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Yeongju Bak

Publications and source records attributed to Yeongju Bak.

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zk-X509: Privacy-Preserving On-Chain Identity from Legacy PKI via Zero-Knowledge Proofs

Public blockchains impose an inherent tension between regulatory compliance and user privacy. Existing on-chain identity solutions require centralized KYC attestors, specialized hardware, or Decentralized Identifier (DID) frameworks needing entirely new credential infrastructure. Meanwhile, over four billion active X.509 certificates constitute a globally deployed, government-grade trust infrastructure largely unexploited for decentralized identity. This paper presents zk-X509, a privacy-preserving identity system bridging legacy Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) with public ledgers via a RISC-V zero-knowledge virtual machine (zkVM). Users prove ownership of standard X.509 certificates without revealing private keys or personal identifiers. Crucially, the private key never enters the ZK circuit; ownership is proven via OS keychain signature delegation (macOS Security.framework, Windows CNG). The circuit verifies certificate chain validity, temporal validity, key ownership, trustless CRL revocation, blockchain address binding, and Sybil-resistant nullifier generation. It commits 13 public values, including a Certificate Authority (CA) Merkle root hiding the issuing CA, and four selective disclosure hashes. We formalize eight security properties under a Dolev-Yao adversary with game-based definitions and reductions to sEUF-CMA, SHA-256 collision resistance, and ZK soundness. Evaluated on the SP1 zkVM, the system achieves 11.8M cycles for ECDSA P-256 (17.4M for RSA-2048), with on-chain Groth16 verification costing ~300K gas. By leveraging certificates deployed at scale across jurisdictions, zk-X509 enables adoption without new trust establishment, complementing emerging DID-based systems.

cs.CR

Looking for Attention: Randomized Attention Test Design for Validator Monitoring in Optimistic Rollups

Optimistic Rollups (ORUs) significantly enhance blockchain scalability but inherently suffer from the verifier's dilemma, particularly concerning validator attentiveness. Current systems lack mechanisms to proactively ensure validators are diligently monitoring L2 state transitions, creating a vulnerability where fraudulent states could be finalized. This paper introduces the Randomized Attention Test (RAT), a novel L1-based protocol designed to probabilistically challenge validators in ORUs, thereby verifying their liveness and computational readiness. Our game-theoretic analysis demonstrates that an Ideal Security Equilibrium, where all validators are attentive and proposers are honest, can be achieved with RAT. Notably, this equilibrium is attainable and stable with relatively low economic penalties (under \$1000) for non-responsive validators, a low attention test frequency (under 1\% per epoch), and a minimal operation overhead (monthly under \$30) with 10 validators. RAT thus provides a pivotal, practical mechanism to enforce validator diligence, fortifying the overall security and integrity of ORU systems with minimizing additional costs.

cs.CR