arXiv subjects

Yair Zick

Publications and source records attributed to Yair Zick.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

STRUCTUREDAGENT: Planning with AND/OR Trees for Long-Horizon Web Tasks

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have enabled agentic systems for sequential decision-making. Such agents must perceive their environment, reason across multiple time steps, and take actions that optimize long-term objectives. However, existing web agents struggle on complex, long-horizon tasks due to limited in-context memory for tracking history, weak planning abilities, and greedy behaviors that lead to premature termination. To address these challenges, we propose STRUCTUREDAGENT, a hierarchical planning framework with two core components: (1) an online hierarchical planner that uses dynamic AND/OR trees for efficient search and (2) a structured memory module that tracks and maintains candidate solutions to improve constraint satisfaction in information-seeking tasks. The framework also produces interpretable hierarchical plans, enabling easier debugging and facilitating human intervention when needed. Our results on WebVoyager, WebArena, and custom shopping benchmarks show that STRUCTUREDAGENT improves performance on long-horizon web-browsing tasks compared to standard LLM-based agents.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Hedonic Neurons: A Mechanistic Mapping of Latent Coalitions in Transformer MLPs

Fine-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) encode rich task-specific features, but the form of these representations, especially within MLP layers, remains unclear. Empirical inspection of LoRA updates shows that new features concentrate in mid-layer MLPs, yet the scale of these layers obscures meaningful structure. Prior probing suggests that statistical priors may strengthen, split, or vanish across depth, motivating the need to study how neurons work together rather than in isolation. We introduce a mechanistic interpretability framework based on coalitional game theory, where neurons mimic agents in a hedonic game whose preferences capture their synergistic contributions to layer-local computations. Using top-responsive utilities and the PAC-Top-Cover algorithm, we extract stable coalitions of neurons: groups whose joint ablation has non-additive effects. We then track their transitions across layers as persistence, splitting, merging, or disappearance. Applied to LLaMA, Mistral, and Pythia rerankers fine-tuned on scalar IR tasks, our method finds coalitions with consistently higher synergy than clustering baselines. By revealing how neurons cooperate to encode features, hedonic coalitions uncover higher-order structure beyond disentanglement and yield computational units that are functionally important, interpretable, and predictive across domains.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Stable Matching under Matroid Rank Valuations

We study a two-sided matching model where one side of the market (hospitals) has combinatorial preferences over the other side (doctors). Specifically, we consider the setting where hospitals have matroid rank valuations over the doctors, and doctors have either ordinal or cardinal unit-demand valuations over the hospitals. While this setting has been extensively studied in the context of one-sided markets, it remains unexplored in the context of two-sided markets. When doctors have ordinal preferences over hospitals, we present simple sequential allocation algorithms that guarantee stability, strategyproofness for doctors, and approximate strategyproofness for hospitals. When doctors have cardinal utilities over hospitals, we present an algorithm that finds a stable allocation maximizing doctor welfare; subject to that, we show how one can maximize either the hospital utilitarian or hospital Nash welfare. Moreover, we show that it is NP-hard to compute stable allocations that approximately maximize hospital Nash welfare.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

Heterogeneous Multi-Agent Bandits with Parsimonious Hints

We study a hinted heterogeneous multi-agent multi-armed bandits problem (HMA2B), where agents can query low-cost observations (hints) in addition to pulling arms. In this framework, each of the $M$ agents has a unique reward distribution over $K$ arms, and in $T$ rounds, they can observe the reward of the arm they pull only if no other agent pulls that arm. The goal is to maximize the total utility by querying the minimal necessary hints without pulling arms, achieving time-independent regret. We study HMA2B in both centralized and decentralized setups. Our main centralized algorithm, GP-HCLA, which is an extension of HCLA, uses a central decision-maker for arm-pulling and hint queries, achieving $O(M^4K)$ regret with $O(MK\log T)$ adaptive hints. In decentralized setups, we propose two algorithms, HD-ETC and EBHD-ETC, that allow agents to choose actions independently through collision-based communication and query hints uniformly until stopping, yielding $O(M^3K^2)$ regret with $O(M^3K\log T)$ hints, where the former requires knowledge of the minimum gap and the latter does not. Finally, we establish lower bounds to prove the optimality of our results and verify them through numerical simulations.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

