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Yash Chaurasia

Publications and source records attributed to Yash Chaurasia.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

TooLQit: Leptoquark Models and Limits

We introduce the leptoquark (LQ) toolkit, TooLQit, which includes leading-order FeynRules models for all types of LQs and a Python-based calculator, named CaLQ, to test if a set of parameter points are allowed by the LHC dilepton searches. The models include electroweak gauge interactions of the LQs and follow a set of intuitive notations. Currently, CaLQ can calculate the LHC limits on LQ ($S_1$ and $U_1$) couplings (one or more simultaneously) for any mass between $1$ and $5$ TeV using a $χ^2$ method. In this manual for TooLQit, we describe the FeynRules models and discuss the techniques used in CaLQ. We outline the workflow to check parameter spaces of LQ models with an example. We show some illustrative scans for one- and multi-coupling scenarios for the $U_1$ vector LQ. The TooLQit code is available at https://github.com/rsrchtsm/TooLQit

hep-ph

Shapley Value-based Approach for Redistributing Revenue of Matchmaking of Private Transactions in Blockchains

In the context of blockchain, MEV refers to the maximum value that can be extracted from block production through the inclusion, exclusion, or reordering of transactions. Searchers often participate in order flow auctions (OFAs) to obtain exclusive rights to private transactions, available through entities called matchmakers, also known as order flow providers (OFPs). Most often, redistributing the revenue generated through such auctions among transaction creators is desirable. In this work, we formally introduce the matchmaking problem in MEV, its desirable properties, and associated challenges. Using cooperative game theory, we formalize the notion of fair revenue redistribution in matchmaking and present its potential possibilities and impossibilities. Precisely, we define a characteristic form game, referred to as RST-Game, for the transaction creators. We propose to redistribute the revenue using the Shapley value of RST-Game. We show that the corresponding problem could be SUBEXP (i.e. $2^{o(n)}$, where $n$ is the number of transactions); therefore, approximating the Shapley value is necessary. Further, we propose a randomized algorithm for computing the Shapley value in RST-Game and empirically verify its efficacy.

cs.GT

MEV Ecosystem Evolution From Ethereum 1.0

Smart contracts led to the emergence of the decentralized finance (DeFi) marketplace within blockchain ecosystems, where diverse participants engage in financial activities. In traditional finance, there are possibilities to create values, e.g., arbitrage offers to create value from market inefficiencies or front-running offers to extract value for the participants having privileged roles. Such opportunities are readily available -- searching programmatically in DeFi. It is commonly known as Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) in the literature. In this survey, first, we show how lucrative such opportunities can be. Next, we discuss how protocol-following participants trying to capture such opportunities threaten to sabotage blockchain's performance and the core tenets of decentralization, transparency, and trustlessness that blockchains are based on. Then, we explain different attempts by the community in the past to address these issues and the problems introduced by these solutions. Finally, we review the current state of research trying to restore trustlessness and decentralization to provide all DeFi participants with a fair marketplace.

cs.CR

Right-handed neutrino pair production via second-generation leptoquarks

No direct experimental constraints exist on Leptoquark (LQ) couplings with quarks and right-handed neutrinos (RHNs). If a LQ dominantly couples to RHNs, it can leave unique signatures at the LHC. The RHNs can be produced copiously from LQ decays as long as they are lighter than the LQs. LQ-induced RHN production has never been searched for in experiments. This channel can act as a simultaneous probe for RHNs and LQs that dominantly couple to RHNs. In this paper, we consider all possible charge-$2/3$ and $1/3$ scalar and vector LQs that dominantly couple to second-generation quarks and RHN. We study the pair and single productions of TeV-scale LQs and their subsequent decay to sub-TeV RHNs, realised in the inverse seesaw framework. We also consider RHN pair production through a $t$-channel LQ exchange. The single LQ production and $t$-channel contributions can be significant for large LQ-RHN-quark couplings. We systematically combine events from these processes leading to a pair of RHNs plus jets to study the prospects of LQ-assisted RHN pair production. We analyse the monolepton and opposite-sign dilepton final states and estimate the discovery reach at the high-luminosity LHC.

hep-ph

PUPoW: A framework for designing blockchains with practically-useful-proof-of-work & vanitycoin

Bitcoin is the first of its kind, a truly decentralized and anonymous cryptocurrency. To realize it, it has developed blockchain technology using the concept of `Proof of Work' (PoW). The miners, nodes responsible for writing transaction databases, solve a cryptographic puzzle to claim the right to write to the database. Though bitcoin and many other relevant cryptocurrencies, such as ether use revolutionary ideas, the main criticism involves computing resources and energy consumption to solve puzzles that have otherwise no use. There are attempts to use the PoW to do something useful, commonly referred to as Proof-of-Useful-Work (PoUW). In this paper, we attempt to (i) make PoUW more usable -- describe how a central problem setter can crowdsource their work as PoUW and (ii) in the true spirit of blockchains, decentralize the role of problem setter, whom we call puzzlers. We propose a formal framework to do so, namely PUPoW. PUPoW has an inbuilt provision of payments from the puzzler to the miner who solves its puzzle. Additionally, miners have the option to not rely on a continuous feed of the puzzles and instead use original PoW puzzles. We also propose a way to use PUPOW for solving TOR vanity URL generation and bitcoin vanity address generation problems. We call this PUPoW blockchain solving vanity address generation problems as VanityCoin. Both problems require generating public keys from private keys such that resultant addresses are of interest. Such key pairs are found only by a brute-force search. However, there are privacy concerns that miners would know the private keys of the puzzlers. We resolve this by splitting the private keys, and the miners would know only one part of it. In summary, we are proposing how PoW can be made practically helpful, and we believe such an approach is needed for PoW blockchains to survive.

cs.CR