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Yakov Babichenko

Publications and source records attributed to Yakov Babichenko.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs

We study the set of possible joint posterior belief distributions of a group of agents who share a common prior regarding a binary state, and who observe some information structure. For two agents we introduce a quantitative version of Aumann's Agreement Theorem, and show that it is equivalent to a characterization of feasible distributions due to Dawid et al. (1995). For any number of agents, we characterize feasible distributions in terms of a "no-trade" condition. We use these characterizations to study information structures with independent posteriors. We also study persuasion problems with multiple receivers, exploring the extreme feasible distributions.

econ.TH↗

Communication complexity of Nash equilibrium in potential games

We prove communication complexity lower bounds for (possibly mixed) Nash equilibrium in potential games. In particular, we show that finding a Nash equilibrium requires $poly(N)$ communication in two-player $N \times N$ potential games, and $2^{poly(n)}$ communication in $n$-player two-action games. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first results to demonstrate hardness in any model of (possibly mixed) Nash equilibrium in potential games.

cs.GT↗

Incentive-Compatible Selection Mechanisms for Forests

Given a directed forest-graph, a probabilistic \emph{selection mechanism} is a probability distribution over the vertex set. A selection mechanism is \emph{incentive-compatible} (IC), if the probability assigned to a vertex does not change when we alter its outgoing edge (or even remove it). The quality of a selection mechanism is the worst-case ratio between the expected progeny under the mechanism's distribution and the maximal progeny in the forest. In this paper we prove an upper bound of 4/5 and a lower bound of $ 1/\ln16\approx0.36 $ for the quality of any IC selection mechanism. The lower bound is achieved by two novel mechanisms and is a significant improvement to the results of Babichenko et al. (WWW '18). The first, simpler mechanism, has the nice feature of generating distributions which are fair (i.e., monotone and proportional). The downside of this mechanism is that it is not exact (i.e., the probabilities might sum-up to less than 1). Our second, more involved mechanism, is exact but not fair. We also prove an impossibility for an IC mechanism that is both exact and fair and has a positive quality.

cs.GT↗

Incentive-Compatible Classification

We investigate the possibility of an incentive-compatible (IC, a.k.a. strategy-proof) mechanism for the classification of agents in a network according to their reviews of each other. In the $ α$-classification problem we are interested in selecting the top $ α$ fraction of users. We give upper bounds (impossibilities) and lower bounds (mechanisms) on the worst-case coincidence between the classification of an IC mechanism and the ideal $ α$-classification. We prove bounds which depend on $ α$ and on the maximal number of reviews given by a single agent, $ Δ$. Our results show that it is harder to find a good mechanism when $ α$ is smaller and $ Δ$ is larger. In particular, if $ Δ$ is unbounded, then the best mechanism is trivial (that is, it does not take into account the reviews). On the other hand, when $ Δ$ is sublinear in the number of agents, we give a simple, natural mechanism, with a coincidence ratio of $ α$.

cs.GT↗

Golden games

We consider extensive form win-lose games over a complete binary-tree of depth $n$ where players act in an alternating manner. We study arguably the simplest random structure of payoffs over such games where 0/1 payoffs in the leafs are drawn according to an i.i.d. Bernoulli distribution with probability $p$. Whenever $p$ differs from the golden ratio, asymptotically as $n\rightarrow \infty$, the winner of the game is determined. In the case where $p$ equals the golden ratio, we call such a random game a \emph{golden game}. In golden games the winner is the player that acts first with probability that is equal to the golden ratio. We suggest the notion of \emph{fragility} as a measure for "fairness" of a game's rules. Fragility counts how many leaves' payoffs should be flipped in order to convert the identity of the winning player. Our main result provides a recursive formula for asymptotic fragility of golden games. Surprisingly, golden games are extremely fragile. For instance, with probability $\approx 0.77$ a losing player could flip a single payoff (out of $2^n$) and become a winner. With probability $\approx 0.999$ a losing player could flip 3 payoffs and become the winner.

cs.GT↗

Sequential Voting with Confirmation Network

We discuss voting scenarios in which the set of voters (agents) and the set of alternatives are the same; that is, voters select a single representative from among themselves. Such a scenario happens, for instance, when a committee selects a chairperson, or when peer researchers select a prize winner. Our model assumes that each voter either renders worthy (confirms) or unworthy any other agent. We further assume that the prime goal of each agent is to be selected himself. Only if that is not feasible, will he try to get one of those that he confirms selected. In this paper, we investigate the open-sequential voting system in the above model. We consider both plurality (where each voter has one vote) and approval (where a voter may vote for any subset). Our results show that it is possible to find scenarios in which the selected agent is much less popular than the optimal (most popular) agent. We prove, however, that in the case of approval voting, the ratio between their popularity is always bounded from above by 2. In the case of plurality voting, we show that there are cases in which some of the equilibria give an unbounded ratio, but there always exists at least one equilibrium with ratio 2 at most.

