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Yigit Yalin

Publications and source records attributed to Yigit Yalin.

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Reference-Based 3D-Aware Image Editing with Triplanes

Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) have emerged as powerful tools for high-quality image generation and real image editing by manipulating their latent spaces. Recent advancements in GANs include 3D-aware models such as EG3D, which feature efficient triplane-based architectures capable of reconstructing 3D geometry from single images. However, limited attention has been given to providing an integrated framework for 3D-aware, high-quality, reference-based image editing. This study addresses this gap by exploring and demonstrating the effectiveness of the triplane space for advanced reference-based edits. Our novel approach integrates encoding, automatic localization, spatial disentanglement of triplane features, and fusion learning to achieve the desired edits. We demonstrate how our approach excels across diverse domains, including human faces, 360-degree heads, animal faces, partially stylized edits like cartoon faces, full-body clothing edits, and edits on class-agnostic samples. Our method shows state-of-the-art performance over relevant latent direction, text, and image-guided 2D and 3D-aware diffusion and GAN methods, both qualitatively and quantitatively.

cs.CV

Convergence of Heterogeneous Learning Dynamics in Zero-sum Stochastic Games

This paper presents new families of algorithms for the repeated play of two-agent (near) zero-sum games and two-agent zero-sum stochastic games. For example, the family includes fictitious play and its variants as members. Commonly, the algorithms in this family are all uncoupled, rational, and convergent even in heterogeneous cases, e.g., where the dynamics may differ in terms of learning rates, full, none or temporal access to opponent actions, and model-based vs model-free learning. The convergence of heterogeneous dynamics is of practical interest especially in competitive environments since agents may have no means or interests in following the same dynamic with the same parameters. We prove that any mixture of such asymmetries does not impact the algorithms' convergence to equilibrium (or near equilibrium if there is experimentation) in zero-sum games with repeated play and in zero-sum (irreducible) stochastic games with sufficiently small discount factors.

cs.GT