SearcharxivSearch

arXiv subjects

Yingjie Xue

Publications and source records attributed to Yingjie Xue.

10 recordsLinked to original sources

JALMBench: Benchmarking Jailbreak Vulnerabilities in Audio Language Models

Large Audio Language Models (LALMs) have made significant progress. While increasingly deployed in real-world applications, LALMs face growing safety risks from jailbreak attacks that bypass safety alignment. However, there remains a lack of an adversarial audio dataset and a unified framework specifically designed to evaluate and compare jailbreak attacks against them. To address this gap, we introduce JALMBench, a comprehensive benchmark that assesses LALM safety against jailbreak attacks, comprising 11,316 text samples and 245,355 audio samples (>1,000 hours). JALMBench supports 12 mainstream LALMs, 8 attack methods (4 text-transferred and 4 audio-originated), and 5 defenses. We conduct in-depth analysis on attack efficiency, topic sensitivity, voice diversity, and model architecture. Additionally, we explore mitigation strategies for the attacks at both the prompt and response levels. Our systematic evaluation reveals that LALMs' safety is strongly influenced by modality and architectural choices: text-based safety alignment can partially transfer to audio inputs, and interleaved audio-text strategies enable more robust cross-modal generalization. Existing general-purpose moderation methods only slightly improve security, highlighting the need for defense methods specifically designed for LALMs. We hope our work can shed light on the design principles for building more robust LALMs.

cs.CR

Your Trust, Your Terms: A General Paradigm for Near-Instant Cross-Chain Transfer

Cross-chain transactions today remain slow, costly, and fragmented. Existing custodial exchanges expose users to counterparty and centralization risks, while non-custodial liquidity bridges suffer from capital inefficiency and slow settlement; critically, neither approach guarantees users a unilateral path to recover assets if the infrastructure fails. We introduce the Delegated Ownership Transfer (DOT) paradigm, which decouples key ownership from value ownership to enable secure, high-performance cross-chain payments. In DOT, a user deposits funds into a sandboxed on-chain Temporary Account (TA) (value ownership) while delegating its private key (key ownership) to an abstract Trusted Entity (TE). Payments and swaps are thus reframed as near-instant, off-chain ownership handoffs. Security follows from dual guarantees: the TE's exclusive control prevents double-spending, while a pre-signed, unilateral recovery transaction ensures users retain ultimate authority over their assets. Building on this foundation, we design a novel off-chain atomic swap that executes optimistically in near real time and remains fair even if the TE fails. We formalize the security of DOT in the Universal Composability framework and present two concrete instantiations: a high-performance design based on Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) and a cryptographically robust variant leveraging threshold cryptography. Our geo-distributed prototype shows that cross-chain payments complete in under 16.70 ms and atomic swaps in under 33.09 ms, with costs fully decoupled from Layer-1 gas fees. These results provide a practical blueprint for building secure, efficient, and interoperable cross-chain payment systems.

cs.CR

Cross-Chain Options: A Bridgeless, Universal, and Efficient Approach

Options are fundamental to blockchain-based financial services, offering essential tools for risk management and price speculation, which enhance liquidity, flexibility, and market efficiency in decentralized finance (DeFi). Despite the growing interest in options for blockchain-resident assets, such as cryptocurrencies, current option mechanisms face significant challenges, including a high reliance on trusted third parties, limited asset support, high trading delays, and the requirement for option holders to provide upfront collateral. In this paper, we present a protocol that addresses the aforementioned issues. Our protocol is the first to eliminate the need for holders to post collateral when establishing options in trustless service environments (i.e. without a cross-chain bridge), which is achieved by introducing a guarantee from the option writer. Its universality allows for cross-chain options involving nearly \textit{any} assets on \textit{any} two different blockchains, provided the chains' programming languages can enforce and execute the necessary contract logic. Another key innovation is reducing option position transfer latency, which uses Double-Authentication-Preventing Signatures (DAPS). Our evaluation demonstrates that the proposed scheme reduces option transfer latency to less than half of that in existing methods. Rigorous security analysis proves that our protocol achieves secure option trading, even when facing adversarial behaviors.

cs.CR

FairRelay: Fair and Cost-Efficient Peer-to-Peer Content Delivery through Payment Channel Networks

Peer-to-Peer (P2P) content delivery, known for scalability and resilience, offers a decentralized alternative to traditional centralized Content Delivery Networks (CDNs). A significant challenge in P2P content delivery remains: the fair compensation of relayers for their bandwidth contributions. Existing solutions employ blockchains for payment settlements, however, they are not practical due to high on-chain costs and over-simplified network assumptions. In this paper, we introduce FairRelay, a fair and cost-efficient protocol that ensures all participants get fair payoff in complex content delivery network settings. We introduce a novel primitive, Enforceable Accumulative Hashed TimeLock Contract (Enforceable A-HTLC), designed to guarantee payment atomicity - ensuring all participants receive their payments upon successful content delivery. The fairness of FairRelay is proved using the Universal Composability (UC) framework. Our evaluation demonstrates that, in optimistic scenarios, FairRelay employs zero on-chain costs. In pessimistic scenarios, the on-chain dispute costs for relayers and customers are constant, irrespective of the network complexity. Specifically, empirical results indicate that the on-chain dispute costs for relayers and customers are 24,902 gas (equivalent to 0.01 USD on Optimism L2) and 290,797 gas (0.07 USD), respectively. In a 10-hop relay path, FairRelay introduces less than 1.5% additional overhead compared to pure data transmission, showcasing the efficiency of FairRelay.

