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Xiapu Luo

Publications and source records attributed to Xiapu Luo.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

Towards Generalized and Stealthy Watermarking for Generative Code Models

Generative code models (GCMs) significantly enhance development efficiency through automated code generation and code summarization. However, building and training these models require computational resources and time, necessitating effective digital copyright protection to prevent unauthorized leaks and misuse. Backdoor watermarking, by embedding hidden identifiers, simplifies copyright verification by breaking the model's black-box nature. Current backdoor watermarking techniques face two main challenges: first, limited generalization across different tasks and datasets, causing fluctuating verification rates; second, insufficient stealthiness, as watermarks are easily detected and removed by automated methods. To address these issues, we propose CodeGuard, a novel watermarking method combining attention mechanisms with distributed trigger embedding strategies. Specifically, CodeGuard employs attention mechanisms to identify watermark embedding positions, ensuring verifiability. Moreover, by using homomorphic character replacement, it avoids manual detection, while distributed trigger embedding reduces the likelihood of automated detection. Experimental results demonstrate that CodeGuard achieves up to 100% watermark verification rates in both code summarization and code generation tasks, with no impact on the primary task performance. In terms of stealthiness, CodeGuard performs exceptionally, with a maximum detection rate of only 0.078 against ONION detection methods, significantly lower than baseline methods.

cs.CR↗

Vehicular Intrusion Detection System for Controller Area Network: A Comprehensive Survey and Evaluation

The progress of automotive technologies has made cybersecurity a crucial focus, leading to various cyber attacks. These attacks primarily target the Controller Area Network (CAN) and specialized Electronic Control Units (ECUs). In order to mitigate these attacks and bolster the security of vehicular systems, numerous defense solutions have been proposed.These solutions aim to detect diverse forms of vehicular attacks. However, the practical implementation of these solutions still presents certain limitations and challenges. In light of these circumstances, this paper undertakes a thorough examination of existing vehicular attacks and defense strategies employed against the CAN and ECUs. The objective is to provide valuable insights and inform the future design of Vehicular Intrusion Detection Systems (VIDS). The findings of our investigation reveal that the examined VIDS primarily concentrate on particular categories of attacks, neglecting the broader spectrum of potential threats. Moreover, we provide a comprehensive overview of the significant challenges encountered in implementing a robust and feasible VIDS. Additionally, we put forth several defense recommendations based on our study findings, aiming to inform and guide the future design of VIDS in the context of vehicular security.

cs.CR↗

The Promise and Pitfalls of WebAssembly: Perspectives from the Industry

As JavaScript has been criticized for performance and security issues in web applications, WebAssembly (Wasm) was proposed in 2017 and is regarded as the complementation for JavaScript. Due to its advantages like compact-size, native-like speed, and portability, Wasm binaries are gradually used as the compilation target for industrial projects in other high-level programming languages and are responsible for computation-intensive tasks in browsers, e.g., 3D graphic rendering and video decoding. Intuitively, characterizing in-the-wild adopted Wasm binaries from different perspectives, like their metadata, relation with source programming language, existence of security threats, and practical purpose, is the prerequisite before delving deeper into the Wasm ecosystem and beneficial to its roadmap selection. However, currently, there is no work that conducts a large-scale measurement study on in-the-wild adopted Wasm binaries. To fill this gap, we collect the largest-ever dataset to the best of our knowledge, and characterize the status quo of them from industry perspectives. According to the different roles of people engaging in the community, i.e., web developers, Wasm maintainers, and researchers, we reorganized our findings to suggestions and best practices for them accordingly. We believe this work can shed light on the future direction of the web and Wasm.

cs.SE↗

Large Language Models for Blockchain Security: A Systematic Literature Review

Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as powerful tools across various domains within cyber security. Notably, recent studies are increasingly exploring LLMs applied to the context of blockchain security (BS). However, there remains a gap in a comprehensive understanding regarding the full scope of applications, impacts, and potential constraints of LLMs on blockchain security. To fill this gap, we undertake a literature review focusing on the studies that apply LLMs in blockchain security (LLM4BS). Our study aims to comprehensively analyze and understand existing research, and elucidate how LLMs contribute to enhancing the security of blockchain systems. Through a thorough examination of existing literature, we delve into the integration of LLMs into various aspects of blockchain security. We explore the mechanisms through which LLMs can bolster blockchain security, including their applications in smart contract auditing, transaction anomaly detection, vulnerability repair, program analysis of smart contracts, and serving as participants in the cryptocurrency community. Furthermore, we assess the challenges and limitations associated with leveraging LLMs for enhancing blockchain security, considering factors such as scalability, privacy concerns, and ethical concerns. Our thorough review sheds light on the opportunities and potential risks of tasks on LLM4BS, providing valuable insights for researchers, practitioners, and policymakers alike.

