arXiv subjects

Xinhao Song

Publications and source records attributed to Xinhao Song.

7 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

HLL: Can Agents Cross Humanity's Last Line of Verification?

Multimodal agents are increasingly expected to operate interfaces on behalf of users, raising a central deployment question: can they truly substitute for humans in workflows that services deliberately protect against automation? CAPTCHA verification makes this question concrete. It is not merely a visual puzzle, but a human-verification boundary placed before account creation, content access, form submission, and other protected actions. We introduce \textbf{Humanity's Last Line of Verification (HLL)}, a controlled benchmark that uses interactive CAPTCHA verification to evaluate whether agents can cross this boundary through grounded, human-like interaction rather than recognition alone. HLL covers diverse CAPTCHA interactions and exposes agents to controlled realism stressors, including cluttered webpages, harder task variants, and trace-conditioned validation of the solving process. We evaluate eight frontier multimodal agents in a closed-loop GUI environment. The results show that current agents remain brittle at this human-substitution boundary: performance varies sharply across verification types, degrades under realistic interface conditions, and drops further when correct answers must be supported by valid action traces. By exposing gaps in localization, action calibration, state tracking, and process consistency, HLL provides a concrete testbed for measuring how close multimodal agents are to acting as human substitutes in protected real-world workflows. Our code is available at https://github.com/XinhaoS0101/HLL

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

A Unified Conditional Flow for Motion Generation, Editing, and Intra-Structural Retargeting

Text-driven motion editing and intra-structural retargeting, where skeletons share topology but may differ in bone lengths and rest pose, are traditionally handled by fragmented pipelines with incompatible inputs and representations: editing relies on specialized generative steering, while retargeting is deferred to geometric post-processing. We present a unified conditional-flow framework that casts generation, semantic editing, and intra-structural retargeting as condition-modulated transport within one text- and skeleton-conditioned rectified-flow model. Under this formulation, editing changes the semantic condition while preserving skeletal structure, whereas retargeting changes the skeletal condition while preserving motion semantics. This makes FlowEdit-style transport a unified inference rule for motion manipulation rather than a task-specific editor. To instantiate this for articulated 3D motion, we develop a text- and skeleton-conditioned rectified-flow transformer. The model uses per-joint tokenization and explicit joint self-attention to capture spatial kinematic dependencies. We further inject text conditions at both joint and frame levels, while residual multi-condition classifier-free guidance balances text adherence and skeletal conformity. Experiments on SnapMoGen and a multi-character Mixamo subset show that one trained model supports text-to-motion generation, zero-shot editing, and zero-shot intra-structural retargeting without task-specific fine-tuning. This unified framework replaces separate pipelines with a single conditional motion transport model while keeping the same-topology retargeting scope explicit.

cs.GR↗

arXiv2026

SEARL: Joint Optimization of Policy and Tool Graph Memory for Self-Evolving Agents

Recent advances in Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) have demonstrated significant potential in single-turn reasoning tasks. With the paradigm shift toward self-evolving agentic learning, models are increasingly expected to learn from trajectories by synthesizing tools or accumulating explicit experiences. However, prevailing methods typically rely on large-scale LLMs or multi-agent frameworks, which hinder their deployment in resource-constrained environments. The inherent sparsity of outcome-based rewards also poses a substantial challenge, as agents typically receive feedback only upon completion of tasks. To address these limitations, we introduce a Tool-Memory based self-evolving agentic framework SEARL. Unlike approaches that directly utilize interaction experiences, our method constructs a structured experience memory that integrates planning with execution. This provides a novel state abstraction that facilitates generalization across analogous contexts, such as tool reuse. Consequently, agents extract explicit knowledge from historical data while leveraging inter-trajectory correlations to densify reward signals. We evaluate our framework on knowledge reasoning and mathematics tasks, demonstrating its effectiveness in achieving more practical and efficient learning.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

GhostEI-Bench: Do Mobile Agents Resilience to Environmental Injection in Dynamic On-Device Environments?