RankSHAP: Shapley Value Based Feature Attributions for Learning to Rank

Numerous works propose post-hoc, model-agnostic explanations for learning to rank, focusing on ordering entities by their relevance to a query through feature attribution methods. However, these attributions often weakly correlate or contradict each other, confusing end users. We adopt an axiomatic game-theoretic approach, popular in the feature attribution community, to identify a set of fundamental axioms that every ranking-based feature attribution method should satisfy. We then introduce Rank-SHAP, extending classical Shapley values to ranking. We evaluate the RankSHAP framework through extensive experiments on two datasets, multiple ranking methods and evaluation metrics. Additionally, a user study confirms RankSHAP's alignment with human intuition. We also perform an axiomatic analysis of existing rank attribution algorithms to determine their compliance with our proposed axioms. Ultimately, our aim is to equip practitioners with a set of axiomatically backed feature attribution methods for studying IR ranking models, that ensure generality as well as consistency.

cs.IR↗

arXiv2025

Deploying Fair and Efficient Course Allocation Mechanisms

Universities regularly face the challenging task of assigning classes to thousands of students while considering their preferences, along with course schedules and capacities. Ensuring the effectiveness and fairness of course allocation mechanisms is crucial to guaranteeing student satisfaction and optimizing resource utilization. We approach this problem from an economic perspective, using formal justice criteria to evaluate different algorithmic frameworks. To evaluate our frameworks, we conduct a large scale survey of university students at University of Massachusetts Amherst, collecting over 1,000 student preferences. This is, to our knowledge, the largest publicly available dataset of student preferences. We develop software for generating synthetic student preferences over courses, and implement four allocation algorithms: the serial dictatorship algorithm used by University of Massachusetts Amherst; Round Robin; an Integer Linear Program; and the Yankee Swap algorithm. We propose improvements to the Yankee Swap framework to handle scenarios with item multiplicities. Through experimentation with the Fall 2024 Computer Science course schedule at University of Massachusetts Amherst, we evaluate each algorithm's performance relative to standard justice criteria, providing insights into fair course allocation in large university settings.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Simple Steps to Success: A Method for Step-Based Counterfactual Explanations

Algorithmic recourse is a process that leverages counterfactual explanations, going beyond understanding why a system produced a given classification, to providing a user with actions they can take to change their predicted outcome. Existing approaches to compute such interventions -- known as recourse -- identify a set of points that satisfy some desiderata -- e.g. an intervention in the underlying causal graph, minimizing a cost function, etc. Satisfying these criteria, however, requires extensive knowledge of the underlying model structure, an often unrealistic amount of information in several domains. We propose a data-driven and model-agnostic framework to compute counterfactual explanations. We introduce StEP, a computationally efficient method that offers incremental steps along the data manifold that directs users towards their desired outcome. We show that StEP uniquely satisfies a desirable set of axioms. Furthermore, via a thorough empirical and theoretical investigation, we show that StEP offers provable robustness and privacy guarantees while outperforming popular methods along important metrics.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

Fair and Welfare-Efficient Constrained Multi-matchings under Uncertainty

We study fair allocation of constrained resources, where a market designer optimizes overall welfare while maintaining group fairness. In many large-scale settings, utilities are not known in advance, but are instead observed after realizing the allocation. We therefore estimate agent utilities using machine learning. Optimizing over estimates requires trading-off between mean utilities and their predictive variances. We discuss these trade-offs under two paradigms for preference modeling -- in the stochastic optimization regime, the market designer has access to a probability distribution over utilities, and in the robust optimization regime they have access to an uncertainty set containing the true utilities with high probability. We discuss utilitarian and egalitarian welfare objectives, and we explore how to optimize for them under stochastic and robust paradigms. We demonstrate the efficacy of our approaches on three publicly available conference reviewer assignment datasets. The approaches presented enable scalable constrained resource allocation under uncertainty for many combinations of objectives and preference models.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

On the Hardness of Fair Allocation under Ternary Valuations

We study the problem of fair allocation of indivisible items when agents have ternary additive valuations -- each agent values each item at some fixed integer values $a$, $b$, or $c$ that are common to all agents. The notions of fairness we consider are max Nash welfare (MNW), when $a$, $b$, and $c$ are non-negative, and max egalitarian welfare (MEW). We show that for any distinct non-negative $a$, $b$, and $c$, maximizing Nash welfare is APX-hard -- i.e., the problem does not admit a PTAS unless P = NP. We also show that for any distinct $a$, $b$, and $c$, maximizing egalitarian welfare is APX-hard except for a few cases when $b = 0$ that admit efficient algorithms. These results make significant progress towards completely characterizing the complexity of computing exact MNW allocations and MEW allocations. En route, we resolve open questions left by prior work regarding the complexity of computing MNW allocations under bivalued valuations, and MEW allocations under ternary mixed manna.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Percentile Criterion Optimization in Offline Reinforcement Learning

