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Yihui Jin

Publications and source records attributed to Yihui Jin.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Mind Your Boundaries: Boundary-Aware Model Obfuscation against Cross-node Attack

With the advancement of powerful AI chips, on-device machine learning is gaining traction for its low latency and privacy protection. However, when edge devices are compromised, attackers can obtain white-box access to the deployed models by reversing the apps directly to obtain the knowledge of peer devices, which is known as Cross-Node Attacks, like performing efficient adversarial attacks. Most existing defenses target known vulnerabilities, yet white-box access still enables attackers to uncover more unknown weaknesses. This creates a critical risk for edge-device deployments, where one compromised device can endanger all models distributed from the same source. Motivated by findings that the model robustness is primarily influenced by the curvature of the decision boundary, we investigate how model parameters shape its curvature. In this paper, we propose a novel method, BMO, that obfuscates model parameters to diversify the decision boundary further resisting cross-node attack while preserving its benign accuracy. Specifically, we explore decomposing model parameters into boundary-position and boundary-curvature components based on null-space constraints, then models with differentiated decision boundaries are instantiated by injecting noise into the boundary-curvature component. Across all four major types of adversarial attacks with four widely-deployed on-device models, BMO achieves an average success rate of 68.68% in defense, far exceeding the most competitive baseline, which attains only 22.32% in defending against cross-node attacks. Moreover, BMO achieves comparable performance in benign accuracy compared with baselines.

cs.CR↗

Model Exposure on One Device Endangers Others: Rethinking Edge Neural Network Security across Devices

Neural networks (NNs) are increasingly deployed on edge devices such as mobile and IoT platforms, offering low latency and improved privacy compared to cloud-based deployment. However, on-device models embedded in mobile applications can be unpacked and exposed to adversaries, enabling cross-node attacks in centrally distributed ecosystems, where adversarial examples crafted on one compromised device transfer effectively to other nodes sharing the same models. To address this threat, we propose VeilNN, a defense framework that reduces adversarial transferability across on-device models via model obfuscation. The core idea of VeilNN is to introduce controlled model diversity while preserving original task functionality. Specifically, VeilNN applies stealthy and irreversible obfuscation at both the architectural and parameter levels through network cell obfuscation and layer assembling, and is applicable to diverse NN architectures, including MLPs, CNNs, and Vision Transformers. Extensive experiments demonstrate that VeilNN effectively defends against cross-node attacks, achieving an average defense success of 49.19% and up to 81.19% across four adversarial attack types, with more than 33.16% improvement over existing defenses.

cs.CR↗