arXiv subjects

Xiaojin Zhu

Publications and source records attributed to Xiaojin Zhu.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Pure Nash Equilibria under the Affine Mechanism: A Potential Game of Exaggeration

The mean mechanism is known to be non-incentive-compatible, namely, rational players are incentivized to misreport their values. Despite this game-theoretic issue, the mean mechanism is prevalent in practice due to its other desirable properties. We give a full characterization of pure Nash equilibria--how the players will misreport--for the affine mechanism, of which the mean is a special case. Furthermore, we characterize both complete-information and Bayesian games under the affine mechanism. Our results highlight the inevitability of extreme exaggeration in such games.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

The Game Changer Problem: Controlling Equilibria with Discrete Rewards

We introduce the game changer problem, where an external designer modifies a game's reward matrix to make a target pure action profile the unique equilibrium, subject to the constraint that all entries of the reward matrix come from a finite set. We give simple feasibility characterizations for two-player zero-sum games and general-sum games, and the discrete reward structure yields exact optimality and enables efficient dynamic programming algorithms, providing a sharper alternative to prior continuous reward redesign formulations based on linear programming.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

When Identity Skews Debate: Anonymization for Bias-Reduced Multi-Agent Reasoning

Multi-agent debate (MAD) aims to improve large language model (LLM) reasoning by letting multiple agents exchange answers and then aggregate their opinions. Yet recent studies reveal that agents are not neutral: they are prone to identity-driven sycophancy and self-bias, uncritically adopting a peer's view or stubbornly adhering to their own prior output, undermining the reliability of debate. In this work, we present the first principled framework that joins sycophancy and self-bias to mitigate and quantify identity bias in MAD. First, we formalize the debate dynamics as an identity-weighted Bayesian update process. Second, we propose response anonymization: by removing identity markers from prompts, agents cannot distinguish "self" from "peer", which forces equal weights on agent identity, thereby reducing bias and improving trustworthiness. Third, we define the Identity Bias Coefficient (IBC), a principled bias metric that measures an agent's tendency to follow its peer versus itself. Empirical studies across multiple models and benchmarks confirm that identity bias is widespread, with sycophancy far more common than self-bias. Our findings highlight the need to ensure that MAD systems reason based on content rather than identity. Code is released in https://github.com/deeplearning-wisc/MAD-identity-bias.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

A Cramér-von Mises Approach to Incentivizing Truthful Data Sharing

Modern data marketplaces and data sharing consortia increasingly rely on incentive mechanisms to encourage agents to contribute data. However, schemes that reward agents based on the quantity of submitted data are vulnerable to manipulation, as agents may submit fabricated or low-quality data to inflate their rewards. Prior work has proposed comparing each agent's data against others' to promote honesty: when others contribute genuine data, the best way to minimize discrepancy is to do the same. Yet prior implementations of this idea rely on very strong assumptions about the data distribution (e.g. Gaussian), limiting their applicability. In this work, we develop reward mechanisms based on a novel, two-sample test inspired by the Cramér-von Mises statistic. Our methods strictly incentivize agents to submit more genuine data, while disincentivizing data fabrication and other types of untruthful reporting. We establish that truthful reporting constitutes a (possibly approximate) Nash equilibrium in both Bayesian and prior-agnostic settings. We theoretically instantiate our method in three canonical data sharing problems and show that it relaxes key assumptions made by prior work. Empirically, we demonstrate that our mechanism incentivizes truthful data sharing via simulations and on real-world language and image data.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Debate or Vote: Which Yields Better Decisions in Multi-Agent Large Language Models?

Multi-Agent Debate~(MAD) has emerged as a promising paradigm for improving the performance of large language models through collaborative reasoning. Despite recent advances, the key factors driving MAD's effectiveness remain unclear. In this work, we disentangle MAD into two key components--Majority Voting and inter-agent Debate--and assess their respective contributions. Through extensive experiments across seven NLP benchmarks, we find that Majority Voting alone accounts for most of the performance gains typically attributed to MAD. To explain this, we propose a theoretical framework that models debate as a stochastic process. We prove that it induces a martingale over agents' belief trajectories, implying that debate alone does not improve expected correctness. Guided by these insights, we demonstrate that targeted interventions, by biasing the belief update toward correction, can meaningfully enhance debate effectiveness. Overall, our findings suggest that while MAD has potential, simple ensembling methods remain strong and more reliable alternatives in many practical settings. Code is released in https://github.com/deeplearning-wisc/debate-or-vote.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2025

