EF) and envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) cannot be directly applied to the mixed goods setting. In this work, we propose a new fairness notion envy-freeness for mixed goods (EFM), which is a direct generalization of both EF and EF1 to the mixed goods setting. We prove that an EFM allocation always exists for any number of agents. We also propose efficient algorithms to compute an EFM allocation for two agents and for $n$ agents with piecewise linear valuations over the divisible goods. Finally, we relax the envy-free requirement, instead asking for $ε$-envy-freeness for mixed goods ($ε$-EFM), and present an algorithm that finds an $ε$-EFM allocation in time polynomial in the number of agents, the number of indivisible goods, and $1/ε$.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

Truthful Fair Division without Free Disposal

We study the problem of fairly dividing a heterogeneous resource, commonly known as cake cutting and chore division, in the presence of strategic agents. While a number of results in this setting have been established in previous works, they rely crucially on the free disposal assumption, meaning that the mechanism is allowed to throw away part of the resource at no cost. In the present work, we remove this assumption and focus on mechanisms that always allocate the entire resource. We exhibit a truthful and envy-free mechanism for cake cutting and chore division for two agents with piecewise uniform valuations, and we complement our result by showing that such a mechanism does not exist when certain additional constraints are imposed on the mechanisms. Moreover, we provide bounds on the efficiency of mechanisms satisfying various properties, and give truthful mechanisms for multiple agents with restricted classes of valuations.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

Dividing a Graphical Cake

We consider the classical cake-cutting problem where we wish to fairly divide a heterogeneous resource, often modeled as a cake, among interested agents. Work on the subject typically assumes that the cake is represented by an interval. In this paper, we introduce a generalized setting where the cake can be in the form of the set of edges of an undirected graph. This allows us to model the division of road or cable networks. Unlike in the canonical setting, common fairness criteria such as proportionality cannot always be satisfied in our setting if each agent must receive a connected subgraph. We determine the optimal approximation of proportionality that can be obtained for any number of agents with arbitrary valuations, and exhibit tight guarantees for each graph in the case of two agents. In addition, when more than one connected piece per agent is allowed, we establish the best egalitarian welfare guarantee for each total number of connected pieces. We also study a number of variants and extensions, including when approximate equitability is considered, or when the item to be divided is undesirable (also known as chore division).

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

From independent sets and vertex colorings to isotropic spaces and isotropic decompositions

In the 1970's, Lovász built a bridge between graphs and alternating matrix spaces, in the context of perfect matchings (FCT 1979). A similar connection between bipartite graphs and matrix spaces plays a key role in the recent resolutions of the non-commutative rank problem (Garg-Gurvits-Oliveira-Wigderson, FOCS 2016; Ivanyos-Qiao-Subrahmanyam, ITCS 2017). In this paper, we lay the foundation for another bridge between graphs and alternating matrix spaces, in the context of independent sets and vertex colorings. The corresponding structures in alternating matrix spaces are isotropic spaces and isotropic decompositions, both useful structures in group theory and manifold theory. We first show that the maximum independent set problem and the vertex c-coloring problem reduce to the maximum isotropic space problem and the isotropic c-decomposition problem, respectively. Next, we show that several topics and results about independent sets and vertex colorings have natural correspondences for isotropic spaces and decompositions. These include algorithmic problems, such as the maximum independent set problem for bipartite graphs, and exact exponential-time algorithms for the chromatic number, as well as mathematical questions, such as the number of maximal independent sets, and the relation between the maximum degree and the chromatic number. These connections lead to new interactions between graph theory and algebra. Some results have concrete applications to group theory and manifold theory, and we initiate a variant of these structures in the context of quantum information theory. Finally, we propose several open questions for further exploration. This paper is dedicated to the memory of Ker-I Ko.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2019

