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Xingang Shi

Publications and source records attributed to Xingang Shi.

8 recordsLinked to original sources

TORCH: Characterizing Invalid Route Filtering via Tunnelled Observation

To mitigate BGP prefix hijacking, the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) provides prefix origin authentication via Route Origin Validation (ROV). Despite extensive measurement efforts in IPv4, the protective impact of ROV in IPv6 has yet to be systematically assessed. Existing approaches suffer from limited observability into invalid route propagation: they often rely on a small set of controlled prefixes or cannot fully profile the filtering of in-the-wild RPKI-invalid routes, which undermines the accuracy of assessment. Furthermore, the inherent opacity of the IPv6 data plane exacerbates the difficulty of performing scalable and reliable active measurements. In this paper, we present TORCH, a novel framework for measuring invalid route filtering in IPv6. It repurposes open 6in4 tunnel endpoints as widely distributed vantage points for global measurement. At its core, we develop a cross-plane inference technique that determines reachability without requiring responsive targets. This method allows us to characterize whether and how traffic is steered to invalid origins across diverse routing scenarios, leading to an in-depth evaluation of the real-world impact of ROV. Our measurements reveal that about 27\% of ASes have achieved nearly full ROV protection. However, several permissive Tier-1 ASes still transit traffic towards invalid origins, maintaining a substantial attack surface. Through a prefix-centric analysis, we provide the first empirical evidence that the collateral damage of same-length prefix filtering can affect a significant fraction of the global Internet. Our findings pinpoint fundamental vulnerabilities in ROV deployment and underscore the urgent necessity for network operators to accelerate RPKI adoption. We make our datasets publicly available.

cs.NI

Centralized Network Utility Maximization with Accelerated Gradient Method

Network utility maximization (NUM) is a well-studied problem for network traffic management and resource allocation. Because of the inherent decentralization and complexity of networks, most researches develop decentralized NUM algorithms. In recent years, the Software Defined Networking (SDN) architecture has been widely used, especially in cloud networks and inter-datacenter networks managed by large enterprises, promoting the design of centralized NUM algorithms. To cope with the large and increasing number of flows in such SDN networks, existing researches about centralized NUM focus on the scalability of the algorithm with respect to the number of flows, however the efficiency is ignored. In this paper, we focus on the SDN scenario, and derive a centralized, efficient and scalable algorithm for the NUM problem. By the designing of a smooth utility function and a smooth penalty function, we formulate the NUM problem with a smooth objective function, which enables the use of Nesterov's accelerated gradient method. We prove that the proposed method has $O(d/t^2)$ convergence rate, which is the fastest with respect to the number of iterations $t$, and our method is scalable with respect to the number of flows $d$ in the network. Experiments show that our method obtains accurate solutions with less iterations, and achieves close-to-optimal network utility.

cs.NI

threaTrace: Detecting and Tracing Host-based Threats in Node Level Through Provenance Graph Learning

Host-based threats such as Program Attack, Malware Implantation, and Advanced Persistent Threats (APT), are commonly adopted by modern attackers. Recent studies propose leveraging the rich contextual information in data provenance to detect threats in a host. Data provenance is a directed acyclic graph constructed from system audit data. Nodes in a provenance graph represent system entities (e.g., $processes$ and $files$) and edges represent system calls in the direction of information flow. However, previous studies, which extract features of the whole provenance graph, are not sensitive to the small number of threat-related entities and thus result in low performance when hunting stealthy threats. We present threaTrace, an anomaly-based detector that detects host-based threats at system entity level without prior knowledge of attack patterns. We tailor GraphSAGE, an inductive graph neural network, to learn every benign entity's role in a provenance graph. threaTrace is a real-time system, which is scalable of monitoring a long-term running host and capable of detecting host-based intrusion in their early phase. We evaluate threaTrace on three public datasets. The results show that threaTrace outperforms three state-of-the-art host intrusion detection systems.

cs.CR

DeepAID: Interpreting and Improving Deep Learning-based Anomaly Detection in Security Applications

Unsupervised Deep Learning (DL) techniques have been widely used in various security-related anomaly detection applications, owing to the great promise of being able to detect unforeseen threats and superior performance provided by Deep Neural Networks (DNN). However, the lack of interpretability creates key barriers to the adoption of DL models in practice. Unfortunately, existing interpretation approaches are proposed for supervised learning models and/or non-security domains, which are unadaptable for unsupervised DL models and fail to satisfy special requirements in security domains. In this paper, we propose DeepAID, a general framework aiming to (1) interpret DL-based anomaly detection systems in security domains, and (2) improve the practicality of these systems based on the interpretations. We first propose a novel interpretation method for unsupervised DNNs by formulating and solving well-designed optimization problems with special constraints for security domains. Then, we provide several applications based on our Interpreter as well as a model-based extension Distiller to improve security systems by solving domain-specific problems. We apply DeepAID over three types of security-related anomaly detection systems and extensively evaluate our Interpreter with representative prior works. Experimental results show that DeepAID can provide high-quality interpretations for unsupervised DL models while meeting the special requirements of security domains. We also provide several use cases to show that DeepAID can help security operators to understand model decisions, diagnose system mistakes, give feedback to models, and reduce false positives.