In reinforcement learning, robust policies for high-stakes decision-making problems with limited data are usually computed by optimizing the \emph{percentile criterion}. The percentile criterion is approximately solved by constructing an \emph{ambiguity set} that contains the true model with high probability and optimizing the policy for the worst model in the set. Since the percentile criterion is non-convex, constructing ambiguity sets is often challenging. Existing work uses \emph{Bayesian credible regions} as ambiguity sets, but they are often unnecessarily large and result in learning overly conservative policies. To overcome these shortcomings, we propose a novel Value-at-Risk based dynamic programming algorithm to optimize the percentile criterion without explicitly constructing any ambiguity sets. Our theoretical and empirical results show that our algorithm implicitly constructs much smaller ambiguity sets and learns less conservative robust policies.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

Model Explanations via the Axiomatic Causal Lens

Explaining the decisions of black-box models is a central theme in the study of trustworthy ML. Numerous measures have been proposed in the literature; however, none of them take an axiomatic approach to causal explainability. In this work, we propose three explanation measures which aggregate the set of all but-for causes -- a necessary and sufficient explanation -- into feature importance weights. Our first measure is a natural adaptation of Chockler and Halpern's notion of causal responsibility, whereas the other two correspond to existing game-theoretic influence measures. We present an axiomatic treatment for our proposed indices, showing that they can be uniquely characterized by a set of desirable properties. We also extend our approach to derive a new method to compute the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices for black-box model explanations. Finally, we analyze and compare the necessity and sufficiency of all our proposed explanation measures in practice using the Adult-Income dataset. Thus, our work is the first to formally bridge the gap between model explanations, game-theoretic influence, and causal analysis.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

I Will Have Order! Optimizing Orders for Fair Reviewer Assignment

We present fast, fair, flexible, and welfare efficient algorithms for assigning reviewers to submitted conference papers. Our approaches extend picking sequence mechanisms, standard tools from the fair allocation literature to ensure approximate envy-freeness (typically envy-freeness up to one item, or EF1). However, fairness often comes at the cost of decreased efficiency. To overcome this challenge, we carefully select approximately optimal picking sequence orders. Applying a relaxation of submodularity, $γ$-weak submodularity, we show our Greedy Reviewer Round Robin (GRRR) approach is EF1 and yields a ${(1+γ)}$-approximation to the maximum welfare attainable by a round-robin picking sequence mechanism under any order. We present a weighted picking sequence mechanism called FairSequence that targets the Weighted EF1 criterion to offer fairness in a more general setting. Using data from three conferences, we show that FairSequence runs an order of magnitude faster and provides approximate envy-freeness guarantees that are violated by existing approaches. Its simple design also makes it very flexible to new assignment constraints. FairSequence is available in the OpenReview conference management platform, giving conference organizers access to faster reviewer assignment with high welfare and envy-freeness guarantees.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Axiomatic Aggregations of Abductive Explanations

The recent criticisms of the robustness of post hoc model approximation explanation methods (like LIME and SHAP) have led to the rise of model-precise abductive explanations. For each data point, abductive explanations provide a minimal subset of features that are sufficient to generate the outcome. While theoretically sound and rigorous, abductive explanations suffer from a major issue -- there can be several valid abductive explanations for the same data point. In such cases, providing a single abductive explanation can be insufficient; on the other hand, providing all valid abductive explanations can be incomprehensible due to their size. In this work, we solve this issue by aggregating the many possible abductive explanations into feature importance scores. We propose three aggregation methods: two based on power indices from cooperative game theory and a third based on a well-known measure of causal strength. We characterize these three methods axiomatically, showing that each of them uniquely satisfies a set of desirable properties. We also evaluate them on multiple datasets and show that these explanations are robust to the attacks that fool SHAP and LIME.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2023