Dynamic Trip-Vehicle Dispatch with Scheduled and On-Demand Requests

Transportation service providers that dispatch drivers and vehicles to riders start to support both on-demand ride requests posted in real time and rides scheduled in advance, leading to new challenges which, to the best of our knowledge, have not been addressed by existing works. To fill the gap, we design novel trip-vehicle dispatch algorithms to handle both types of requests while taking into account an estimated request distribution of on-demand requests. At the core of the algorithms is the newly proposed Constrained Spatio-Temporal value function (CST-function), which is polynomial-time computable and represents the expected value a vehicle could gain with the constraint that it needs to arrive at a specific location at a given time. Built upon CST-function, we design a randomized best-fit algorithm for scheduled requests and an online planning algorithm for on-demand requests given the scheduled requests as constraints. We evaluate the algorithms through extensive experiments on a real-world dataset of an online ride-hailing platform.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2019

Cake Cutting on Graphs: A Discrete and Bounded Proportional Protocol

The classical cake cutting problem studies how to find fair allocations of a heterogeneous and divisible resource among multiple agents. Two of the most commonly studied fairness concepts in cake cutting are proportionality and envy-freeness. It is well known that a proportional allocation among $n$ agents can be found efficiently via simple protocols [16]. For envy-freeness, in a recent breakthrough, Aziz and Mackenzie [5] proposed a discrete and bounded envy-free protocol for any number of players. However, the protocol suffers from high multiple-exponential query complexity and it remains open to find simpler and more efficient envy-free protocols. In this paper we consider a variation of the cake cutting problem by assuming an underlying graph over the agents whose edges describe their acquaintance relationships, and agents evaluate their shares relatively to those of their neighbors. An allocation is called locally proportional if each agent thinks she receives at least the average value over her neighbors. Local proportionality generalizes proportionality and is in an interesting middle ground between proportionality and envy-freeness: its existence is guaranteed by that of an envy-free allocation, but no simple protocol is known to produce such a locally proportional allocation for general graphs. Previous works showed locally proportional protocols for special classes of graphs, and it is listed in both [1] and [8] as an open question to design simple locally proportional protocols for more general classes of graphs. In this paper we completely resolved this open question by presenting a discrete and bounded locally proportional protocol for any given graphs. Our protocol has a query complexity of only single exponential, which is significantly smaller than the six towers of $n$ query complexity of the envy-free protocol given in [5].

cs.DS↗

arXiv2017

Networked Fairness in Cake Cutting

We introduce a graphical framework for fair division in cake cutting, where comparisons between agents are limited by an underlying network structure. We generalize the classical fairness notions of envy-freeness and proportionality to this graphical setting. Given a simple undirected graph G, an allocation is envy-free on G if no agent envies any of her neighbor's share, and is proportional on G if every agent values her own share no less than the average among her neighbors, with respect to her own measure. These generalizations open new research directions in developing simple and efficient algorithms that can produce fair allocations under specific graph structures. On the algorithmic frontier, we first propose a moving-knife algorithm that outputs an envy-free allocation on trees. The algorithm is significantly simpler than the discrete and bounded envy-free algorithm recently designed by Aziz and Mackenzie for complete graphs. Next, we give a discrete and bounded algorithm for computing a proportional allocation on descendant graphs, a class of graphs by taking a rooted tree and connecting all its ancestor-descendant pairs.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2016

Ascending-Price Algorithms for Unknown Markets

We design a simple ascending-price algorithm to compute a $(1+\varepsilon)$-approximate equilibrium in Arrow-Debreu exchange markets with weak gross substitute (WGS) property, which runs in time polynomial in market parameters and $\log 1/\varepsilon$. This is the first polynomial-time algorithm for most of the known tractable classes of Arrow-Debreu markets, which is easy to implement and avoids heavy machinery such as the ellipsoid method. In addition, our algorithm can be applied in unknown market setting without exact knowledge about the number of agents, their individual utilities and endowments. Instead, our algorithm only relies on queries to a global demand oracle by posting prices and receiving aggregate demand for goods as feedback. When demands are real-valued functions of prices, the oracles can only return values of bounded precision based on real utility functions. Due to this more realistic assumption, precision and representation of prices and demands become a major technical challenge, and we develop new tools and insights that may be of independent interest. Furthermore, our approach also gives the first polynomial-time algorithm to compute an exact equilibrium for markets with spending constraint utilities, a piecewise linear concave generalization of linear utilities. This resolves an open problem posed by Duan and Mehlhorn (2015).

