arXiv subjects

Xuhang Ying

Publications and source records attributed to Xuhang Ying.

8 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2019

Covert Channel-Based Transmitter Authentication in Controller Area Networks

In recent years, the security of automotive Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) is facing urgent threats due to the widespread use of legacy in-vehicle communication systems. As a representative legacy bus system, the Controller Area Network (CAN) hosts Electronic Control Units (ECUs) that are crucial vehicle functioning. In this scenario, malicious actors can exploit CAN vulnerabilities, such as the lack of built-in authentication and encryption schemes, to launch CAN bus attacks with life-threatening consequences (e.g., disabling brakes). In this paper, we present TACAN (Transmitter Authentication in CAN), which provides secure authentication of ECUs on the legacy CAN bus by exploiting the covert channels, without introducing CAN protocol modifications or traffic overheads. TACAN turns upside-down the originally malicious concept of covert channels and exploits it to build an effective defensive technique that facilitates transmitter authentication via a centralized, trusted Monitor Node. TACAN consists of three different covert channels for ECU authentication: 1) the Inter-Arrival Time (IAT)-based; 2) the Least Significant Bit (LSB)-based; and 3) a hybrid covert channel, exploiting the combination of the first two. In order to validate TACAN, we implement the covert channels on the University of Washington (UW) EcoCAR (Chevrolet Camaro 2016) testbed. We further evaluate the bit error, throughput, and detection performance of TACAN through extensive experiments using the EcoCAR testbed and a publicly available dataset collected from Toyota Camry 2010. We demonstrate the feasibility of TACAN and the effectiveness of detecting CAN bus attacks, highlighting no traffic overheads and attesting the regular functionality of ECUs.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2019

Detecting ADS-B Spoofing Attacks using Deep Neural Networks

The Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) system is a key component of the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) that manages the increasingly congested airspace. It provides accurate aircraft localization and efficient air traffic management and also improves the safety of billions of current and future passengers. While the benefits of ADS-B are well known, the lack of basic security measures like encryption and authentication introduces various exploitable security vulnerabilities. One practical threat is the ADS-B spoofing attack that targets the ADS-B ground station, in which the ground-based or aircraft-based attacker manipulates the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) address (a unique identifier for each aircraft) in the ADS-B messages to fake the appearance of non-existent aircraft or masquerade as a trusted aircraft. As a result, this attack can confuse the pilots or the air traffic control personnel and cause dangerous maneuvers. In this paper, we introduce SODA - a two-stage Deep Neural Network (DNN)-based spoofing detector for ADS-B that consists of a message classifier and an aircraft classifier. It allows a ground station to examine each incoming message based on the PHY-layer features (e.g., IQ samples and phases) and flag suspicious messages. Our experimental results show that SODA detects ground-based spoofing attacks with a probability of 99.34%, while having a very small false alarm rate (i.e., 0.43%). It outperforms other machine learning techniques such as XGBoost, Logistic Regression, and Support Vector Machine. It further identifies individual aircraft with an average F-score of 96.68% and an accuracy of 96.66%, with a significant improvement over the state-of-the-art detector.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2019

TACAN: Transmitter Authentication through Covert Channels in Controller Area Networks

Nowadays, the interconnection of automotive systems with modern digital devices offers advanced user experiences to drivers. Electronic Control Units (ECUs) carry out a multitude of operations using the insecure Controller Area Network (CAN) bus in automotive Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs). Therefore, dangerous attacks, such as disabling brakes, are possible and the safety of passengers is at risk. In this paper, we present TACAN (Transmitter Authentication in CAN), which provides secure authentication of ECUs by exploiting the covert channels without introducing CAN protocol modifications or traffic overheads (i.e., no extra bits or messages are used). TACAN turns upside-down the originally malicious concept of covert channels and exploits it to build an effective defensive technique that facilitates transmitter authentication via a trusted Monitor Node. TACAN consists of three different covert channels for ECU authentication: 1) Inter-Arrival Time (IAT)-based, leveraging the IATs of CAN messages; 2) offset-based, exploiting the clock offsets of CAN messages; 3) Least Significant Bit (LSB)-based, concealing authentication messages into the LSBs of normal CAN data. We implement the covert channels on the University of Washington (UW) EcoCAR testbed and evaluate their performance through extensive experiments. We demonstrate the feasibility of TACAN, highlighting no traffic overheads and attesting the regular functionality of ECUs. In particular, the bit error ratios are within 0.1% and 0.42% for the IAT-based and offset-based covert channels, respectively. Furthermore, the bit error ratio of the LSB-based covert channel is equal to that of a normal CAN bus, which is 3.1x10^-7%.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2019