cs.CR

Evaluating and Improving Adversarial Robustness of Machine Learning-Based Network Intrusion Detectors

Machine learning (ML), especially deep learning (DL) techniques have been increasingly used in anomaly-based network intrusion detection systems (NIDS). However, ML/DL has shown to be extremely vulnerable to adversarial attacks, especially in such security-sensitive systems. Many adversarial attacks have been proposed to evaluate the robustness of ML-based NIDSs. Unfortunately, existing attacks mostly focused on feature-space and/or white-box attacks, which make impractical assumptions in real-world scenarios, leaving the study on practical gray/black-box attacks largely unexplored. To bridge this gap, we conduct the first systematic study of the gray/black-box traffic-space adversarial attacks to evaluate the robustness of ML-based NIDSs. Our work outperforms previous ones in the following aspects: (i) practical-the proposed attack can automatically mutate original traffic with extremely limited knowledge and affordable overhead while preserving its functionality; (ii) generic-the proposed attack is effective for evaluating the robustness of various NIDSs using diverse ML/DL models and non-payload-based features; (iii) explainable-we propose an explanation method for the fragile robustness of ML-based NIDSs. Based on this, we also propose a defense scheme against adversarial attacks to improve system robustness. We extensively evaluate the robustness of various NIDSs using diverse feature sets and ML/DL models. Experimental results show our attack is effective (e.g., >97% evasion rate in half cases for Kitsune, a state-of-the-art NIDS) with affordable execution cost and the proposed defense method can effectively mitigate such attacks (evasion rate is reduced by >50% in most cases).

cs.CR

Placement and Routing Optimization Problem for Service Function Chain: State of Art and Future Opportunities

Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) allows implantation of network functions to be independent of dedicated hardware devices. Any series of services can be represented by a service function chain which contains a set of virtualized network functions in a specified order. From the perspective of network performance optimization, the challenges of deploying service chain in network is twofold: 1) the location of placing virtualized network functions and resources allocation scheme; and 2) routing policy for traffic flow among different instances of network function. This article introduces service function chain related optimization problems, summarizes the optimization motivation and mainstream algorithm of virtualized network functions deployment and traffic routing. We hope it can help readers to learn about the current research progress and make further innovation in this field.

cs.NI

PriMe: Per-Flow Network Measurement by Combining SRAM with DRAM

Network measurement is necessary to obtain an understanding of the network traffic and keep the network healthy. Flow-level measurement is widely used because it provides rich enough information while being resource efficient, in contrast to the traffic-level solutions like SNMP and packet-level solutions like tcpdump. Flow-level measurement requires to maintain a TFR for each active flow, and update the corresponding TFR when a packet arrives. In the scenario of high-speed networks, the processing time for each packet is only several or tens of nanoseconds, and there may be up to millions of concurrent active flows. Two requirements have to be met to be able to do flow-level measurement in this scenario, i.e., the memory size have to be large enough to maintain a TFR for each flow, and the access time of the memory have to be small enough to be able to update the TFR for each packet. Unfortunately, SRAM, which is fast enough, is expensive and there are limited amount available for the measurement tasks, while DRAM, which is large in capacity, is slow and cannot support the per-packet access. In this paper, we proposed a solution, PriMe, by combining SRAM with DRAM, overcoming the resource limitation by exporting TFRs to the DRAM when necessary, while enjoying the fast access of SRAM. We designed a peculiar algorithm to reduce the frequency of exporting TFRs to DRAM, as well as an algorithm to reduce the accesses of DRAM in aggregating the TFRs exported from SRAM.

cs.NI

HashFlow For Better Flow Record Collection

Collecting flow records is a common practice of network operators and researchers for monitoring, diagnosing and understanding a network. Traditional tools like NetFlow face great challenges when both the speed and the complexity of the network traffic increase. To keep pace up, we propose HashFlow, a tool for more efficient and accurate collection and analysis of flow records. The central idea of HashFlow is to maintain accurate records for elephant flows, but summarized records for mice flows, by applying a novel collision resolution and record promotion strategy to hash tables. The performance bound can be analyzed with a probabilistic model, and with this strategy, HashFlow achieves a better utilization of space, and also more accurate flow records, without bringing extra complexity. We have implemented HashFlow, as well as several latest flow measurement algorithms such as FlowRadar, HashPipe and ElasticSketch, in a P4 software switch. Then we use traces from different operational networks to evaluate them. In these experiments, for various types of traffic analysis applications, HashFlow consistently demonstrates a clearly better performance against its state-of-the-art competitors. For example, using a small memory of 1 MB, HashFlow can accurately record around 55K flows, which is often 12.5% higher than the others. For estimating the sizes of 50K flows, HashFlow achieves a relative error of around 11.6%, while the estimation error of the best competitor is 42.9% higher. It detects 96.1% of the heavy hitters out of 250K flows with a size estimation error of 5.6%, which is 11.3% and 73.7% better than the best competitor respectively. At last, we show these merits of HashFlow come with almost no degradation of throughput.

cs.NI