cs.CR↗

Modern DDoS Threats and Countermeasures: Insights into Emerging Attacks and Detection Strategies

Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks persist as significant threats to online services and infrastructure, evolving rapidly in sophistication and eluding traditional detection mechanisms. This evolution demands a comprehensive examination of current trends in DDoS attacks and the efficacy of modern detection strategies. This paper offers an comprehensive survey of emerging DDoS attacks and detection strategies over the past decade. We delve into the diversification of attack targets, extending beyond conventional web services to include newer network protocols and systems, and the adoption of advanced adversarial tactics. Additionally, we review current detection techniques, highlighting essential features that modern systems must integrate to effectively neutralize these evolving threats. Given the technological demands of contemporary network systems, such as high-volume and in-line packet processing capabilities, we also explore how innovative hardware technologies like programmable switches can significantly enhance the development and deployment of robust DDoS detection systems. We conclude by identifying open problems and proposing future directions for DDoS research. In particular, our survey sheds light on the investigation of DDoS attack surfaces for emerging systems, protocols, and adversarial strategies. Moreover, we outlines critical open questions in the development of effective detection systems, e.g., the creation of defense mechanisms independent of control planes.

cs.CR↗

SliceLocator: Locating Vulnerable Statements with Graph-based Detectors

Vulnerability detection is a crucial component in the software development lifecycle. Existing vulnerability detectors, especially those based on deep learning (DL) models, have achieved high effectiveness. Despite their capability of detecting vulnerable code snippets from given code fragments, the detectors are typically unable to further locate the fine-grained information pertaining to the vulnerability, such as the precise vulnerability triggering locations. Although explanation methods can filter important statements based on the predictions of code fragments, their effectiveness is limited by the fact that the model primarily learns the difference between vulnerable and non-vulnerable samples. In this paper, we propose SliceLocator, which, unlike previous approaches, leverages the detector's understanding of the differences between vulnerable and non-vulnerable samples, essentially, vulnerability-fixing statements. SliceLocator identifies the most relevant taint flow by selecting the highest-weighted flow path from all potential vulnerability-triggering statements in the program, in conjunction with the detector. We demonstrate that SliceLocator consistently performs well on four state-of-the-art GNN-based vulnerability detectors, achieving an accuracy of around 87% in flagging vulnerability-triggering statements across six common C/C++ vulnerabilities. It outperforms five widely used GNN-based explanation methods and two statement-level detectors.

cs.SE↗

Phantom Events: Demystifying the Issues of Log Forgery in Blockchain

With the rapid development of blockchain technology, transaction logs play a central role in various applications, including decentralized exchanges, wallets, cross-chain bridges, and other third-party services. However, these logs, particularly those based on smart contract events, are highly susceptible to manipulation and forgery, creating substantial security risks across the ecosystem. To address this issue, we present the first in-depth security analysis of transaction log forgery in EVM-based blockchains, a phenomenon we term Phantom Events. We systematically model five types of attacks and propose a tool designed to detect event forgery vulnerabilities in smart contracts. Our evaluation demonstrates that our approach outperforms existing tools in identifying potential phantom events. Furthermore, we have successfully identified real-world instances for all five types of attacks across multiple decentralized applications. Finally, we call on community developers to take proactive steps to address these critical security vulnerabilities.

cs.CR↗

"It Warned Me Just at the Right Moment": Exploring LLM-based Real-time Detection of Phone Scams

Despite living in the era of the internet, phone-based scams remain one of the most prevalent forms of scams. These scams aim to exploit victims for financial gain, causing both monetary losses and psychological distress. While governments, industries, and academia have actively introduced various countermeasures, scammers also continue to evolve their tactics, making phone scams a persistent threat. To combat these increasingly sophisticated scams, detection technologies must also advance. In this work, we propose a framework for modeling scam calls and introduce an LLM-based real-time detection approach, which assesses fraudulent intent in conversations, further providing immediate warnings to users to mitigate harm. Through experiments, we evaluate the method's performance and analyze key factors influencing its effectiveness. This analysis enables us to refine the method to improve precision while exploring the trade-off between recall and timeliness, paving the way for future directions in this critical area of research.