cs.CR

Invited Paper: Fault-tolerant and Expressive Cross-Chain Swaps

Cross-chain swaps enable exchange of different assets that reside on different blockchains. Several protocols have been proposed for atomic cross-chain swaps. However, those protocols are not fault-tolerant, in the sense that if any party deviates, no asset transfer can happen. In this paper, we propose two alternative protocols for structuring composable and robust cross-chain swaps. Participants can propose multiple swaps simultaneously and then complete a subset of those swaps according to their needs. Their needs are expressed as predicates which capture acceptable payoff of each participant. Our proposed protocols are thus more expressive due to the introduction of predicates. The proposed protocols are fault-tolerant since, even if some participants deviate, those predicates can still be satisfied, and conforming parties can complete an acceptable set of swaps.

cs.DC

Cross-Chain State Machine Replication

This paper considers the classical state machine replication (SMR) problem in a distributed system model inspired by cross-chain exchanges. We propose a novel SMR protocol adapted for this model. Each state machine transition takes $O(n)$ message delays, where $n$ is the number of active participants, of which any number may be Byzantine. This protocol makes novel use of path signatures to keep replicas consistent. This protocol design cleanly separates application logic from fault-tolerance, providing a systematic way to replace complex ad-hoc cross-chain protocols with a more principled approach.

cs.DC

Transferable Cross-Chain Options

An option is a financial agreement between two parties to trade two assets. One party is given the right, but not the obligation, to complete the swap before a specified termination time. In todays financial markets, an option is considered an asset which can itself be transferred: while an option is active, one party can sell its rights (or obligations) to another. Todays blockchains support simple options in the form of cross-chain atomic swap protocols where one party has the choice whether to complete the swap. The options implemented by these cross-chain protocols, are not, however, transferable. This paper proposes novel distributed protocols for transferable cross-chain options, where both option owners and providers can sell their positions to third parties. The protocol ensures that none of the parties can be cheated, that no unauthorized party can interfere, and that the transfer succeeds if the buyer and seller faithfully follow the protocol.

cs.CR

Distributed Runtime Verification of Metric Temporal Properties for Cross-Chain Protocols

Transactions involving multiple blockchains are implemented by cross-chain protocols. These protocols are based on smart contracts, programs that run on blockchains, executed by a network of computers. Because smart contracts can automatically transfer ownership of cryptocurrencies, electronic securities, and other valuable assets among untrusting parties, verifying the runtime correctness of smart contracts is a problem of compelling practical interest. Such verification is challenging since smart contract execution is time-sensitive, and the clocks on different blockchains may not be perfectly synchronized. This paper describes a method for runtime monitoring of blockchain executions. First, we propose a generalized runtime verification technique for verifying partially synchronous distributed computations for the metric temporal logic (MTL) by exploiting bounded-skew clock synchronization. Second, we introduce a progression-based formula rewriting scheme for monitoring \MTL specifications which employ SMT solving techniques and report experimental results.

cs.DC

Invited Paper: Failure is (literally) an Option: Atomic Commitment vs Optionality in Decentralized Finance

Many aspects of blockchain-based decentralized finance can be understood as an extension of classical distributed computing. In this paper, we trace the evolution of two interrelated notions: failure and fault-tolerance. In classical distributed computing, a failure to complete a multi-party protocol is typically attributed to hardware malfunctions. A fault-tolerant protocol is one that responds to such failures by rolling the system back to an earlier consistent state. In the presence of Byzantine failures, a failure may be the result of an attack, and a fault-tolerant protocol is one that ensures that attackers will be punished and victims compensated. In modern decentralized finance however, failure to complete a protocol can be considered a legitimate option, not a transgression. A fault-tolerant protocol is one that ensures that the party offering the option cannot renege, and the party purchasing the option provides fair compensation (in the form of a fee) to the offering party. We sketch the evolution of such protocols, starting with two-phase commit, and finishing with timed hashlocked smart contracts.

cs.DC

Hedging Against Sore Loser Attacks in Cross-Chain Transactions

A *sore loser attack* in cross-blockchain commerce rises when one party decides to halt participation partway through, leaving other parties' assets locked up for a long duration. Although vulnerability to sore loser attacks cannot be entirely eliminated, it can be reduced to an arbitrarily low level. This paper proposes new distributed protocols for hedging a range of cross-chain transactions in a synchronous communication model, such as two-party swaps, $n$-party swaps, brokered transactions, and auctions.

cs.CR