Collaborative Mean Estimation Among Heterogeneous Strategic Agents: Individual Rationality, Fairness, and Truthful Contribution

We study a collaborative learning problem where $m$ agents aim to estimate a vector $μ=(μ_1,\ldots,μ_d)\in \mathbb{R}^d$ by sampling from associated univariate normal distributions $\{\mathcal{N}(μ_k, σ^2)\}_{k\in[d]}$. Agent $i$ incurs a cost $c_{i,k}$ to sample from $\mathcal{N}(μ_k, σ^2)$. Instead of working independently, agents can exchange data, collecting cheaper samples and sharing them in return for costly data, thereby reducing both costs and estimation error. We design a mechanism to facilitate such collaboration, while addressing two key challenges: ensuring individually rational (IR) and fair outcomes so all agents benefit, and preventing strategic behavior (e.g. non-collection, data fabrication) to avoid socially undesirable outcomes. We design a mechanism and an associated Nash equilibrium (NE) which minimizes the social penalty-sum of agents' estimation errors and collection costs-while being IR for all agents. We achieve a $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{m})$-approximation to the minimum social penalty in the worst case and an $\mathcal{O}(1)$-approximation under favorable conditions. Additionally, we establish three hardness results: no nontrivial mechanism guarantees (i) a dominant strategy equilibrium where agents report truthfully, (ii) is IR for every strategy profile of other agents, (iii) or avoids a worst-case $Ω(\sqrt{m})$ price of stability in any NE. Finally, by integrating concepts from axiomatic bargaining, we demonstrate that our mechanism supports fairer outcomes than one which minimizes social penalty.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

CHARTOM: A Visual Theory-of-Mind Benchmark for LLMs on Misleading Charts

We introduce CHARTOM, a visual theory-of-mind benchmark designed to evaluate multimodal large language models' capability to understand and reason about misleading data visualizations though charts. CHARTOM consists of carefully designed charts and associated questions that require a language model to not only correctly comprehend the factual content in the chart (the FACT question) but also judge whether the chart will be misleading to a human readers (the MIND question), a dual capability with significant societal benefits. We detail the construction of our benchmark including its calibration on human performance and estimation of MIND ground truth called the Human Misleadingness Index. We evaluated several leading LLMs -- including GPT, Claude, Gemini, Qwen, Llama, and Llava series models -- on the CHARTOM dataset and found that it was challenging to all models both on FACT and MIND questions. This highlights the limitations of current LLMs and presents significant opportunity for future LLMs to improve on understanding misleading charts.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Optimally Installing Strict Equilibria

In this work, we develop a reward design framework for installing a desired behavior as a strict equilibrium across standard solution concepts: dominant strategy equilibrium, Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, and coarse correlated equilibrium. We also extend our framework to capture the Markov-perfect equivalents of each solution concept. Central to our framework is a comprehensive mathematical characterization of strictly installable, based on the desired solution concept and the behavior's structure. These characterizations lead to efficient iterative algorithms, which we generalize to handle optimization objectives through linear programming. Finally, we explore how our results generalize to bounded rational agents.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

The Battling Influencers Game: Nash Equilibria Structure of a Potential Game and Implications to Value Alignment

When multiple influencers attempt to compete for a receiver's attention, their influencing strategies must account for the presence of one another. We introduce the Battling Influencers Game (BIG), a multi-player simultaneous-move general-sum game, to provide a game-theoretic characterization of this social phenomenon. We prove that BIG is a potential game, that it has either one or an infinite number of pure Nash equilibria (NEs), and these pure NEs can be found by convex optimization. Interestingly, we also prove that at any pure NE, all (except at most one) influencers must exaggerate their actions to the maximum extent. In other words, it is rational for the influencers to be non-truthful and extreme because they anticipate other influencers to cancel out part of their influence. We discuss the implications of BIG to value alignment.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Minimally Modifying a Markov Game to Achieve Any Nash Equilibrium and Value

We study the game modification problem, where a benevolent game designer or a malevolent adversary modifies the reward function of a zero-sum Markov game so that a target deterministic or stochastic policy profile becomes the unique Markov perfect Nash equilibrium and has a value within a target range, in a way that minimizes the modification cost. We characterize the set of policy profiles that can be installed as the unique equilibrium of a game and establish sufficient and necessary conditions for successful installation. We propose an efficient algorithm that solves a convex optimization problem with linear constraints and then performs random perturbation to obtain a modification plan with a near-optimal cost. The code for our algorithm is available at https://github.com/YoungWu559/game-modification .