cs.HC↗

Mesh Watermark Removal Attack and Mitigation: A Novel Perspective of Function Space

Mesh watermark embeds secret messages in 3D meshes and decodes the message from watermarked meshes for ownership verification. Current watermarking methods directly hide secret messages in vertex and face sets of meshes. However, mesh is a discrete representation that uses vertex and face sets to describe a continuous signal, which can be discretized in other discrete representations with different vertex and face sets. This raises the question of whether the watermark can still be verified on the different discrete representations of the watermarked mesh. We conduct this research in an attack-then-defense manner by proposing a novel function space mesh watermark removal attack FuncEvade and then mitigating it through function space mesh watermarking FuncMark. In detail, FuncEvade generates a different discrete representation of a watermarked mesh by extracting it from the signed distance function of the watermarked mesh. We observe that the generated mesh can evade ALL previous watermarking methods. FuncMark mitigates FuncEvade by watermarking signed distance function through message-guided deformation. Such deformation can survive isosurfacing and thus be inherited by the extracted meshes for further watermark decoding. Extensive experiments demonstrate that FuncEvade achieves 100% evasion rate among all previous watermarking methods while achieving only 0.3% evasion rate on FuncMark. Besides, our FuncMark performs similarly on other metrics compared to state-of-the-art mesh watermarking methods.

cs.CV↗

Fine-tuning is Not Fine: Mitigating Backdoor Attacks in GNNs with Limited Clean Data

Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have achieved remarkable performance through their message-passing mechanism. However, recent studies have highlighted the vulnerability of GNNs to backdoor attacks, which can lead the model to misclassify graphs with attached triggers as the target class. The effectiveness of recent promising defense techniques, such as fine-tuning or distillation, is heavily contingent on having comprehensive knowledge of the sufficient training dataset. Empirical studies have shown that fine-tuning methods require a clean dataset of 20% to reduce attack accuracy to below 25%, while distillation methods require a clean dataset of 15%. However, obtaining such a large amount of clean data is commonly impractical. In this paper, we propose a practical backdoor mitigation framework, denoted as GRAPHNAD, which can capture high-quality intermediate-layer representations in GNNs to enhance the distillation process with limited clean data. To achieve this, we address the following key questions: How to identify the appropriate attention representations in graphs for distillation? How to enhance distillation with limited data? By adopting the graph attention transfer method, GRAPHNAD can effectively align the intermediate-layer attention representations of the backdoored model with that of the teacher model, forcing the backdoor neurons to transform into benign ones. Besides, we extract the relation maps from intermediate-layer transformation and enforce the relation maps of the backdoored model to be consistent with that of the teacher model, thereby ensuring model accuracy while further reducing the influence of backdoors. Extensive experimental results show that by fine-tuning a teacher model with only 3% of the clean data, GRAPHNAD can reduce the attack success rate to below 5%.

cs.LG↗

SecBench: A Comprehensive Multi-Dimensional Benchmarking Dataset for LLMs in Cybersecurity

Evaluating Large Language Models (LLMs) is crucial for understanding their capabilities and limitations across various applications, including natural language processing and code generation. Existing benchmarks like MMLU, C-Eval, and HumanEval assess general LLM performance but lack focus on specific expert domains such as cybersecurity. Previous attempts to create cybersecurity datasets have faced limitations, including insufficient data volume and a reliance on multiple-choice questions (MCQs). To address these gaps, we propose SecBench, a multi-dimensional benchmarking dataset designed to evaluate LLMs in the cybersecurity domain. SecBench includes questions in various formats (MCQs and short-answer questions (SAQs)), at different capability levels (Knowledge Retention and Logical Reasoning), in multiple languages (Chinese and English), and across various sub-domains. The dataset was constructed by collecting high-quality data from open sources and organizing a Cybersecurity Question Design Contest, resulting in 44,823 MCQs and 3,087 SAQs. Particularly, we used the powerful while cost-effective LLMs to (1). label the data and (2). constructing a grading agent for automatic evaluation of SAQs. Benchmarking results on 16 SOTA LLMs demonstrate the usability of SecBench, which is arguably the largest and most comprehensive benchmark dataset for LLMs in cybersecurity. More information about SecBench can be found at our website, and the dataset can be accessed via the artifact link.

