arXiv subjects

Xuwei Yang

Publications and source records attributed to Xuwei Yang.

12 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

FAM-DQ: A Dual-Quadrotor-Based Fully Actuated Aerial Manipulator for High-Torque Interaction

Aerial physical interaction requires aerial manipulation platforms to generate large interaction forces and torques while maintaining precise end-effector control. However, conventional underactuated aerial manipulators suffer from strong position-attitude coupling, whereas fully actuated platform designs often face structural complexity, limited payload capacity, and insufficient torque output. This paper presents FAM-DQ, a dual-quadrotor based fully actuated aerial manipulator designed for high-torque physical interaction tasks. By mounting two quadrotor propulsion modules at the ends of a central frame through passive joints, while using a gear-driven servo to regulate the pointing direction, FAM-DQ achieves decoupled $6$-DoF end-effector control with omnidirectional manipulation capability and enhanced torque output. Experiments including trajectory tracking, attitude tracking, static torque measurement, and screw driving validate the proposed design. FAM-DQ achieves a maximum torque of $1.019~\mathrm{N}\cdot\mathrm{m}$ with a total mass of $0.447~\mathrm{kg}$, corresponding to a torque-to-mass ratio of $2.28~\mathrm{N}\cdot\mathrm{m/kg}$.

cs.RO↗

arXiv2026

MEMOA: Massive Mixtures of Online Agents via Mean-Field Decentralized Nash Equilibria

In the modern age of large-scale AI, federated learning has become an increasingly important tool for training large populations of AI agents; however, its computational and communication costs can rapidly fail to scale with the number of agents. This is precisely where decentralized agentic strategies shine: each agent acts autonomously, using only its own state together with a minimal summary of the ensemble, namely the mean-field. We derive the unique optimal decentralized policy in closed form. Optimality is characterized through a worst-client/minimax criterion: minimizing the under-performer regret, namely the maximal online cost incurred by the weakest agent in the ensemble. We further prove that the resulting decentralized policy asymptotically converges, in the large-population limit, to the Nash-optimal centralized policy, whose direct computation is not scalable. We use an online weighting mechanism to optimize the server-computed mixture of client predictions, thereby improving the mean prediction in addition to the previously optimized weakest-client prediction. Numerical experiments verify our theoretical guarantees and demonstrate that our decentralized policy typically outperforms natural greedy decentralized baselines.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Simultaneously Solving Infinitely Many LQ Mean Field Games In Hilbert Spaces: The Power of Neural Operators

Traditional mean-field game (MFG) solvers operate on an instance-by-instance basis, which becomes infeasible when many related problems must be solved (e.g., for seeking a robust description of the solution under perturbations of the dynamics or utilities, or in settings involving continuum-parameterized agents.). We overcome this by training neural operators (NOs) to learn the rules-to-equilibrium map from the problem data (``rules'': dynamics and cost functionals) of LQ MFGs defined on separable Hilbert spaces to the corresponding equilibrium strategy. Our main result is a statistical guarantee: an NO trained on a small number of randomly sampled rules reliably solves unseen LQ MFG variants, even in infinite-dimensional settings. The number of NO parameters needed remains controlled under appropriate rule sampling during training. Our guarantee follows from three results: (i) local-Lipschitz estimates for the highly nonlinear rules-to-equilibrium map; (ii) a universal approximation theorem using NOs with a prespecified Lipschitz regularity (unlike traditional NO results where the NO's Lipschitz constant can diverge as the approximation error vanishes); and (iii) new sample-complexity bounds for $L$-Lipschitz learners in infinite dimensions, directly applicable as the Lipschitz constants of our approximating NOs are controlled in (ii).

math.OC↗

arXiv2025

Flexbee: A Grasping and Perching UAV Based on Soft Vector-Propulsion Nozzle

The aim of this paper is to design a new type of grasping and perching unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), called Flexbee, which features a soft vector-propulsion nozzle (SVPN). Compared to previous UAVs, Flexbee integrates flight, grasping, and perching functionalities into the four SVPNs. This integration offers advantages including decoupled position and attitude control, high structural reuse, and strong adaptability strong adaptability for grasping and perching. A dynamics model of Flexbee has been developed, and the nonlinear coupling issue of the moment has been resolved through linearization of the equivalent moment model. A hierarchical control strategy was used to design controllers for the two operational modes of Flexbee. Finally, flight, grasping, and perching experiments were conducted to validate Flexbee's kinematic capabilities and the effectiveness of the control strategy.