Shape of the Cloak: Formal Analysis of Clock Skew-Based Intrusion Detection System in Controller Area Networks

This paper presents a new masquerade attack called the cloaking attack and provides formal analyses for clock skew-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) that detect masquerade attacks in the Controller Area Network (CAN) in automobiles. In the cloaking attack, the adversary manipulates the message inter-transmission times of spoofed messages by adding delays so as to emulate a desired clock skew and avoid detection. In order to predict and characterize the impact of the cloaking attack in terms of the attack success probability on a given CAN bus and IDS, we develop formal models for two clock skew-based IDSs, i.e., the state-of-the-art (SOTA) IDS and its adaptation to the widely used Network Time Protocol (NTP), using parameters of the attacker, the detector, and the hardware platform. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that provides formal analyses of clock skew-based IDSs in automotive CAN. We implement the cloaking attack on two hardware testbeds, a prototype and a real vehicle (the University of Washington (UW) EcoCAR), and demonstrate its effectiveness against both the SOTA and NTP-based IDSs. We validate our formal analyses through extensive experiments for different messages, IDS settings, and vehicles. By comparing each predicted attack success probability curve against its experimental curve, we find that the average prediction error is within 3.0% for the SOTA IDS and 5.7% for the NTP-based IDS.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2018

SAS-Assisted Coexistence-Aware Dynamic Channel Assignment in CBRS Band

The paradigm of shared spectrum allows secondary devices to opportunistically access spectrum bands underutilized by primary owners. Recently, the FCC has targeted the sharing of the 3.5 GHz (3550-3700 MHz) federal spectrum with commercial systems such as small cells. The rules require a Spectrum Access System (SAS) to accommodate three service tiers: 1) Incumbent Access, 2) Priority Access (PA), and 3) Generalized Authorized Access (GAA). In this work, we study the SAS-assisted dynamic channel assignment (CA) for PA and GAA tiers.We introduce the node-channel-pair conflict graph to capture pairwise interference, channel and geographic contiguity constraints, spatially varying channel availability, and coexistence awareness. The proposed conflict graph allows us to formulate PA CA and GAA CA with binary conflicts as max-cardinality and max-reward CA, respectively. Approximate solutions can be found by a heuristic-based algorithm that search for the maximum weighted independent set. We further formulate GAA CA with non-binary conflicts as max-utility CA. We show that the utility function is submodular, and the problem is an instance of matroid-constrained submodular maximization. A polynomial-time algorithm based on local search is proposed that provides a provable performance guarantee. Extensive simulations using a real-world Wi-Fi hotspot location dataset are conducted to evaluate the proposed algorithms. Our results have demonstrated the advantages of the proposed graph representation and improved performance of the proposed algorithms over the baseline algorithms.