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents to navigate mobile graphical user interfaces (GUIs). Operating in dynamic on-device ecosystems, which include notifications, pop-ups, and inter-app interactions, exposes them to a unique and underexplored threat vector: environmental injection. Unlike prompt-based attacks that manipulate textual instructions, environmental injection corrupts an agent's visual perception by inserting adversarial UI elements (for example, deceptive overlays or spoofed notifications) directly into the GUI. This bypasses textual safeguards and can derail execution, causing privacy leakage, financial loss, or irreversible device compromise. To systematically evaluate this threat, we introduce GhostEI-Bench, the first benchmark for assessing mobile agents under environmental injection attacks within dynamic, executable environments. Moving beyond static image-based assessments, GhostEI-Bench injects adversarial events into realistic application workflows inside fully operational Android emulators and evaluates performance across critical risk scenarios. We further propose a judge-LLM protocol that conducts fine-grained failure analysis by reviewing the agent's action trajectory alongside the corresponding screenshot sequence, pinpointing failure in perception, recognition, or reasoning. Comprehensive experiments on state-of-the-art agents reveal pronounced vulnerability to deceptive environmental cues: current models systematically fail to perceive and reason about manipulated UIs. GhostEI-Bench provides a framework for quantifying and mitigating this emerging threat, paving the way toward more robust and secure embodied agents.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Your Agent May Misevolve: Emergent Risks in Self-evolving LLM Agents

Advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) have enabled a new class of self-evolving agents that autonomously improve through interaction with the environment, demonstrating strong capabilities. However, self-evolution also introduces novel risks overlooked by current safety research. In this work, we study the case where an agent's self-evolution deviates in unintended ways, leading to undesirable or even harmful outcomes. We refer to this as Misevolution. To provide a systematic investigation, we evaluate misevolution along four key evolutionary pathways: model, memory, tool, and workflow. Our empirical findings reveal that misevolution is a widespread risk, affecting agents built even on top-tier LLMs (e.g., Gemini-2.5-Pro). Different emergent risks are observed in the self-evolutionary process, such as the degradation of safety alignment after memory accumulation, or the unintended introduction of vulnerabilities in tool creation and reuse. To our knowledge, this is the first study to systematically conceptualize misevolution and provide empirical evidence of its occurrence, highlighting an urgent need for new safety paradigms for self-evolving agents. Finally, we discuss potential mitigation strategies to inspire further research on building safer and more trustworthy self-evolving agents. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/ShaoShuai0605/Misevolution . Warning: this paper includes examples that may be offensive or harmful in nature.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

SafeWork-R1: Coevolving Safety and Intelligence under the AI-45$^{\circ}$ Law

We introduce SafeWork-R1, a cutting-edge multimodal reasoning model that demonstrates the coevolution of capabilities and safety. It is developed by our proposed SafeLadder framework, which incorporates large-scale, progressive, safety-oriented reinforcement learning post-training, supported by a suite of multi-principled verifiers. Unlike previous alignment methods such as RLHF that simply learn human preferences, SafeLadder enables SafeWork-R1 to develop intrinsic safety reasoning and self-reflection abilities, giving rise to safety `aha' moments. Notably, SafeWork-R1 achieves an average improvement of $46.54\%$ over its base model Qwen2.5-VL-72B on safety-related benchmarks without compromising general capabilities, and delivers state-of-the-art safety performance compared to leading proprietary models such as GPT-4.1 and Claude Opus 4. To further bolster its reliability, we implement two distinct inference-time intervention methods and a deliberative search mechanism, enforcing step-level verification. Finally, we further develop SafeWork-R1-InternVL3-78B, SafeWork-R1-DeepSeek-70B, and SafeWork-R1-Qwen2.5VL-7B. All resulting models demonstrate that safety and capability can co-evolve synergistically, highlighting the generalizability of our framework in building robust, reliable, and trustworthy general-purpose AI.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2024

Professor X: Manipulating EEG BCI with Invisible and Robust Backdoor Attack

While electroencephalogram (EEG) based brain-computer interface (BCI) has been widely used for medical diagnosis, health care, and device control, the safety of EEG BCI has long been neglected. In this paper, we propose Professor X, an invisible and robust "mind-controller" that can arbitrarily manipulate the outputs of EEG BCI through backdoor attack, to alert the EEG community of the potential hazard. However, existing EEG attacks mainly focus on single-target class attacks, and they either require engaging the training stage of the target BCI, or fail to maintain high stealthiness. Addressing these limitations, Professor X exploits a three-stage clean label poisoning attack: 1) selecting one trigger for each class; 2) learning optimal injecting EEG electrodes and frequencies strategy with reinforcement learning for each trigger; 3) generating poisoned samples by injecting the corresponding trigger's frequencies into poisoned data for each class by linearly interpolating the spectral amplitude of both data according to previously learned strategies. Experiments on datasets of three common EEG tasks demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness of Professor X, which also easily bypasses existing backdoor defenses.

cs.CR↗