cs.RO↗

arXiv2025

Online Federation For Mixtures of Proprietary Agents with Black-Box Encoders

Most industry-standard generative AIs and feature encoders are proprietary, offering only black-box access: their outputs are observable, but their internal parameters and architectures remain hidden from the end-user. This black-box access is especially limiting when constructing mixture-of-expert type ensemble models since the user cannot optimize each proprietary AI's internal parameters. Our problem naturally lends itself to a non-competitive game-theoretic lens where each proprietary AI (agent) is inherently competing against the other AI agents, with this competition arising naturally due to their obliviousness of the AI's to their internal structure. In contrast, the user acts as a central planner trying to synchronize the ensemble of competing AIs. We show the existence of the unique Nash equilibrium in the online setting, which we even compute in closed-form by eliciting a feedback mechanism between any given time series and the sequence generated by each (proprietary) AI agent. Our solution is implemented as a decentralized, federated-learning algorithm in which each agent optimizes their structure locally on their machine without ever releasing any internal structure to the others. We obtain refined expressions for pre-trained models such as transformers, random feature models, and echo-state networks. Our ``proprietary federated learning'' algorithm is implemented on a range of real-world and synthetic time-series benchmarks. It achieves orders-of-magnitude improvements in predictive accuracy over natural benchmarks, of which there are surprisingly few due to this natural problem still being largely unexplored.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

Neural Operators Can Play Dynamic Stackelberg Games

Dynamic Stackelberg games are a broad class of two-player games in which the leader acts first, and the follower chooses a response strategy to the leader's strategy. Unfortunately, only stylized Stackelberg games are explicitly solvable since the follower's best-response operator (as a function of the control of the leader) is typically analytically intractable. This paper addresses this issue by showing that the \textit{follower's best-response operator} can be approximately implemented by an \textit{attention-based neural operator}, uniformly on compact subsets of adapted open-loop controls for the leader. We further show that the value of the Stackelberg game where the follower uses the approximate best-response operator approximates the value of the original Stackelberg game. Our main result is obtained using our universal approximation theorem for attention-based neural operators between spaces of square-integrable adapted stochastic processes, as well as stability results for a general class of Stackelberg games.

math.OC↗

arXiv2024

Higher-Order Transformer Derivative Estimates for Explicit Pathwise Learning Guarantees

An inherent challenge in computing fully-explicit generalization bounds for transformers involves obtaining covering number estimates for the given transformer class $T$. Crude estimates rely on a uniform upper bound on the local-Lipschitz constants of transformers in $T$, and finer estimates require an analysis of their higher-order partial derivatives. Unfortunately, these precise higher-order derivative estimates for (realistic) transformer models are not currently available in the literature as they are combinatorially delicate due to the intricate compositional structure of transformer blocks. This paper fills this gap by precisely estimating all the higher-order derivatives of all orders for the transformer model. We consider realistic transformers with multiple (non-linearized) attention heads per block and layer normalization. We obtain fully-explicit estimates of all constants in terms of the number of attention heads, the depth and width of each transformer block, and the number of normalization layers. Further, we explicitly analyze the impact of various standard activation function choices (e.g. SWISH and GeLU). As an application, we obtain explicit pathwise generalization bounds for transformers on a single trajectory of an exponentially-ergodic Markov process valid at a fixed future time horizon. We conclude that real-world transformers can learn from $N$ (non-i.i.d.) samples of a single Markov process's trajectory at a rate of ${O}(\operatorname{polylog}(N)/\sqrt{N})$.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2023

Transformers Can Solve Non-Linear and Non-Markovian Filtering Problems in Continuous Time For Conditionally Gaussian Signals

