arXiv subjects

Yevgeniy Dodis

Publications and source records attributed to Yevgeniy Dodis.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2024

Ideal Pseudorandom Codes

Pseudorandom codes are error-correcting codes with the property that no efficient adversary can distinguish encodings from uniformly random strings. They were recently introduced by Christ and Gunn [CRYPTO 2024] for the purpose of watermarking the outputs of randomized algorithms, such as generative AI models. Several constructions of pseudorandom codes have since been proposed, but none of them are robust to error channels that depend on previously seen codewords. This stronger kind of robustness is referred to as adaptive robustness, and it is important for meaningful applications to watermarking. In this work, we show the following. - Adaptive robustness: We show that the pseudorandom codes of Christ and Gunn are adaptively robust, resolving a conjecture posed by Cohen, Hoover, and Schoenbach [S&P 2025]. - Ideal security: We define an ideal pseudorandom code as one which is indistinguishable from the ideal functionality, capturing both the pseudorandomness and robustness properties in one simple definition. We show that any adaptively robust pseudorandom code for single-bit messages can be bootstrapped to build an ideal pseudorandom code with linear information rate, under no additional assumptions. - CCA security: In the setting where the encoding key is made public, we define a CCA-secure pseudorandom code in analogy with CCA-secure encryption. We show that any adaptively robust public-key pseudorandom code for single-bit messages can be used to build a CCA-secure pseudorandom code with linear information rate, in the random oracle model. These results immediately imply stronger robustness guarantees for generative AI watermarking schemes, such as the practical quality-preserving image watermarks of Gunn, Zhao, and Song (2024).

cs.CR↗

arXiv2011

Privacy Amplification and Non-Malleable Extractors Via Character Sums

In studying how to communicate over a public channel with an active adversary, Dodis and Wichs introduced the notion of a non-malleable extractor. A non-malleable extractor dramatically strengthens the notion of a strong extractor. A strong extractor takes two inputs, a weakly-random x and a uniformly random seed y, and outputs a string which appears uniform, even given y. For a non-malleable extractor nmExt, the output nmExt(x,y) should appear uniform given y as well as nmExt(x,A(y)), where A is an arbitrary function with A(y) not equal to y. We show that an extractor introduced by Chor and Goldreich is non-malleable when the entropy rate is above half. It outputs a linear number of bits when the entropy rate is 1/2 + alpha, for any alpha>0. Previously, no nontrivial parameters were known for any non-malleable extractor. To achieve a polynomial running time when outputting many bits, we rely on a widely-believed conjecture about the distribution of prime numbers in arithmetic progressions. Our analysis involves a character sum estimate, which may be of independent interest. Using our non-malleable extractor, we obtain protocols for "privacy amplification": key agreement between two parties who share a weakly-random secret. Our protocols work in the presence of an active adversary with unlimited computational power, and have asymptotically optimal entropy loss. When the secret has entropy rate greater than 1/2, the protocol follows from a result of Dodis and Wichs, and takes two rounds. When the secret has entropy rate delta for any constant delta>0, our new protocol takes a constant (polynomial in 1/delta) number of rounds. Our protocols run in polynomial time under the above well-known conjecture about primes.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2008

Fuzzy Extractors: How to Generate Strong Keys from Biometrics and Other Noisy Data

We provide formal definitions and efficient secure techniques for - turning noisy information into keys usable for any cryptographic application, and, in particular, - reliably and securely authenticating biometric data. Our techniques apply not just to biometric information, but to any keying material that, unlike traditional cryptographic keys, is (1) not reproducible precisely and (2) not distributed uniformly. We propose two primitives: a "fuzzy extractor" reliably extracts nearly uniform randomness R from its input; the extraction is error-tolerant in the sense that R will be the same even if the input changes, as long as it remains reasonably close to the original. Thus, R can be used as a key in a cryptographic application. A "secure sketch" produces public information about its input w that does not reveal w, and yet allows exact recovery of w given another value that is close to w. Thus, it can be used to reliably reproduce error-prone biometric inputs without incurring the security risk inherent in storing them. We define the primitives to be both formally secure and versatile, generalizing much prior work. In addition, we provide nearly optimal constructions of both primitives for various measures of ``closeness'' of input data, such as Hamming distance, edit distance, and set difference.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2006

On the impossibility of extracting classical randomness using a quantum computer

In this work we initiate the question of whether quantum devices can provide us with an almost perfect source of classical randomness, and more generally, suffice for classical cryptographic tasks, such as encryption. Indeed, it is well known that classical computers are insufficient for either one of these tasks when all they have access to is a realistic imperfect source of randomness. On the other hand, quantum physics is inherently probabilistic which suggests that perhaps quantum computers can provide a reasonable way to overcome the above mentioned impossibility results. However, we show that this is not the case in a realistic setting where observations (measurements) are subject to noise.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2004

Multiparty Quantum Coin Flipping

We investigate coin-flipping protocols for multiple parties in a quantum broadcast setting: (1) We propose and motivate a definition for quantum broadcast. Our model of quantum broadcast channel is new. (2) We discovered that quantum broadcast is essentially a combination of pairwise quantum channels and a classical broadcast channel. This is a somewhat surprising conclusion, but helps us in both our lower and upper bounds. (3) We provide tight upper and lower bounds on the optimal bias epsilon of a coin which can be flipped by k parties of which exactly g parties are honest: for any 1 <= g <= k, epsilon = 1/2 - Theta(g/k). Thus, as long as a constant fraction of the players are honest, they can prevent the coin from being fixed with at least a constant probability. This result stands in sharp contrast with the classical setting, where no non-trivial coin-flipping is possible when g <= k/2.

quant-ph↗