cs.CR↗

DreaMark: Rooting Watermark in Score Distillation Sampling Generated Neural Radiance Fields

Recent advancements in text-to-3D generation can generate neural radiance fields (NeRFs) with score distillation sampling, enabling 3D asset creation without real-world data capture. With the rapid advancement in NeRF generation quality, protecting the copyright of the generated NeRF has become increasingly important. While prior works can watermark NeRFs in a post-generation way, they suffer from two vulnerabilities. First, a delay lies between NeRF generation and watermarking because the secret message is embedded into the NeRF model post-generation through fine-tuning. Second, generating a non-watermarked NeRF as an intermediate creates a potential vulnerability for theft. To address both issues, we propose Dreamark to embed a secret message by backdooring the NeRF during NeRF generation. In detail, we first pre-train a watermark decoder. Then, the Dreamark generates backdoored NeRFs in a way that the target secret message can be verified by the pre-trained watermark decoder on an arbitrary trigger viewport. We evaluate the generation quality and watermark robustness against image- and model-level attacks. Extensive experiments show that the watermarking process will not degrade the generation quality, and the watermark achieves 90+% accuracy among both image-level attacks (e.g., Gaussian noise) and model-level attacks (e.g., pruning attack).

cs.GR↗

The Age of DDoScovery: An Empirical Comparison of Industry and Academic DDoS Assessments

Motivated by the impressive but diffuse scope of DDoS research and reporting, we undertake a multistakeholder (joint industry-academic) analysis to seek convergence across the best available macroscopic views of the relative trends in two dominant classes of attacks - direct-path attacks and reflection-amplification attacks. We first analyze 24 industry reports to extract trends and (in)consistencies across observations by commercial stakeholders in 2022. We then analyze ten data sets spanning industry and academic sources, across four years (2019-2023), to find and explain discrepancies based on data sources, vantage points, methods, and parameters. Our method includes a new approach: we share an aggregated list of DDoS targets with industry players who return the results of joining this list with their proprietary data sources to reveal gaps in visibility of the academic data sources. We use academic data sources to explore an industry-reported relative drop in spoofed reflection-amplification attacks in 2021-2022. Our study illustrates the value, but also the challenge, in independent validation of security-related properties of Internet infrastructure. Finally, we reflect on opportunities to facilitate greater common understanding of the DDoS landscape. We hope our results inform not only future academic and industry pursuits but also emerging policy efforts to reduce systemic Internet security vulnerabilities.

cs.CR↗

fAmulet: Finding Finalization Failure Bugs in Polygon zkRollup

Zero-knowledge layer 2 protocols emerge as a compelling approach to overcoming blockchain scalability issues by processing transactions through the transaction finalization process. During this process, transactions are efficiently processed off the main chain. Besides, both the transaction data and the zero-knowledge proofs of transaction executions are reserved on the main chain, ensuring the availability of transaction data as well as the correctness and verifiability of transaction executions. Hence, any bugs that cause the transaction finalization failure are crucial, as they impair the usability of these protocols and the scalability of blockchains. In this work, we conduct the first systematic study on finalization failure bugs in zero-knowledge layer 2 protocols, and define two kinds of such bugs. Besides, we design fAmulet, the first tool to detect finalization failure bugs in Polygon zkRollup, a prominent zero-knowledge layer 2 protocol, by leveraging fuzzing testing. To trigger finalization failure bugs effectively, we introduce a finalization behavior model to guide our transaction fuzzer to generate and mutate transactions for inducing diverse behaviors across each component (e.g., Sequencer) in the finalization process. Moreover, we define bug oracles according to the distinct bug definitions to accurately detect bugs. Through our evaluation, fAmulet can uncover twelve zero-day finalization failure bugs in Polygon zkRollup, and cover at least 20.8% more branches than baselines. Furthermore, through our preliminary study, fAmulet uncovers a zero-day finalization failure bug in Scroll zkRollup, highlighting the generality of fAmulet to be applied to other zero-knowledge layer 2 protocols. At the time of writing, all our uncovered bugs have been confirmed and fixed by Polygon zkRollup and Scroll zkRollup teams.