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Inception: Efficiently Computable Misinformation Attacks on Markov Games

We study security threats to Markov games due to information asymmetry and misinformation. We consider an attacker player who can spread misinformation about its reward function to influence the robust victim player's behavior. Given a fixed fake reward function, we derive the victim's policy under worst-case rationality and present polynomial-time algorithms to compute the attacker's optimal worst-case policy based on linear programming and backward induction. Then, we provide an efficient inception ("planting an idea in someone's mind") attack algorithm to find the optimal fake reward function within a restricted set of reward functions with dominant strategies. Importantly, our methods exploit the universal assumption of rationality to compute attacks efficiently. Thus, our work exposes a security vulnerability arising from standard game assumptions under misinformation.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

Data Poisoning to Fake a Nash Equilibrium in Markov Games

We characterize offline data poisoning attacks on Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL), where an attacker may change a data set in an attempt to install a (potentially fictitious) unique Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium for a two-player zero-sum Markov game. We propose the unique Nash set, namely the set of games, specified by their Q functions, with a specific joint policy being the unique Nash equilibrium. The unique Nash set is central to poisoning attacks because the attack is successful if and only if data poisoning pushes all plausible games inside the set. The unique Nash set generalizes the reward polytope commonly used in inverse reinforcement learning to MARL. For zero-sum Markov games, both the inverse Nash set and the set of plausible games induced by data are polytopes in the Q function space. We exhibit a linear program to efficiently compute the optimal poisoning attack. Our work sheds light on the structure of data poisoning attacks on offline MARL, a necessary step before one can design more robust MARL algorithms.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2024

Optimal Attack and Defense for Reinforcement Learning

To ensure the usefulness of Reinforcement Learning (RL) in real systems, it is crucial to ensure they are robust to noise and adversarial attacks. In adversarial RL, an external attacker has the power to manipulate the victim agent's interaction with the environment. We study the full class of online manipulation attacks, which include (i) state attacks, (ii) observation attacks (which are a generalization of perceived-state attacks), (iii) action attacks, and (iv) reward attacks. We show the attacker's problem of designing a stealthy attack that maximizes its own expected reward, which often corresponds to minimizing the victim's value, is captured by a Markov Decision Process (MDP) that we call a meta-MDP since it is not the true environment but a higher level environment induced by the attacked interaction. We show that the attacker can derive optimal attacks by planning in polynomial time or learning with polynomial sample complexity using standard RL techniques. We argue that the optimal defense policy for the victim can be computed as the solution to a stochastic Stackelberg game, which can be further simplified into a partially-observable turn-based stochastic game (POTBSG). Neither the attacker nor the victim would benefit from deviating from their respective optimal policies, thus such solutions are truly robust. Although the defense problem is NP-hard, we show that optimal Markovian defenses can be computed (learned) in polynomial time (sample complexity) in many scenarios.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

Anytime-Constrained Reinforcement Learning

We introduce and study constrained Markov Decision Processes (cMDPs) with anytime constraints. An anytime constraint requires the agent to never violate its budget at any point in time, almost surely. Although Markovian policies are no longer sufficient, we show that there exist optimal deterministic policies augmented with cumulative costs. In fact, we present a fixed-parameter tractable reduction from anytime-constrained cMDPs to unconstrained MDPs. Our reduction yields planning and learning algorithms that are time and sample-efficient for tabular cMDPs so long as the precision of the costs is logarithmic in the size of the cMDP. However, we also show that computing non-trivial approximately optimal policies is NP-hard in general. To circumvent this bottleneck, we design provable approximation algorithms that efficiently compute or learn an arbitrarily accurate approximately feasible policy with optimal value so long as the maximum supported cost is bounded by a polynomial in the cMDP or the absolute budget. Given our hardness results, our approximation guarantees are the best possible under worst-case analysis.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2023

