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Xiaoyu Xin

Publications and source records attributed to Xiaoyu Xin.

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Revealing Strategic Interactions in Network Games Under Decaying Active Probing

Revealing the interaction topology underlying strategic behavior is fundamental to prediction, intervention, and policy design in networked systems. Yet the interaction matrix is often unobservable, and passive observation of repeated actions fails to provide sufficient excitation for reliable recovery. This paper studies topology recovery in repeated linear-quadratic network games under decaying active probing, where probing inputs are injected into a subset of players and the unknown interaction matrix is inferred from the resulting action trajectories. We first characterize a structural recoverability condition that determines when noiseless probing experiments can make the interaction matrix identifiable. We then show that, under suitable stability and controllability assumptions, a concrete decaying probing signal guarantees exact finite-step recovery while preserving convergence of the repeated-play process. To handle decision perturbations, we further develop a reweighted sparse estimator that achieves almost-sure consistency together with finite-time exact support recovery. These results clarify what can be recovered in both noiseless and perturbed settings.

math.OC

Deception Equilibrium Analysis for Three-Party Stackelberg Game with Insider

This paper investigates strategic interactions within a three party deception security game involving a defender, an insider, and external attackers. We propose a robust deception mechanism where the leader manipulates game parameters perceived by followers to enhance defense performance when followers operate under misperceived and uncertain observation. Specifically, we propose a unified three party leader follower game framework and introduce the concepts of Deception Stackelberg equilibria (DSE) and Hyper Nash equilibria (HNE), which generalize classical two-player Stackelberg and deception games. We develop necessary and sufficient conditions for the consistency between DSE and HNE, ensuring that the defender's utility remains invariant when the hierarchical structure degenerates into a simultaneous-move scenario. Moreover, we propose a scalable hypergradient-based algorithm with established convergence guarantees for seeking DSE, efficiently addressing the computational challenges posed by non-smooth and set-valued best-response mappings. Finally, we apply theoretical analysis to practical scenarios in secure wireless communication and defense against insider-assisted false data injection attacks.

cs.GT