cs.NI↗

arXiv2018

Cloaking the Clock: Emulating Clock Skew in Controller Area Networks

Automobiles are equipped with Electronic Control Units (ECU) that communicate via in-vehicle network protocol standards such as Controller Area Network (CAN). These protocols are designed under the assumption that separating in-vehicle communications from external networks is sufficient for protection against cyber attacks. This assumption, however, has been shown to be invalid by recent attacks in which adversaries were able to infiltrate the in-vehicle network. Motivated by these attacks, intrusion detection systems (IDSs) have been proposed for in-vehicle networks that attempt to detect attacks by making use of device fingerprinting using properties such as clock skew of an ECU. In this paper, we propose the cloaking attack, an intelligent masquerade attack in which an adversary modifies the timing of transmitted messages in order to match the clock skew of a targeted ECU. The attack leverages the fact that, while the clock skew is a physical property of each ECU that cannot be changed by the adversary, the estimation of the clock skew by other ECUs is based on network traffic, which, being a cyber component only, can be modified by an adversary. We implement the proposed cloaking attack and test it on two IDSs, namely, the current state-of-the-art IDS and a new IDS that we develop based on the widely-used Network Time Protocol (NTP). We implement the cloaking attack on two hardware testbeds, a prototype and a real connected vehicle, and show that it can always deceive both IDSs. We also introduce a new metric called the Maximum Slackness Index to quantify the effectiveness of the cloaking attack even when the adversary is unable to precisely match the clock skew of the targeted ECU.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2017

Detecting LTE-U Duty Cycling Misbehavior for Fair Sharing with Wi-Fi in Shared Bands

Coexistence of Wi-Fi and LTE Unlicensed (LTE-U) in shared or unlicensed bands has drawn growing attention from both academia and industry. An important consideration is fairness between Wi-Fi and duty cycled LTE-U, which is often defined in terms of channel access time, as adopted by the LTE-U Forum. Despite many studies on duty cycle adaptation design for fair sharing, one crucial fact has often been neglected: LTE-U systems unilaterally control LTE-U duty cycles; hence, as self- interested users, they have incentives to misbehave, e.g., transmitting with a larger duty cycle that exceeds a given limit, so as to gain a greater share in channel access time and throughput. In this paper, we propose a scheme that allows the spectrum manager managing the shared bands to estimate the duty cycle of a target LTE-U cell based on PHY layer observations from a nearby Wi-Fi AP, without interrupting normal Wi-Fi operations. We further propose a thresholding scheme to detect duty cycling misbehavior (i.e., determining if the duty cycle exceeds the assigned limit), and analyze its performance in terms of detection and false alarm probabilities. The proposed schemes are implemented in ns3 and evaluated with extensive simulations. Our results show that the proposed scheme provides an estimate within +/- 1% of the true duty cycle, and detects misbehavior with a duty cycle 2.8% higher than the limit with a detection probability of at least 95%, while keeping the false alarm probability less than or equal to 1%.

cs.NI↗

arXiv2017

Pricing Mechanisms for Crowd-Sensed Spatial-Statistics-Based Radio Mapping

Networking on white spaces (i.e., locally unused spectrum) relies on active monitoring of spectrum usage. Spectrum databases based on empirical radio propagation models are widely adopted but shown to be error-prone, since they do not account for built environments like trees and man-made buildings. As an economically viable option, crowd-sensed radio mapping acquires more accurate local spectrum data from mobile users and constructs radio maps using spatial models such as Kriging and Gaussian Process. Success of such crowd-sensing systems presumes some incentive mechanisms to attract user participation. In this work, we consider the scenario where the platform who constructs radio environment maps makes one-time offers to selected users, and collects data from those who accept the offers. We design pricing mechanisms based on expected utility (EU) maximization, where EU captures the tradeoff between radio mapping performance (location and data quality), crowd-sensing cost and uncertainty in offer outcomes (i.e., possible expiration and rejection). Specifically, we consider sequential offering, where one best price offer is sent to the best user in each round, and batched offering, where a batch of multiple offers are made in each round. For the later, we show that EU is submodular in the discrete domain, and propose a mechanism that first fixes the pricing rule and selects users based on Unconstrained Submodular Maximization (USM); it then compares different pricing rules to find the best batch of offers in each round. We show that USM-based user selection has provable performance guarantee. Proposed mechanisms are evaluated and compared against utility-maximization-based baseline mechanisms.

cs.NI↗