cs.GT↗

Paradoxes in Sequential Voting

We analyse strategic, complete information, sequential voting with ordinal preferences over the alternatives. We consider several voting mechanisms: plurality voting and approval voting with deterministic or uniform tie-breaking rules. We show that strategic voting in these voting procedures may lead to a very undesirable outcome: Condorcet winning alternative might be rejected, Condorcet losing alternative might be elected, and Pareto dominated alternative might be elected. These undesirable phenomena occur already with four alternatives and a small number of voters. For the case of three alternatives we present positive and negative results.

cs.GT↗

The Communication Complexity of Local Search

We study the following communication variant of local search. There is some fixed, commonly known graph $G$. Alice holds $f_A$ and Bob holds $f_B$, both are functions that specify a value for each vertex. The goal is to find a local maximum of $f_A+f_B$ with respect to $G$, i.e., a vertex $v$ for which $(f_A+f_B)(v)\geq (f_A+f_B)(u)$ for every neighbor $u$ of $v$. Our main result is that finding a local maximum requires polynomial (in the number of vertices) bits of communication. The result holds for the following families of graphs: three dimensional grids, hypercubes, odd graphs, and degree 4 graphs. Moreover, we provide an \emph{optimal} communication bound of $Ω(\sqrt{N})$ for the hypercube, and for a constant dimensional greed, where $N$ is the number of vertices in the graph. We provide applications of our main result in two domains, exact potential games and combinatorial auctions. First, we show that finding a pure Nash equilibrium in $2$-player $N$-action exact potential games requires polynomial (in $N$) communication. We also show that finding a pure Nash equilibrium in $n$-player $2$-action exact potential games requires exponential (in $n$) communication. The second domain that we consider is combinatorial auctions, in which we prove that finding a local maximum in combinatorial auctions requires exponential (in the number of items) communication even when the valuations are submodular. Each one of the results demonstrates an exponential separation between the non-deterministic communication complexity and the randomized communication complexity of a total search problem.

cs.GT↗

Incentive-Compatible Diffusion

Our work bridges the literature on incentive-compatible mechanism design and the literature on diffusion algorithms. We introduce the study of finding an incentive-compatible (strategy-proof) mechanism for selecting an influential vertex in a directed graph (e.g. Twitter's network). The goal is to devise a mechanism with a bounded ratio between the maximal influence and the influence of the selected user, and in which no user can improve its probability of being selected by following or unfollowing other users. We introduce the `Two Path' mechanism which is based on the idea of selecting the vertex that is the first intersection of two independent random walks in the network. The Two Path mechanism is incentive compatible on directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), and has a finite approximation ratio on natural subfamilies of DAGs. Simulations indicate that this mechanism is suitable for practical uses.

cs.GT↗

Learning of Optimal Forecast Aggregation in Partial Evidence Environments

We consider the forecast aggregation problem in repeated settings, where the forecasts are done on a binary event. At each period multiple experts provide forecasts about an event. The goal of the aggregator is to aggregate those forecasts into a subjective accurate forecast. We assume that experts are Bayesian; namely they share a common prior, each expert is exposed to some evidence, and each expert applies Bayes rule to deduce his forecast. The aggregator is ignorant with respect to the information structure (i.e., distribution over evidence) according to which experts make their prediction. The aggregator observes the experts' forecasts only. At the end of each period the actual state is realized. We focus on the question whether the aggregator can learn to aggregate optimally the forecasts of the experts, where the optimal aggregation is the Bayesian aggregation that takes into account all the information (evidence) in the system. We consider the class of partial evidence information structures, where each expert is exposed to a different subset of conditionally independent signals. Our main results are positive; We show that optimal aggregation can be learned in polynomial time in a quite wide range of instances of the partial evidence environments. We provide a tight characterization of the instances where learning is possible and impossible.

cs.LG↗

Robust Forecast Aggregation

Bayesian experts who are exposed to different evidence often make contradictory probabilistic forecasts. An aggregator, ignorant of the underlying model, uses this to calculate her own forecast. We use the notions of scoring rules and regret to propose a natural way to evaluate an aggregation scheme. We focus on a binary state space and construct low regret aggregation schemes whenever there are only two experts which are either Blackwell-ordered or receive conditionally i.i.d. signals. In contrast, if there are many experts with conditionally i.i.d. signals, then no scheme performs (asymptotically) better than a $(0.5,0.5)$ forecast.

