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Xiaoxing Chen

Publications and source records attributed to Xiaoxing Chen.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Securing Multi-Agent Systems by Design

Multi-agent systems solve complex tasks by decomposing them into subtasks, delegating the subtasks to agents, and aggregating the agents' responses using an aggregation rule. Malicious agents can manipulate the final solution by providing malicious responses to their assigned subtasks. In this paper, we first propose response manipulation attacks (ReMA), which iteratively optimize malicious responses to maximize attack effectiveness. Specifically, we formulate untargeted and targeted attacks as optimization problems and develop an approach to approximately solve these problems by iteratively refining malicious responses based on feedback from a surrogate multi-agent system. To defend against such attacks, we further propose SecMAS, a secure aggregation rule that leverages the semantic similarities among agent responses to select the response that is most consistent with a sufficiently large subset of the other responses. We theoretically establish security guarantees for SecMAS against both untargeted and targeted attacks. Extensive evaluations demonstrate that existing aggregation rules are vulnerable to ReMA, whereas SecMAS effectively defends against all evaluated attacks, including adaptive variants of ReMA, while maintaining utility comparable to that of existing aggregation rules.

cs.CR↗

Same-Origin Policy for Agentic Browsers

Agentic browsers integrate autonomous AI agents into web browsers, enabling users to accomplish web tasks through natural-language instructions. The same-origin policy (SOP) is a fundamental browser security mechanism that prevents unauthorized automated cross-origin data flows induced by scripts. However, whether SOP remains effective in agentic browsers is an open question that has not been systematically studied. In this work, we bridge this gap. We first observe that an agentic browser can itself serve as an automated channel for cross-origin data flows, potentially leading to SOP violations. To investigate this phenomenon, we construct SOPBench, a benchmark for evaluating SOP violations in agentic browsers. Our evaluation shows that existing agentic browsers frequently violate SOP, both in benign settings and under attacks. To address this problem, we propose SOPGuard, an SOP enforcement mechanism tailored to agentic browsers. We implement SOPGuard in BrowserOS, an open-source agentic browser. Extensive evaluations demonstrate that SOPGuard effectively enforces SOP while preserving utility and incurring only a small runtime overhead. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/wxl-lxw/BrowserOS-SOPGuard.

cs.CR↗