cs.GT↗

arXiv2016

Computing Equilibria in Markets with Budget-Additive Utilities

We present the first analysis of Fisher markets with buyers that have budget-additive utility functions. Budget-additive utilities are elementary concave functions with numerous applications in online adword markets and revenue optimization problems. They extend the standard case of linear utilities and have been studied in a variety of other market models. In contrast to the frequently studied CES utilities, they have a global satiation point which can imply multiple market equilibria with quite different characteristics. Our main result is an efficient combinatorial algorithm to compute a market equilibrium with a Pareto-optimal allocation of goods. It relies on a new descending-price approach and, as a special case, also implies a novel combinatorial algorithm for computing a market equilibrium in linear Fisher markets. We complement these positive results with a number of hardness results for related computational questions. We prove that it is NP-hard to compute a market equilibrium that maximizes social welfare, and it is PPAD-hard to find any market equilibrium with utility functions with separate satiation points for each buyer and each good.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2013

Solving Linear Programming with Constraints Unknown

What is the value of input information in solving linear programming? The celebrated ellipsoid algorithm tells us that the full information of input constraints is not necessary; the algorithm works as long as there exists an oracle that, on a proposed candidate solution, returns a violation in the format of a separating hyperplane. Can linear programming still be efficiently solved if the returned violation is in other formats? We study this question in a trial-and-error framework: there is an oracle that, upon a proposed solution, returns the index of a violated constraint (with the content of the constraint still hidden). When more than one constraint is violated, two variants in the model are investigated. (1) The oracle returns the index of a "most violated" constraint, measured by the Euclidean distance of the proposed solution and the half-spaces defined by the constraints. In this case, the LP can be efficiently solved. (2) The oracle returns the index of an arbitrary (i.e., worst-case) violated constraint. In this case, we give an algorithm with running time exponential in the number of variables. We then show that the exponential dependence on n is unfortunately necessary even for the query complexity. These results put together shed light on the amount of information that one needs in order to solve a linear program efficiently. The proofs of the results employ a variety of geometric techniques, including McMullen's Upper Bound Theorem, the weighted spherical Voronoi diagram, and the furthest Voronoi diagram. In addition, we give an alternative proof to a conjecture of László Fejes Tóth on bounding the number of disconnected components formed by the union of m convex bodies in R^n. Our proof, inspired by the Gauss-Bonnet Theorem in global differential geometry, is independent of the known and reveals more clear insights into the problem and the bound.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2013

On the Complexity of Trial and Error

Motivated by certain applications from physics, biochemistry, economics, and computer science, in which the objects under investigation are not accessible because of various limitations, we propose a trial-and-error model to examine algorithmic issues in such situations. Given a search problem with a hidden input, we are asked to find a valid solution, to find which we can propose candidate solutions (trials), and use observed violations (errors), to prepare future proposals. In accordance with our motivating applications, we consider the fairly broad class of constraint satisfaction problems, and assume that errors are signaled by a verification oracle in the format of the index of a violated constraint (with the content of the constraint still hidden). Our discoveries are summarized as follows. On one hand, despite the seemingly very little information provided by the verification oracle, efficient algorithms do exist for a number of important problems. For the Nash, Core, Stable Matching, and SAT problems, the unknown-input versions are as hard as the corresponding known-input versions, up to a factor of polynomial. We further give almost tight bounds on the latter two problems' trial complexities. On the other hand, there are problems whose complexities are substantially increased in the unknown-input model. In particular, no time-efficient algorithms exist (under standard hardness assumptions) for Graph Isomorphism and Group Isomorphism problems. The tools used to achieve these results include order theory, strong ellipsoid method, and some non-standard reductions. Our model investigates the value of information, and our results demonstrate that the lack of input information can introduce various levels of extra difficulty. The model exhibits intimate connections with (and we hope can also serve as a useful supplement to) certain existing learning and complexity theories.

cs.CC↗

arXiv2012

Distributed Consensus Resilient to Both Crash Failures and Strategic Manipulations