Optimally Teaching a Linear Behavior Cloning Agent

We study optimal teaching of Linear Behavior Cloning (LBC) learners. In this setup, the teacher can select which states to demonstrate to an LBC learner. The learner maintains a version space of infinite linear hypotheses consistent with the demonstration. The goal of the teacher is to teach a realizable target policy to the learner using minimum number of state demonstrations. This number is known as the Teaching Dimension(TD). We present a teaching algorithm called ``Teach using Iterative Elimination(TIE)" that achieves instance optimal TD. However, we also show that finding optimal teaching set computationally is NP-hard. We further provide an approximation algorithm that guarantees an approximation ratio of $\log(|A|-1)$ on the teaching dimension. Finally, we provide experimental results to validate the efficiency and effectiveness of our algorithm.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2023

Mechanism Design for Collaborative Normal Mean Estimation

We study collaborative normal mean estimation, where $m$ strategic agents collect i.i.d samples from a normal distribution $\mathcal{N}(μ, σ^2)$ at a cost. They all wish to estimate the mean $μ$. By sharing data with each other, agents can obtain better estimates while keeping the cost of data collection small. To facilitate this collaboration, we wish to design mechanisms that encourage agents to collect a sufficient amount of data and share it truthfully, so that they are all better off than working alone. In naive mechanisms, such as simply pooling and sharing all the data, an individual agent might find it beneficial to under-collect and/or fabricate data, which can lead to poor social outcomes. We design a novel mechanism that overcomes these challenges via two key techniques: first, when sharing the others' data with an agent, the mechanism corrupts this dataset proportional to how much the data reported by the agent differs from the others; second, we design minimax optimal estimators for the corrupted dataset. Our mechanism, which is Nash incentive compatible and individually rational, achieves a social penalty (sum of all agents' estimation errors and data collection costs) that is at most a factor 2 of the global minimum. When applied to high dimensional (non-Gaussian) distributions with bounded variance, this mechanism retains these three properties, but with slightly weaker results. Finally, in two special cases where we restrict the strategy space of the agents, we design mechanisms that essentially achieve the global minimum.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Learning interactions to boost human creativity with bandits and GPT-4

This paper considers how interactions with AI algorithms can boost human creative thought. We employ a psychological task that demonstrates limits on human creativity, namely semantic feature generation: given a concept name, respondents must list as many of its features as possible. Human participants typically produce only a fraction of the features they know before getting "stuck." In experiments with humans and with a language AI (GPT-4) we contrast behavior in the standard task versus a variant in which participants can ask for algorithmically-generated hints. Algorithm choice is administered by a multi-armed bandit whose reward indicates whether the hint helped generating more features. Humans and the AI show similar benefits from hints, and remarkably, bandits learning from AI responses prefer the same prompting strategy as those learning from human behavior. The results suggest that strategies for boosting human creativity via computer interactions can be learned by bandits run on groups of simulated participants.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2023

Dream the Impossible: Outlier Imagination with Diffusion Models

Utilizing auxiliary outlier datasets to regularize the machine learning model has demonstrated promise for out-of-distribution (OOD) detection and safe prediction. Due to the labor intensity in data collection and cleaning, automating outlier data generation has been a long-desired alternative. Despite the appeal, generating photo-realistic outliers in the high dimensional pixel space has been an open challenge for the field. To tackle the problem, this paper proposes a new framework DREAM-OOD, which enables imagining photo-realistic outliers by way of diffusion models, provided with only the in-distribution (ID) data and classes. Specifically, DREAM-OOD learns a text-conditioned latent space based on ID data, and then samples outliers in the low-likelihood region via the latent, which can be decoded into images by the diffusion model. Different from prior works, DREAM-OOD enables visualizing and understanding the imagined outliers, directly in the pixel space. We conduct comprehensive quantitative and qualitative studies to understand the efficacy of DREAM-OOD, and show that training with the samples generated by DREAM-OOD can benefit OOD detection performance. Code is publicly available at https://github.com/deeplearning-wisc/dream-ood.

cs.LG↗