The use of attention-based deep learning models in stochastic filtering, e.g. transformers and deep Kalman filters, has recently come into focus; however, the potential for these models to solve stochastic filtering problems remains largely unknown. The paper provides an affirmative answer to this open problem in the theoretical foundations of machine learning by showing that a class of continuous-time transformer models, called \textit{filterformers}, can approximately implement the conditional law of a broad class of non-Markovian and conditionally Gaussian signal processes given noisy continuous-time (possibly non-Gaussian) measurements. Our approximation guarantees hold uniformly over sufficiently regular compact subsets of continuous-time paths, where the worst-case 2-Wasserstein distance between the true optimal filter and our deep learning model quantifies the approximation error. Our construction relies on two new customizations of the standard attention mechanism: The first can losslessly adapt to the characteristics of a broad range of paths since we show that the attention mechanism implements bi-Lipschitz embeddings of sufficiently regular sets of paths into low-dimensional Euclidean spaces; thus, it incurs no ``dimension reduction error''. The latter attention mechanism is tailored to the geometry of Gaussian measures in the $2$-Wasserstein space. Our analysis relies on new stability estimates of robust optimal filters in the conditionally Gaussian setting.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2023

Regret-Optimal Federated Transfer Learning for Kernel Regression with Applications in American Option Pricing

We propose an optimal iterative scheme for federated transfer learning, where a central planner has access to datasets ${\cal D}_1,\dots,{\cal D}_N$ for the same learning model $f_{\theta}$. Our objective is to minimize the cumulative deviation of the generated parameters $\{\theta_i(t)\}_{t=0}^T$ across all $T$ iterations from the specialized parameters $\theta^\star_{1},\ldots,\theta^\star_N$ obtained for each dataset, while respecting the loss function for the model $f_{\theta(T)}$ produced by the algorithm upon halting. We only allow for continual communication between each of the specialized models (nodes/agents) and the central planner (server), at each iteration (round). For the case where the model $f_{\theta}$ is a finite-rank kernel regression, we derive explicit updates for the regret-optimal algorithm. By leveraging symmetries within the regret-optimal algorithm, we further develop a nearly regret-optimal heuristic that runs with $\mathcal{O}(Np^2)$ fewer elementary operations, where $p$ is the dimension of the parameter space. Additionally, we investigate the adversarial robustness of the regret-optimal algorithm showing that an adversary which perturbs $q$ training pairs by at-most $\varepsilon>0$, across all training sets, cannot reduce the regret-optimal algorithm's regret by more than $\mathcal{O}(\varepsilon q \bar{N}^{1/2})$, where $\bar{N}$ is the aggregate number of training pairs. To validate our theoretical findings, we conduct numerical experiments in the context of American option pricing, utilizing a randomly generated finite-rank kernel.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2021

Linear quadratic mean field games: Decentralized $O(1/N)$-Nash equilibria

This paper studies an asymptotic solvability problem for linear quadratic (LQ) mean field games with controlled diffusions and indefinite weights for the state and control in the costs. We employ a rescaling approach to derive a low dimensional Riccati ordinary differential equation (ODE) system, which characterizes a necessary and sufficient condition for asymptotic solvability. The rescaling technique is further used for performance estimates, establishing an $O(1/N)$-Nash equilibrium for the obtained decentralized strategies.

math.OC↗

arXiv2021

Linear quadratic mean field social optimization: Asymptotic solvability and decentralized control

This paper studies asymptotic solvability of a linear quadratic (LQ) mean field social optimization problem with controlled diffusions and indefinite state and control weights. Starting with an $N$-agent model, we employ a rescaling approach to derive a low-dimensional Riccati ordinary differential equation (ODE) system, which characterizes a necessary and sufficient condition for asymptotic solvability. The decentralized control obtained from the mean field limit ensures a bounded optimality loss in minimizing the social cost having magnitude $O(N)$, which implies an optimality loss of $O(1/N)$ per agent. We further quantify the efficiency gain of the social optimum with respect to the solution of the mean field game.

math.OC↗

arXiv2017

Mean Field Game Approach to Production and Exploration of Exhaustible Commodities

In a game theoretic framework, we study energy markets with a continuum of homogenous producers who produce energy from an exhaustible resource such as oil. Each producer simultaneously optimizes production rate that drives her revenues, as well as exploration effort to replenish her reserves. This exploration activity is modeled through a controlled point process that leads to stochastic increments to reserves level. The producers interact with each other through the market price that depends on the aggregate production. We employ a mean field game approach to solve for a Markov Nash equilibrium and develop numerical schemes to solve the resulting system of non-local HJB and transport equations with non-local coupling. A time-stationary formulation is also explored, as well as the fluid limit where exploration becomes deterministic.

econ.GN↗