In this paper, we study distributed consensus in synchronous systems subject to both unexpected crash failures and strategic manipulations by rational agents in the system. We adapt the concept of collusion-resistant Nash equilibrium to model protocols that are resilient to both crash failures and strategic manipulations of a group of colluding agents. For a system with $n$ distributed agents, we design a deterministic protocol that tolerates 2 colluding agents and a randomized protocol that tolerates $n - 1$ colluding agents, and both tolerate any number of failures. We also show that if colluders are allowed an extra communication round after each synchronous round, there is no protocol that can tolerate even 2 colluding agents and 1 crash failure.

cs.DC↗

arXiv2012

Budget Feasible Mechanism Design via Random Sampling

Budget feasible mechanism considers algorithmic mechanism design questions where there is a budget constraint on the total payment of the mechanism. An important question in the field is that under which valuation domains there exist budget feasible mechanisms that admit `small' approximations (compared to a socially optimal solution). Singer \cite{PS10} showed that additive and submodular functions admit a constant approximation mechanism. Recently, Dobzinski, Papadimitriou, and Singer \cite{DPS11} gave an $O(\log^2n)$ approximation mechanism for subadditive functions and remarked that: "A fundamental question is whether, regardless of computational constraints, a constant-factor budget feasible mechanism exists for subadditive function." In this paper, we give the first attempt to this question. We give a polynomial time $O(\frac{\log n}{\log\log n})$ sub-logarithmic approximation ratio mechanism for subadditive functions, improving the best known ratio $O(\log^2 n)$. Further, we connect budget feasible mechanism design to the concept of approximate core in cooperative game theory, and show that there is a mechanism for subadditive functions whose approximation is, via a characterization of the integrality gap of a linear program, linear to the largest value to which an approximate core exists. Our result implies in particular that the class of XOS functions, which is a superclass of submodular functions, admits a constant approximation mechanism. We believe that our work could be a solid step towards solving the above fundamental problem eventually, and possibly, with an affirmative answer.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2012

Budget Feasible Mechanism Design: From Prior-Free to Bayesian

Budget feasible mechanism design studies procurement combinatorial auctions where the sellers have private costs to produce items, and the buyer(auctioneer) aims to maximize a social valuation function on subsets of items, under the budget constraint on the total payment. One of the most important questions in the field is "which valuation domains admit truthful budget feasible mechanisms with `small' approximations (compared to the social optimum)?" Singer showed that additive and submodular functions have such constant approximations. Recently, Dobzinski, Papadimitriou, and Singer gave an O(log^2 n)-approximation mechanism for subadditive functions; they also remarked that: "A fundamental question is whether, regardless of computational constraints, a constant-factor budget feasible mechanism exists for subadditive functions." We address this question from two viewpoints: prior-free worst case analysis and Bayesian analysis. For the prior-free framework, we use an LP that describes the fractional cover of the valuation function; it is also connected to the concept of approximate core in cooperative game theory. We provide an O(I)-approximation mechanism for subadditive functions, via the worst case integrality gap I of LP. This implies an O(log n)-approximation for subadditive valuations, O(1)-approximation for XOS valuations, and for valuations with a constant I. XOS valuations are an important class of functions that lie between submodular and subadditive classes. We give another polynomial time O(log n/loglog n) sub-logarithmic approximation mechanism for subadditive valuations. For the Bayesian framework, we provide a constant approximation mechanism for all subadditive functions, using the above prior-free mechanism for XOS valuations as a subroutine. Our mechanism allows correlations in the distribution of private information and is universally truthful.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2010

Bayesian Incentive Compatibility via Fractional Assignments

Very recently, Hartline and Lucier studied single-parameter mechanism design problems in the Bayesian setting. They proposed a black-box reduction that converted Bayesian approximation algorithms into Bayesian-Incentive-Compatible (BIC) mechanisms while preserving social welfare. It remains a major open question if one can find similar reduction in the more important multi-parameter setting. In this paper, we give positive answer to this question when the prior distribution has finite and small support. We propose a black-box reduction for designing BIC multi-parameter mechanisms. The reduction converts any algorithm into an eps-BIC mechanism with only marginal loss in social welfare. As a result, for combinatorial auctions with sub-additive agents we get an eps-BIC mechanism that achieves constant approximation.

cs.GT↗