econ.GN↗

Stable Secretaries

We define and study a new variant of the secretary problem. Whereas in the classic setting multiple secretaries compete for a single position, we study the case where the secretaries arrive one at a time and are assigned, in an on-line fashion, to one of multiple positions. Secretaries are ranked according to talent, as in the original formulation, and in addition positions are ranked according to attractiveness. To evaluate an online matching mechanism, we use the notion of blocking pairs from stable matching theory: our goal is to maximize the number of positions (or secretaries) that do not take part in a blocking pair. This is compared with a stable matching in which no blocking pair exists. We consider the case where secretaries arrive randomly, as well as that of an adversarial arrival order, and provide corresponding upper and lower bounds.

cs.GT↗

Pareto Efficient Nash Implementation Via Approval Voting

We study implementation of a social choice correspondence in the case of two players who have von Neumann - Morgenstern utilities over a finite set of social alternatives, and the mechanism is allowed to output lotteries. Our main positive result shows that a close variant of the popular approval voting mechanism succeeds in selecting only Pareto efficient alternatives as pure Nash equilibria outcomes. Moreover, we provide an exact characterization of pure Nash equilibria profiles and outcomes of the mechanism. The characterization demonstrates a close connection between the approval voting mechanism and the notion of average fixed point, which is a point that is equal to the average of all points that it does not Pareto dominate.

econ.GN↗

Simple approximate equilibria in games with many players

We consider $ε$-equilibria notions for constant value of $ε$ in $n$-player $m$-actions games where $m$ is a constant. We focus on the following question: What is the largest grid size over the mixed strategies such that $ε$-equilibrium is guaranteed to exist over this grid. For Nash equilibrium, we prove that constant grid size (that depends on $ε$ and $m$, but not on $n$) is sufficient to guarantee existence of weak approximate equilibrium. This result implies a polynomial (in the input) algorithm for weak approximate equilibrium. For approximate Nash equilibrium we introduce a closely related question and prove its \emph{equivalence} to the well-known Beck-Fiala conjecture from discrepancy theory. To the best of our knowledge this is the first result introduces a connection between game theory and discrepancy theory. For correlated equilibrium, we prove a $O(\frac{1}{\log n})$ lower-bound on the grid size, which matches the known upper bound of $Ω(\frac{1}{\log n})$. Our result implies an $Ω(\log n)$ lower bound on the rate of convergence of dynamics (any dynamic) to approximate correlated (and coarse correlated) equilibrium. Again, this lower bound matches the $O(\log n)$ upper bound that is achieved by regret minimizing algorithms.

cs.GT↗

Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria

For a constant $ε$, we prove a poly(N) lower bound on the (randomized) communication complexity of $ε$-Nash equilibrium in two-player NxN games. For n-player binary-action games we prove an exp(n) lower bound for the (randomized) communication complexity of $(ε,ε)$-weak approximate Nash equilibrium, which is a profile of mixed actions such that at least $(1-ε)$-fraction of the players are $ε$-best replying.

cs.GT↗

Graphical potential games

We study the class of potential games that are also graphical games with respect to a given graph $G$ of connections between the players. We show that, up to strategic equivalence, this class of games can be identified with the set of Markov random fields on $G$. From this characterization, and from the Hammersley-Clifford theorem, it follows that the potentials of such games can be decomposed to local potentials. We use this decomposition to strongly bound the number of strategy changes of a single player along a better response path. This result extends to generalized graphical potential games, which are played on infinite graphs.

math.PR↗

Computational Aspects of Private Bayesian Persuasion

We study computational questions in a game-theoretic model that, in particular, aims to capture advertising/persuasion applications such as viral marketing. Specifically, we consider a multi-agent Bayesian persuasion model where an informed sender (marketer) tries to persuade a group of agents (consumers) to adopt a certain product. The quality of the product is known to the sender, but it is unknown to the agents. The sender is allowed to commit to a signaling policy where she sends a private signal---say, a viral marketing ad---to every agent. This work studies the computation aspects of finding a signaling policy that maximizes the sender's revenue. We show that if the sender's utility is a submodular function of the set of agents that adopt the product, then we can efficiently find a signaling policy whose revenue is at least (1-1/e) times the optimal. We also prove that approximating the sender's optimal revenue by a factor better than (1-1/e) is NP-hard and, hence, the developed approximation guarantee is essentially tight. When the senders' utility is a function of the number of agents that adopt the product (i.e., the utility function is anonymous), we show that an optimal signaling policy can be computed in polynomial time. Our results are based on an interesting connection between the Bayesian persuasion problem and the evaluation of the concave closure of a set function.

cs.GT↗

Random Extensive Form Games and its Application to Bargaining

We consider two-player random extensive form games where the payoffs at the leaves are independently drawn uniformly at random from a given feasible set C. We study the asymptotic distribution of the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome for binary-trees with increasing depth in various random (or deterministic) assignments of players to nodes. We characterize the assignments under which the asymptotic distribution concentrates around a point. Our analysis provides a natural way to derive from the asymptotic distribution a novel solution concept for two-player bargaining problems with a solid strategic justification.

cs.GT↗