Yidan Xing | Searcharxiv

arXiv2024

An Intelligent Innovation Dataset on Scientific Research Outcomes

Various stakeholders, such as researchers, government agencies, businesses, and research laboratories require a large volume of reliable scientific research outcomes including research articles and patent data to support their work. These data are crucial for a variety of application, such as advancing scientific research, conducting business evaluations, and undertaking policy analysis. However, collecting such data is often a time-consuming and laborious task. Consequently, many users turn to using openly accessible data for their research. However, these existing open dataset releases typically suffer from lack of relationship between different data sources and a limited temporal coverage. To address this issue, we present a new open dataset, the Intelligent Innovation Dataset (IIDS), which comprises six interrelated datasets spanning nearly 120 years, encompassing paper information, paper citation relationships, patent details, patent legal statuses, and funding information. The extensive contextual and extensive temporal coverage of the IIDS dataset will provide researchers and practitioners and policy maker with comprehensive data support, enabling them to conduct in-depth scientific research and comprehensive data analyses.

cs.DB↗

arXiv2023

Truthful Auctions for Automated Bidding in Online Advertising

Automated bidding, an emerging intelligent decision making paradigm powered by machine learning, has become popular in online advertising. Advertisers in automated bidding evaluate the cumulative utilities and have private financial constraints over multiple ad auctions in a long-term period. Based on these distinct features, we consider a new ad auction model for automated bidding: the values of advertisers are public while the financial constraints, such as budget and return on investment (ROI) rate, are private types. We derive the truthfulness conditions with respect to private constraints for this multi-dimensional setting, and demonstrate any feasible allocation rule could be equivalently reduced to a series of non-decreasing functions on budget. However, the resulted allocation mapped from these non-decreasing functions generally follows an irregular shape, making it difficult to obtain a closed-form expression for the auction objective. To overcome this design difficulty, we propose a family of truthful automated bidding auction with personalized rank scores, similar to the Generalized Second-Price (GSP) auction. The intuition behind our design is to leverage personalized rank scores as the criteria to allocate items, and compute a critical ROI to transform the constraints on budget to the same dimension as ROI. The experimental results demonstrate that the proposed auction mechanism outperforms the widely used ad auctions, such as first-price auction and second-price auction, in various automated bidding environments.

cs.GT↗