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Yi-Duo Chen

Publications and source records attributed to Yi-Duo Chen.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Three-state coevolutionary game dynamics with environmental feedback

Environmental feedback mechanisms are ubiquitous in real-world complex systems. In this study, we incorporate a homogeneous environment into the evolutionary dynamics of a three-state system comprising cooperators, defectors, and empty nodes. Both coherence resonance and equilibrium states, resulting from the tightly clustering of cooperator agglomerates, enhance population survival and environmental quality. The resonance phenomenon arises at the transition between cooperative and defective payoff parameters in the prisoner's dilemma game.

nlin.AO

Higher-order evolutionary dynamics with game transitions

Higher-order interactions are prevalent in real-world complex systems and exert unique influences on system evolution that cannot be captured by pairwise interactions. We incorporate game transitions into the higher-order prisoner's dilemma game model, where these transitions consistently promote cooperation. Moreover, in systems with game transitions, the proportion of higher-order interactions has a dual impact, either enhancing the emergence and persistence of cooperation or facilitating invasions that promote defection within an otherwise cooperative system. Correspondingly, bistable states, consisting of mutual defection and either mutual cooperation or coexistence, are consistently identified in both theoretical analyses and simulation results.

nlin.AO

Coevolutionary game dynamics with localized environmental resource feedback

Dynamic environments shape diverse dynamics in evolutionary game systems. We introduce spatial heterogeneity of resources into the prisoner's dilemma game model to explore coevolutionary game dynamics with environmental feedback. The availability of resources significantly affects the survival competitiveness of surrounding individuals. Feedback between individuals' strategies and the resources they can use leads to the oscillating dynamic known as the "oscillatory tragedy of the commons". Our findings indicate that when the influence of individuals' strategies on the update rate of resources is significantly high in systems characterized by environmental heterogeneity, they can attain an equilibrium state that avoids the oscillatory tragedy. In contrast to the numerical results obtained in well-mixed structures, self-organized clustered patterns emerge in simulations utilizing square lattices, further enhancing the stability of the system. We discuss critical phenomena in detail, demonstrating that the aforementioned transition is robust across various system parameters, including the strength of cooperators in restoring the environment, initial distributions of cooperators, system size and structures, and noise.

q-bio.PE