SearcharxivSearch

arXiv subjects

Yingchao Zhao

Publications and source records attributed to Yingchao Zhao.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Composite Resource Scheduling for Networked Control Systems

Real-time end-to-end task scheduling in networked control systems (NCSs) requires the joint consideration of both network and computing resources to guarantee the desired quality of service (QoS). This paper introduces a new model for composite resource scheduling (CRS) in real-time networked control systems, which considers a strict execution order of sensing, computing, and actuating segments based on the control loop of the target NCS. We prove that the general CRS problem is NP-hard and study two special cases of the CRS problem. The first case restricts the computing and actuating segments to have unit-size execution time while the second case assumes that both sensing and actuating segments have unit-size execution time. We propose an optimal algorithm to solve the first case by checking the intervals with 100% network resource utilization and modify the deadlines of the tasks within those intervals to prune the search. For the second case, we propose another optimal algorithm based on a novel backtracking strategy to check the time intervals with the network resource utilization larger than 100% and modify the timing parameters of tasks based on these intervals. For the general case, we design a greedy strategy to modify the timing parameters of both network segments and computing segments within the time intervals that have network and computing resource utilization larger than 100%, respectively. The correctness and effectiveness of the proposed algorithms are verified through extensive experiments.

cs.NI

Mechanism Design for Facility Location Games with Candidate Locations

We study the facility location games with candidate locations from a mechanism design perspective. Suppose there are n agents located in a metric space whose locations are their private information, and a group of candidate locations for building facilities. The authority plans to build some homogeneous facilities among these candidates to serve the agents, who bears a cost equal to the distance to the closest facility. The goal is to design mechanisms for minimizing the total/maximum cost among the agents. For the single-facility problem under the maximum-cost objective, we give a deterministic 3-approximation group strategy-proof mechanism, and prove that no deterministic (or randomized) strategy-proof mechanism can have an approximation ratio better than 3 (or 2). For the two-facility problem on a line, we give an anonymous deterministic group strategy-proof mechanism that is (2n-3)-approximation for the total-cost objective, and 3-approximation for the maximum-cost objective. We also provide (asymptotically) tight lower bounds on the approximation ratio.

cs.GT