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Yasemin Acar

Publications and source records attributed to Yasemin Acar.

27 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

Ethical Frameworks and Computer Security Trolley Problems: Foundations for Conversations

The computer security research community regularly tackles ethical questions. The field of ethics / moral philosophy has for centuries considered what it means to be "morally good" or at least "morally allowed / acceptable". Among philosophy's contributions are (1) frameworks for evaluating the morality of actions -- including the well-established consequentialist and deontological frameworks -- and (2) scenarios (like trolley problems) featuring moral dilemmas that can facilitate discussion about and intellectual inquiry into different perspectives on moral reasoning and decision-making. In a classic trolley problem, consequentialist and deontological analyses may render different opinions. In this research, we explicitly make and explore connections between moral questions in computer security research and ethics / moral philosophy through the creation and analysis of trolley problem-like computer security-themed moral dilemmas and, in doing so, we seek to contribute to conversations among security researchers about the morality of security research-related decisions. We explicitly do not seek to define what is morally right or wrong, nor do we argue for one framework over another. Indeed, the consequentialist and deontological frameworks that we center, in addition to coming to different conclusions for our scenarios, have significant limitations. Instead, by offering our scenarios and by comparing two different approaches to ethics, we strive to contribute to how the computer security research field considers and converses about ethical questions, especially when there are different perspectives on what is morally right or acceptable.

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S3C2 Summit 2023-02: Industry Secure Supply Chain Summit

Recent years have shown increased cyber attacks targeting less secure elements in the software supply chain and causing fatal damage to businesses and organizations. Past well-known examples of software supply chain attacks are the SolarWinds or log4j incidents that have affected thousands of customers and businesses. The US government and industry are equally interested in enhancing software supply chain security. On February 22, 2023, researchers from the NSF-supported Secure Software Supply Chain Center (S3C2) conducted a Secure Software Supply Chain Summit with a diverse set of 17 practitioners from 15 companies. The goal of the Summit is to enable sharing between industry practitioners having practical experiences and challenges with software supply chain security and helping to form new collaborations. We conducted six-panel discussions based upon open-ended questions regarding software bill of materials (SBOMs), malicious commits, choosing new dependencies, build and deploy,the Executive Order 14028, and vulnerable dependencies. The open discussions enabled mutual sharing and shed light on common challenges that industry practitioners with practical experience face when securing their software supply chain. In this paper, we provide a summary of the Summit. Full panel questions can be found in the appendix.

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S3C2 Summit 2202-09: Industry Secure Suppy Chain Summit

Recent years have shown increased cyber attacks targeting less secure elements in the software supply chain and causing fatal damage to businesses and organizations. Past well-known examples of software supply chain attacks are the SolarWinds or log4j incidents that have affected thousands of customers and businesses. The US government and industry are equally interested in enhancing software supply chain security. We conducted six panel discussions with a diverse set of 19 practitioners from industry. We asked them open-ended questions regarding SBOMs, vulnerable dependencies, malicious commits, build and deploy, the Executive Order, and standards compliance. The goal of this summit was to enable open discussions, mutual sharing, and shedding light on common challenges that industry practitioners with practical experience face when securing their software supply chain. This paper summarizes the summit held on September 30, 2022.

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Beyond the Boolean: How Programmers Ask About, Use, and Discuss Gender

Categorization via gender is omnipresent throughout society, and thus also computing; gender identity is often requested of users before they use software or web services. Despite this fact, no research has explored how software developers approach requesting gender disclosure from users. To understand how developers think about gender in software, we present an interview study with 15 software developers recruited from the freelancing platform Upwork as well as Twitter. We also collected and categorized 917 threads that contained keywords relevant to gender from programming-related sub-forums on the social media service Reddit. 16 posts that discussed approaches to gender disclosure were further analyzed. We found that while some developers have an understanding of inclusive gender options, programmers rarely consider when gender data is necessary or the way in which they request gender disclosure from users. Our findings have implications for programmers, software engineering educators, and the broader community concerned with inclusivity.

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A World Full of Privacy and Security (Mis)conceptions? Findings of a Representative Survey in 12 Countries

Misconceptions about digital security and privacy topics in the general public frequently lead to insecure behavior. However, little is known about the prevalence and extent of such misconceptions in a global context. In this work, we present the results of the first large-scale survey of a global population on misconceptions: We conducted an online survey with n = 12, 351 participants in 12 countries on four continents. By investigating influencing factors of misconceptions around eight common security and privacy topics (including E2EE, Wi-Fi, VPN, and malware), we find the country of residence to be the strongest estimate for holding misconceptions. We also identify differences between non-Western and Western countries, demonstrating the need for region-specific research on user security knowledge, perceptions, and behavior. While we did not observe many outright misconceptions, we did identify a lack of understanding and uncertainty about several fundamental privacy and security topics.