cs.CR↗

FDI: Attack Neural Code Generation Systems through User Feedback Channel

Neural code generation systems have recently attracted increasing attention to improve developer productivity and speed up software development. Typically, these systems maintain a pre-trained neural model and make it available to general users as a service (e.g., through remote APIs) and incorporate a feedback mechanism to extensively collect and utilize the users' reaction to the generated code, i.e., user feedback. However, the security implications of such feedback have not yet been explored. With a systematic study of current feedback mechanisms, we find that feedback makes these systems vulnerable to feedback data injection (FDI) attacks. We discuss the methodology of FDI attacks and present a pre-attack profiling strategy to infer the attack constraints of a targeted system in the black-box setting. We demonstrate two proof-of-concept examples utilizing the FDI attack surface to implement prompt injection attacks and backdoor attacks on practical neural code generation systems. The attacker may stealthily manipulate a neural code generation system to generate code with vulnerabilities, attack payload, and malicious and spam messages. Our findings reveal the security implications of feedback mechanisms in neural code generation systems, paving the way for increasing their security.

cs.SE↗

Understanding Impacts of Electromagnetic Signal Injection Attacks on Object Detection

Object detection can localize and identify objects in images, and it is extensively employed in critical multimedia applications such as security surveillance and autonomous driving. Despite the success of existing object detection models, they are often evaluated in ideal scenarios where captured images guarantee the accurate and complete representation of the detecting scenes. However, images captured by image sensors may be affected by different factors in real applications, including cyber-physical attacks. In particular, attackers can exploit hardware properties within the systems to inject electromagnetic interference so as to manipulate the images. Such attacks can cause noisy or incomplete information about the captured scene, leading to incorrect detection results, potentially granting attackers malicious control over critical functions of the systems. This paper presents a research work that comprehensively quantifies and analyzes the impacts of such attacks on state-of-the-art object detection models in practice. It also sheds light on the underlying reasons for the incorrect detection outcomes.

cs.CR↗

The Dark Side of NFTs: A Large-Scale Empirical Study of Wash Trading

NFTs (Non-Fungible Tokens) have seen significant growth since they first captured public attention in 2021. However, the NFT market is plagued by fake transactions and economic bubbles, e.g., NFT wash trading. Wash trading typically refers to a transaction involving the same person or two colluding individuals, and has become a major threat to the NFT ecosystem. Previous studies only detect NFT wash trading from the financial aspect, while the real-world wash trading cases are much more complicated (e.g., not aiming at inflating the market value). There is still a lack of multi-dimension analysis to better understand NFT wash trading. Therefore, we present the most comprehensive study of NFT wash trading, analyzing 8,717,031 transfer events and 3,830,141 sale events from 2,701,883 NFTs. We first optimize the dataset collected via the OpenSea API. Next, we identify three types of NFT wash trading and propose identification algorithms. Our experimental results reveal 824 transfer events and 5,330 sale events (accounting for a total of \$8,857,070.41) and 370 address pairs related to NFT wash trading behaviors, causing a minimum loss of \$3,965,247.13. Furthermore, we provide insights from six aspects, i.e., marketplace design, profitability, NFT project design, payment token, user behavior, and NFT ecosystem.

cs.CR↗

Detect Llama -- Finding Vulnerabilities in Smart Contracts using Large Language Models

In this paper, we test the hypothesis that although OpenAI's GPT-4 performs well generally, we can fine-tune open-source models to outperform GPT-4 in smart contract vulnerability detection. We fine-tune two models from Meta's Code Llama and a dataset of 17k prompts, Detect Llama - Foundation and Detect Llama - Instruct, and we also fine-tune OpenAI's GPT-3.5 Turbo model (GPT-3.5FT). We then evaluate these models, plus a random baseline, on a testset we develop against GPT-4, and GPT-4 Turbo's, detection of eight vulnerabilities from the dataset and the two top identified vulnerabilities - and their weighted F1 scores. We find that for binary classification (i.e., is this smart contract vulnerable?), our two best-performing models, GPT-3.5FT and Detect Llama - Foundation, achieve F1 scores of $0.776$ and $0.68$, outperforming both GPT-4 and GPT-4 Turbo, $0.66$ and $0.675$. For the evaluation against individual vulnerability identification, our top two models, GPT-3.5FT and Detect Llama - Foundation, both significantly outperformed GPT-4 and GPT-4 Turbo in both weighted F1 for all vulnerabilities ($0.61$ and $0.56$ respectively against GPT-4's $0.218$ and GPT-4 Turbo's $0.243$) and weighted F1 for the top two identified vulnerabilities ($0.719$ for GPT-3.5FT, $0.674$ for Detect Llama - Foundation against GPT-4's $0.363$ and GPT-4 Turbo's $0.429$).

cs.CR↗