arXiv subjects

Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou

Publications and source records attributed to Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou.

7 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2025

The Smart Contract Model

Many of the problems that arise in the context of blockchains and decentralized finance can be seen as variations on classical problems of distributed computing. The smart contract model proposed here is intended to capture both the similarities and the differences between classical and blockchain-based models of distributed computing. The focus is on cross-chain protocols in which a collection of parties, some honest and some perhaps not, interact through trusted smart contracts residing on multiple, independent ledgers. While cross-chain protocols are capable of general computations, they are primarily used to track ownership of assets such as cryptocurrencies or other valuable data. For this reason, the smart contract model differs in some essential ways from familiar models of distributed and concurrent computing. Because parties are potentially Byzantine, tasks to be solved are formulated using elementary game-theoretic notions, taking into account the utility to each party of each possible outcome. As in the classical model, the parties provide task inputs and agree on a desired sequence of proposed asset transfers. Unlike the classical model, the contracts, not the parties, determine task outputs in the form of executed asset transfers, since they alone have the power to control ownership.

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arXiv2023

Ethereum Proof-of-Stake under Scrutiny

Ethereum has undergone a recent change called \textit{the Merge}, which made Ethereum a Proof-of-Stake blockchain, shifting closer to BFT consensus. Ethereum, which wished to keep the best of the two protocol designs (BFT and Nakomoto-style), now has a convoluted consensus protocol as its core. The result is a blockchain being possibly produced in a tree-like form while participants try to finalize blocks. We categorize different attacks jeopardizing the liveness of the protocol. The Ethereum community has responded by creating patches against some of them. We discovered a new attack on the patched protocol. To support our analysis, we propose a new high-level formalization of the properties of liveness and availability of the Ethereum blockchain, and we provide a pseudo-code. We believe this formalization to be helpful for other analyses as well. Our results yield that the Ethereum Proof-of-Stake has safety but only probabilistic liveness. The probability of the liveness is influenced by the parameter describing the time frame allowed for validators to change their mind about the current main chain.

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arXiv2023

Topos: A Secure, Trustless, and Decentralized Interoperability Protocol

Topos is an open interoperability protocol designed to reduce as much as possible trust assumptions by replacing them with cryptographic constructions and decentralization while exhibiting massive scalability. The protocol does not make use of a central blockchain, nor uses consensus to ensure consistent delivery of messages across a heterogeneous ecosystem of public and private blockchains, named subnets, but instead relies on a weak causal reliable broadcast implemented by a distributed network which we call $\textit{Transmission Control Engine}$ (TCE). The validity of cross-subnet messages is ensured by the $\textit{Universal Certificate Interface}$ (UCI) and stems from zkSTARK proofs asserting the validity of subnets' state transitions executed by the Topos zkVM. Such proofs of computational integrity are publicly verifiable by any other participants in and out the protocol such as other subnets or audit companies. The interface between the TCE and subnets leverages the ICE-FROST protocol, an innovative threshold signature scheme, whose static public key allows for uniquely identifying subnets after they register in the protocol. The Topos protocol is designed to provide $\textit{uniform security}$ to the ecosystem and to handle any type of subnets (e.g., permissioned, permissionless) in order to fit any business use cases and pave the way for global adoption and a new standard for the Internet base layer.

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arXiv2019

On Fairness in Committee-based Blockchains

Committee-based blockchains are among the most popular alternatives of proof-of-work based blockchains, such as Bitcoin. They provide strong consistency (no fork) under classical assumptions, and avoid using energy-consuming mechanisms to add new blocks in the blockchain. For each block, these blockchains use a committee that executes Byzantine-fault tolerant distributed consensus to decide the next block they will add in the blockchain. Unlike Bitcoin, where there is only one creator per block with high probability, in committee-based blockchain any block is cooperatively created. In order to incentivize committee members to participate to the creation of new blocks rewarding schemes have to be designed. In this paper, we study the fairness of rewarding in committee-based blockchains and we provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the system communication under which it is possible to have a fair reward mechanism.

cs.DC↗

arXiv2019

Dissecting Tendermint

In this paper we analyze Tendermint proposed in [7], one of the most popular blockchains based on PBFT Consensus. The current paper dissects Tendermint under various system communication models and Byzantine adversaries. Our methodology consists in identifying the algorithmic principles of Tendermint necessary for a specific combination of communication model-adversary. This methodology allowed to identify bugs [3] in preliminary versions of the protocol ([19], [7]) and to prove its correctness under the most adversarial conditions: an eventually synchronous communication model and asymmetric Byzantine faults.

cs.DC↗

arXiv2019

Rationals vs Byzantines in Consensus-based Blockchains

In this paper we analyze from the game theory point of view Byzantine Fault Tolerant blockchains when processes exhibit rational or Byzantine behavior. Our work is the first to model the Byzantine-consensus based blockchains as a committee coordination game. Our first contribution is to offer a game-theoretical methodology to analyse equilibrium interactions between Byzantine and rational committee members in Byzantine Fault Tolerant blockchains. Byzantine processes seek to inflict maximum damage to the system, while rational processes best-respond to maximise their expected net gains. Our second contribution is to derive conditions under which consensus properties are satisfied or not in equilibrium. When the majority threshold is lower than the proportion of Byzantine processes, invalid blocks are accepted in equilibrium. When the majority threshold is large, equilibrium can involve coordination failures , in which no block is ever accepted. However, when the cost of accepting invalid blocks is large, there exists an equilibrium in which blocks are accepted iff they are valid.

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arXiv2018

Correctness and Fairness of Tendermint-core Blockchains

Tendermint-core blockchains (e.g. Cosmos) are considered today one of the most viable alternatives for the highly energy consuming proof-of-work blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum. Their particularity is that they aim at offering strong consistency (no forks) in an open system combining two ingredients (i) a set of validators that generate blocks via a variant of Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerant (PBFT) consensus protocol and (ii) a selection strategy that dynamically selects nodes to be validators for the next block via a proof-of-stake mechanism. However,the exact assumptions on the system model under which Tendermint underlying algorithms are correct and the exact properties Tendermint verifies have never been formally analyzed. The contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, while formalizing Tendermint algorithms we precisely characterize the system model and the exact problem solved by Tendermint. We prove that in eventual synchronous systems a modified version of Tendermint solves (i) under additional assumptions, a variant of one-shot consensus for the validation of one single block and (ii) a variant of the repeated consensus problem for multiple blocks. These results hold even if the set of validators is hit by Byzantine failures, provided that for each one-shot consensus instance less than one third of the validators is Byzantine. Our second contribution relates to the fairness of the rewarding mechanism. It is common knowledge that in permisionless blockchain systems the main threat is the tragedy of commons that may yield the system to collapse if the rewarding mechanism is not adequate. Ad minimum the rewarding mechanism must be fair, i.e.distributing the rewards in proportion to the merit of participants. We prove, for the first time in blockchain systems, that in repeated-consensus based blockchains there exists an (eventual) fair rewarding mechanism if and only if the system is (eventual) synchronous. We also show that the original Tendermint rewarding is not fair, however, a modification of the original protocol makes it eventually fair.

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