arXiv subjects

Yijia Chang

Publications and source records attributed to Yijia Chang.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2025

Arbitrary-Threshold Fully Homomorphic Encryption with Lower Complexity

Threshold fully homomorphic encryption (ThFHE) enables multiple parties to compute functions over their sensitive data without leaking data privacy. Most of existing ThFHE schemes are restricted to full threshold and require the participation of \textit{all} parties to output computing results. Compared with these full-threshold schemes, arbitrary threshold (ATh)-FHE schemes are robust to non-participants and can be a promising solution to many real-world applications. However, existing AThFHE schemes are either inefficient to be applied with a large number of parties $N$ and a large data size $K$, or insufficient to tolerate all types of non-participants. In this paper, we propose an AThFHE scheme to handle all types of non-participants with lower complexity over existing schemes. At the core of our scheme is the reduction from AThFHE construction to the design of a new primitive called \textit{approximate secret sharing} (ApproxSS). Particularly, we formulate ApproxSS and prove the correctness and security of AThFHE on top of arbitrary-threshold (ATh)-ApproxSS's properties. Such a reduction reveals that existing AThFHE schemes implicitly design ATh-ApproxSS following a similar idea called ``noisy share''. Nonetheless, their ATh-ApproxSS design has high complexity and become the performance bottleneck. By developing ATASSES, an ATh-ApproxSS scheme based on a novel ``encrypted share'' idea, we reduce the computation (resp. communication) complexity from $\mathcal{O}(N^2K)$ to $\mathcal{O}(N^2+K)$ (resp. from $\mathcal{O}(NK)$ to $\mathcal{O}(N+K)$). We not only theoretically prove the (approximate) correctness and security of ATASSES, but also empirically evaluate its efficiency against existing baselines. Particularly, when applying to a system with one thousand parties, ATASSES achieves a speedup of $3.83\times$ -- $15.4\times$ over baselines.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2024

Towards Understanding and Enhancing Security of Proof-of-Training for DNN Model Ownership Verification

The great economic values of deep neural networks (DNNs) urge AI enterprises to protect their intellectual property (IP) for these models. Recently, proof-of-training (PoT) has been proposed as a promising solution to DNN IP protection, through which AI enterprises can utilize the record of DNN training process as their ownership proof. To prevent attackers from forging ownership proof, a secure PoT scheme should be able to distinguish honest training records from those forged by attackers. Although existing PoT schemes provide various distinction criteria, these criteria are based on intuitions or observations. The effectiveness of these criteria lacks clear and comprehensive analysis, resulting in existing schemes initially deemed secure being swiftly compromised by simple ideas. In this paper, we make the first move to identify distinction criteria in the style of formal methods, so that their effectiveness can be explicitly demonstrated. Specifically, we conduct systematic modeling to cover a wide range of attacks and then theoretically analyze the distinctions between honest and forged training records. The analysis results not only induce a universal distinction criterion, but also provide detailed reasoning to demonstrate its effectiveness in defending against attacks covered by our model. Guided by the criterion, we propose a generic PoT construction that can be instantiated into concrete schemes. This construction sheds light on the realization that trajectory matching algorithms, previously employed in data distillation, possess significant advantages in PoT construction. Experimental results demonstrate that our scheme can resist attacks that have compromised existing PoT schemes, which corroborates its superiority in security.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2022

Generalized Lagrange Coded Computing: A Flexible Computation-Communication Tradeoff for Resilient, Secure, and Private Computation

We consider the problem of evaluating arbitrary multivariate polynomials over a massive dataset containing multiple inputs, on a distributed computing system with a master node and multiple worker nodes. Generalized Lagrange Coded Computing (GLCC) codes are proposed to simultaneously provide resiliency against stragglers who do not return computation results in time, security against adversarial workers who deliberately modify results for their benefit, and information-theoretic privacy of the dataset amidst possible collusion of workers. GLCC codes are constructed by first partitioning the dataset into multiple groups, then encoding the dataset using carefully designed interpolating polynomials, and sharing multiple encoded data points to each worker, such that interference computation results across groups can be eliminated at the master. Particularly, GLCC codes include the state-of-the-art Lagrange Coded Computing (LCC) codes as a special case, and exhibit a more flexible tradeoff between communication and computation overheads in optimizing system efficiency. Furthermore, we apply GLCC to distributed training of machine learning models, and demonstrate that GLCC codes achieve a speedup of up to $2.5\text{--}3.9\times$ over LCC codes in training time, across experiments for training image classifiers on different datasets, model architectures, and straggler patterns.

cs.IT↗