Into the Unknown: Assigning Reviewers to Papers with Uncertain Affinities

A successful peer review process requires that qualified and interested reviewers are assigned to each paper. Most automated reviewer assignment approaches estimate a real-valued affinity score for each paper-reviewer pair that acts as a proxy for the quality of the match, and then assign reviewers to maximize the sum of affinity scores. Most affinity score estimation methods are inherently noisy: reviewers can only bid on a small number of papers, and textual similarity models and subject-area matching are inherently noisy estimators. Current paper assignment systems are not designed to rigorously handle noise in the peer-review matching market. In this work, we assume paper-reviewer affinity scores are located in or near a high-probability region called an uncertainty set. We maximize the worst-case sum of scores for a reviewer assignment over the uncertainty set. We demonstrate how to robustly maximize the sum of scores across various classes of uncertainty sets, avoiding potentially serious mistakes in assignment. Our general approach can be used to integrate a large variety of paper-reviewer affinity models into reviewer assignment, opening the door to a much more robust peer review process.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Towards AI Transparency and Accountability: A Global Framework for Exchanging Information on AI Systems

We propose that future AI transparency and accountability regulations are based on an open global standard for exchanging information about AI systems, which allows co-existence of potentially conflicting local regulations. Then, we discuss key components of a lightweight and effective AI transparency and/or accountability regulation. To prevent overregulation, the proposed approach encourages collaboration between regulators and industry to create a scalable and cost-efficient mutually beneficial solution. This includes using automated assessments and benchmarks with results transparently communicated through AI cards in an open AI register to facilitate meaningful public comparisons of competing AI systems. Such AI cards should report standardized measures tailored to the specific high-risk applications of AI systems and could be used for conformity assessments under AI transparency and accountability policies such as the European Union's AI Act.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2023

The Good, the Bad and the Submodular: Fairly Allocating Mixed Manna Under Order-Neutral Submodular Preferences

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods (positively valued items) and chores (negatively valued items) among agents with decreasing marginal utilities over items. Our focus is on instances where all the agents have simple preferences; specifically, we assume the marginal value of an item can be either $-1$, $0$ or some positive integer $c$. Under this assumption, we present an efficient algorithm to compute leximin allocations for a broad class of valuation functions we call order-neutral submodular valuations. Order-neutral submodular valuations strictly contain the well-studied class of additive valuations but are a strict subset of the class of submodular valuations. We show that these leximin allocations are Lorenz dominating and approximately proportional. We also show that, under further restriction to additive valuations, these leximin allocations are approximately envy-free and guarantee each agent their maxmin share. We complement this algorithmic result with a lower bound showing that the problem of computing leximin allocations is NP-hard when $c$ is a rational number.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Dividing Good and Better Items Among Agents with Bivalued Submodular Valuations

We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with {\em bivalued submodular valuations} -- each good provides a marginal gain of either $a$ or $b$ ($a < b$) and goods have decreasing marginal gains. This is a natural generalization of two well-studied valuation classes -- bivalued additive valuations and binary submodular valuations. We present a simple sequential algorithmic framework, based on the recently introduced Yankee Swap mechanism, that can be adapted to compute a variety of solution concepts, including max Nash welfare (MNW), leximin and $p$-mean welfare maximizing allocations when $a$ divides $b$. This result is complemented by an existing result on the computational intractability of MNW and leximin allocations when $a$ does not divide $b$. We show that MNW and leximin allocations guarantee each agent at least $\frac25$ and $\frac{a}{b+2a}$ of their maximin share, respectively, when $a$ divides $b$. We also show that neither the leximin nor the MNW allocation is guaranteed to be envy free up to one good (EF1). This is surprising since for the simpler classes of bivalued additive valuations and binary submodular valuations, MNW allocations are known to be envy free up to any good (EFX).

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

A General Framework for Fair Allocation under Matroid Rank Valuations

We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with matroid rank valuations -- every good provides a marginal value of $0$ or $1$ when added to a bundle and valuations are submodular. We generalize the Yankee Swap algorithm to create a simple framework, called General Yankee Swap, that can efficiently compute allocations that maximize any justice criterion (or fairness objective) satisfying some mild assumptions. Along with maximizing a justice criterion, General Yankee Swap is guaranteed to maximize utilitarian social welfare, ensure strategyproofness and use at most a quadratic number of valuation queries. We show how General Yankee Swap can be used to compute allocations for five different well-studied justice criteria: (a) Prioritized Lorenz dominance, (b) Maximin fairness, (c) Weighted leximin, (d) Max weighted Nash welfare, and (e) Max weighted $p$-mean welfare. In particular, our framework provides the first polynomial time algorithms to compute weighted leximin, max weighted Nash welfare and max weighted $p$-mean welfare allocations for agents with matroid rank valuations.

cs.GT↗