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"We are a startup to the core": A qualitative interview study on the security and privacy development practices in Turkish software startups

Security and privacy are often neglected in software development, and rarely a priority for developers. This insight is commonly based on research conducted by researchers and on developer populations living and working in the United States, Europe, and the United Kingdom. However, the production of software is global, and crucial populations in important technology hubs are not adequately studied. The software startup scene in Turkey is impactful, and comprehension, knowledge, and mitigations related to software security and privacy remain understudied. To close this research gap, we conducted a semi-structured interview study with 16 developers working in Turkish software startups. The goal of the interview study was to analyze if and how developers ensure that their software is secure and preserves user privacy. Our main finding is that developers rarely prioritize security and privacy, due to a lack of awareness, skills, and resources. We find that regulations can make a positive impact on security and privacy. Based on the study, we issue recommendations for industry, individual developers, research, educators, and regulators. Our recommendations can inform a more globalized approach to security and privacy in software development.

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"Please help share!": Security and Privacy Advice on Twitter during the 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine

The Russian Invasion of Ukraine in early 2022 resulted in a rapidly changing (cyber) threat environment. This changing environment incentivized the sharing of security advice on social media, both for the Ukrainian population, as well as against Russian cyber attacks at large. Previous research found a significant influence of online security advice on end users. We collected 8,920 tweets posted after the Russian Invasion of Ukraine and examined 1,228 in detail, including qualitatively coding 232 relevant tweets and 140 linked documents for security and privacy advice. We identified 221 unique pieces of advice which we divided into seven categories and 21 subcategories, and advice targeted at individuals or organizations. We then compared our findings to those of prior studies, finding noteworthy similarities. Our results confirm a lack of advice prioritization found by prior work, which seems especially detrimental during times of crisis. In addition, we find offers for individual support to be a valuable tool and identify misinformation as a rising threat in general and for security advice specifically.

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A Large Scale Investigation of Obfuscation Use in Google Play

Android applications are frequently plagiarized or repackaged, and software obfuscation is a recommended protection against these practices. However, there is very little data on the overall rates of app obfuscation, the techniques used, or factors that lead to developers to choose to obfuscate their apps. In this paper, we present the first comprehensive analysis of the use of and challenges to software obfuscation in Android applications. We analyzed 1.7 million free Android apps from Google Play to detect various obfuscation techniques, finding that only 24.92% of apps are obfuscated by the developer. To better understand this rate of obfuscation, we surveyed 308 Google Play developers about their experiences and attitudes about obfuscation. We found that while developers feel that apps in general are at risk of plagiarism, they do not fear theft of their own apps. Developers also self-report difficulties applying obfuscation for their own apps. To better understand this, we conducted a follow-up study where the vast majority of 70 participants failed to obfuscate a realistic sample app even while many mistakenly believed they had been successful. Our findings show that more work is needed to make obfuscation tools more usable, to educate developers on the risk of their apps being reverse engineered, their intellectual property stolen, their apps being repackaged and redistributed as malware and to improve the health of the overall Android ecosystem.

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Stack Overflow Considered Harmful? The Impact of Copy&Paste on Android Application Security

Online programming discussion platforms such as Stack Overflow serve as a rich source of information for software developers. Available information include vibrant discussions and oftentimes ready-to-use code snippets. Anecdotes report that software developers copy and paste code snippets from those information sources for convenience reasons. Such behavior results in a constant flow of community-provided code snippets into production software. To date, the impact of this behaviour on code security is unknown. We answer this highly important question by quantifying the proliferation of security-related code snippets from Stack Overflow in Android applications available on Google Play. Access to the rich source of information available on Stack Overflow including ready-to-use code snippets provides huge benefits for software developers. However, when it comes to code security there are some caveats to bear in mind: Due to the complex nature of code security, it is very difficult to provide ready-to-use and secure solutions for every problem. Hence, integrating a security-related code snippet from Stack Overflow into production software requires caution and expertise. Unsurprisingly, we observed insecure code snippets being copied into Android applications millions of users install from Google Play every day. To quantitatively evaluate the extent of this observation, we scanned Stack Overflow for code snippets and evaluated their security score using a stochastic gradient descent classifier. In order to identify code reuse in Android applications, we applied state-of-the-art static analysis. Our results are alarming: 15.4% of the 1.3 million Android applications we analyzed, contained security-related code snippets from Stack Overflow. Out of these 97.9% contain at least one insecure code snippet.

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