Yalin Chen | Searcharxiv

arXiv2010

Comments on Five Smart Card Based Password Authentication Protocols

In this paper, we use the ten security requirements proposed by Liao et al. for a smart card based authentication protocol to examine five recent work in this area. After analyses, we found that the protocols of Juang et al.'s , Hsiang et al.'s, Kim et al.'s, and Li et al.'s all suffer from offline password guessing attack if the smart card is lost, and the protocol of Xu et al.'s is subjected to an insider impersonation attack.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2010

Cryptanalysis on Four Two-Party Authentication Protocols

In this paper, we analyze four authentication protocols of Bindu et al., Goriparthi et al., Wang et al. and Hölbl et al.. After investigation, we reveal several weaknesses of these schemes. First, Bindu et al.'s protocol suffers from an insider impersonation attack if a malicious user obtains a lost smart card. Second, both Goriparthi et al.'s and Wang et al.'s protocols cannot withstand a DoS attack in the password change phase, i.e. an attacker can involve the phase to make user's password never be used in subsequent authentications. Third, Hölbl et al.'s protocol is vulnerable to an insider attack since a legal but malevolent user can deduce KGC's secret key.

cs.CR↗